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ABSTRACT 
 
The Story of the Moral: 
On the Power of Literature to Define and Refine the Self 
Jeffrey B. Kobrin 
 
 
This study employs a hybrid research method.  My religious background has led me to 
find a great affinity for certain literary criticism, that which sees literature as a source for moral 
thinking and moral decision-making.  I offer a history of my transactions with texts, texts that 
were initially formative for me as a moral thinker, then useful for me in a variety of ways as a 
teacher of texts, then which I later began to appreciate in a more critical and theoretical way as I 
developed a deeper understanding of how those texts had influenced me and how they had – or 
had not – influenced my students.   
I borrow heavily from the theory and method of autoethnography in this study, in the 
sense that I will examine a variety of “internal data” from my memories of books, teachers, and 
classroom situations, along with “external data” including interviews, report cards, lecture notes 
and exam questions, and will subject my data to a number of critical lenses with the goal of what 
Anderson (2006) describes as a commitment to “an analytic research agenda focused on 
improving theoretical understandings of broader social phenomena” (375).  Using the lenses of 
the literary theory and criticism of Wayne Booth, Martha Nussbaum, Robert Coles and Aharon 
Lichtenstein, I will analyze my experiences as a reader and teacher, and I explain how literary 
works I read and taught can serve as vehicles for the development of a student’s moral sensibility 
– and how teachers can help facilitate that development.  I use my own unique vantage point, 
 
    
that of an Orthodox Jewish boy who initially found friends in secular texts, then found that those 
texts were among his great teachers of values, to offer a singular perspective on the power of 
these texts.  These lenses, which are (to mix metaphors a bit) filtered through my unique 
perspective, provide an interpretation that will at first lead me to explore the field of moral 
education as a whole, if only because I shared many of its desired outcomes in my literature 
classroom.  After a brief overview of this field, I use the work of Hanan Alexander, David 
Hansen, Carl Rogers, and others to present a more general yet nuanced account of how “spiritual 
awareness” and the humane fusing of reason and emotion can be fostered in students, with a 
flexibility and understanding that learning is a way to learn a process, not a process towards a 
specific set of intellectual goals.   
I humbly call this hybrid method a literary-auto-ethno-pedogography, as I seek to 
produce a critical history of my education as a reader and teacher of literature.  After an inquiry 
into my own reading and teaching to understand my own and my students’ development as moral 
decision makers; I then seek to expand the depth and quantity of moral conversations and bring 
them to the classrooms of others.  As such, my study includes ideas for how to bring about moral 
conversations in English classrooms, both through student writing and oral exchange, based on 
ideas from Sheridan Blau, Jeff Wilhelm, David Hansen, Barry Holtz, and others.  I conclude with 
the still unanswered questions that my study has raised for me and for other researchers who 
share my interest in the relations between secular and religious education and the problem of 
teaching literature to shape character and refine a reader’s moral sensibility. I also offer some 
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When I began this work, I came to it like Herbert Cohen, cited below in chapter eight.  I 
had an agenda to prove, and all I needed to find were the prooftexts with which to do so.  I 
wanted to honor and expand upon the work of my teacher, Rabbi Dr. Lichtenstein, and I knew 
from my own classroom experience that the idea of English literary texts as primers for moral 
education was as clear as day.  I often wondered, like the fifth grade Phantom Tollbooth-loving 
version of myself from Chapter four, why everyone else did not see it that way.  The first sources 
I encountered make up much of the opening chapters of this work.   
After beginning my research, encouraged at each stop along the way by a continually 
wise and ever-upbeat Sheridan Blau, I began to realize that there were actually excellent reasons 
that not everybody else saw things my way.  I became less like Cohen and more like Moshe 
Rosenberg, who also appears in chapter eight: I still saw the beauty in the morality of the 
literature, but no longer could assume it would leap out at others the way it did for me.  I would 
need to dig deeper.  I began to do so in earnest, but still sought a way to be able to discuss much 
of the theoretical work I had unearthed.  Janet Miller, over two wonderful semesters, introduced 
me to the world of ethnography and autoethnography and gave me the data set that had long 
eluded me: it had literally been with me all along.  The first three lenses and much of the 
structure of my analysis came from hours spent at the feet of the sage and patient Ruth Vinz as I 
began this work.  I am grateful to all of my teachers and classmates at Teachers College for all 
they have helped me on this path. 
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Rabbi Hanina, according to the Babylonian Talmud in Tractate Ta’anit, said that he had 
learned much from his teachers, more from his colleagues, from his students, “above all.”  I can 
attest to the truth of that observation.  My students every year – some of whose children I now 
teach – have continually been a source of knowledge and inspiration for me since my career 
began.  They have helped maintain my own changingness, and I owe them all an unpayable debt.  
The medieval commentator Rashi, Rabbi Solomon ben Isaac, explains that students must debate 
in front of their teacher in order for the teacher to truly learn from them.  The various respectful 
debates among my students, some of which Nell Noddings would no doubt characterize as 
“interpersonal reasoning,” have indeed been wonderful lessons for me.  
Since Blau would argue that I have not interpreted this Talmudic text without writing my 
own interpretation thereof, I must do so now.  Rabbi Hanina was a lifelong bachelor.  The 
Talmud elsewhere relates his family lineage and his profession but makes it clear that there never 
was a Mrs. Hanina.  I can only imagine, then, were he married, what Rabbi Hanina would have 
said about the lessons he had learned from his own family – those lessons no doubt would have 
been beyond “above all.”  My parents have been among my loudest cheerleaders and greatest 
supporters since they let me throw all the books on the floor – and they have not stopped 
supporting and encouraging.  I derive great strength from my four children, who are some of my 
finest teachers; and I have learned the most of all from my wife Michelle, who has given me the 





A Review of Myself 
 
I. The Odds, Defied 
The very existence of the work you now read defies the odds.  For reasons cultural, 
historical, sociological, and personal, the conflation of worlds that will be discussed in what 
follows should not have occurred.  Yet it has, and – as a result – here I am.  I am both an 
Orthodox rabbi and a doctoral student in the teaching of English literature.  That I – indeed, that 
anyone – could simultaneously inhabit both these roles may be a distinctively modern 
phenomenon, but I see myself uniquely situated to occupy them both, to straddle two disparate 
ideological worlds.  The perspective that my world-straddling has given me, I believe, offers a 
great deal of insight into what the literature classroom has been, currently is, and can ultimately 
be. 
Traditional Judaism has always been wary – not averse, necessarily, but wary – of 
learning ideas from sources that are not the Torah.  One of the earliest Rabbinic sources – and 
there are many – is the adage found in the Midrashic gloss on the book of Lamentations, Eichah 
Rabbah 2:13, which reads ןימאת ,םייוגב המכח שי םדא ךל רמאי םא, “if you are told there is wisdom 
among the [non-Jewish] nations, believe it,” an epigram which seems rather open-minded, until 
one reads its conclusion:ןימאת לא םייוגב הרות – “don’t believe there is Torah among the nations.”  
This complicated and classically terse text immediately begs a number of questions, perhaps the 
most basic of which is a definition of where “Torah” ends and where “wisdom” begins; and, 




Other sources are even less positive: for example, the Sifre, another Midrashic source and 
a gloss to Deuteronomy, cautions the student from thinking “I have learned the wisdom of Israel, 
so now I will go and learn the wisdom of other nations – hence the verse (Leviticus 18:4) says 
‘to walk among [the laws]’ and not get free of them…”1  The Talmud similarly records the query 
of one Ben Damah, who asked Rabbi Yishmael if he was allowed to study Greek wisdom, since 
he had already completed studying the whole of the Torah?  The response:  
he then read to him the verse ‘This book of the law shall not depart out of your 
mouth, but you shall meditate therein day and night’ [Joshua 1:8].  Go then and 
find a time that is neither day nor night and learn then Greek wisdom.2   
This text again begs for the clarification of term “Greek wisdom.”  We will soon get 
there.   
But first: Rabbi Eliezer in the Talmud3 is even stronger: “keep your children away from 
higayyon, and seat them in the laps of rabbinic scholars.”  The next twelve hundred years are 
spent arguing over the definition of the term higayyon and the ramifications of that definition.  
Like all good Talmudic arguments, this one spans generations and remains unresolved.  Does the 
term refer merely to logic, or does it extend to philosophy and beyond?4 
For many who identify as Orthodox Jews, there is little ambiguity here.  The twenty-four 
books of the Bible, commonly referred to as “the Torah” (although that term, confusingly, can 
also be used exclusively to refer to the five books of Moses), are together known as the  הרות
בתכבש, the “written law.”  The Talmud, its commentaries and thousands of pages that follow 
make up the הפ לעבש הרות, the “Oral law.”  Together, these two compendia are, for these students 
                                                          
1 Section 34.  See Blidstein 9-11. 
2 Menachot 99b. 
3 Berachot 28b. 
4 See Blidstein (1997), 23-24. 
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and teachers, the sources of all wisdom and knowledge.  As recently as this month (April 2018), 
New York State legislators argued over the government’s right to oversee the curricula of 
various right-wing yeshivot, a number of which, according to one source cited by Kate Taylor 
(2015) in the New York Times, offer no more than ninety minutes of secular studies four days per 
week.  These yeshivot do so out a belief that there is no need to look elsewhere for wisdom, and 
because they fear the potential negative influence of the secular sources. 
These schools ground their educational philosophy this in such rabbinic sources as those 
cited above, and others, such as the Mishnah in Sanhedrin 10:1, where, in the list of those who 
“have no share in the world to come,” Rabbi Akiva includes “one who reads the outside books.”  
Blidstein (1997) points out that both the term “outside books” needs to be carefully understood 
here (23).  The Palestinian Talmud explains that the books prohibited were only those 
specifically excluded from the Biblical canon, those which might otherwise claim Biblical status 
(which is a fairly narrow category: the Talmud occasionally quotes from such works as the book 
of Ben Sira and the book of Ben La’anah, both of which offer maxims akin to those from the 
canonized book of Proverbs).     
Blidstein (1997) also points out that Rabbi Akiva’s use of the term “reads” must be 
explained as well.  The Palestinian Talmud obliges once again and explains that while one may 
not study works that are not canon (and not prohibited), one may read them for entertainment: 
“hence casual reading of Homer is permissible but intensive study is forbidden” (22).  One could 
therefore allow for an hour and a half on Monday through Thursday of a smattering of 
mathematics, science, reading and writing, but no more.   
I am not a product of such yeshivot, nor have I worked in any of them.  Indeed, I knew of 
none of these issues until long after they had been resolved for me.  All I knew was that I loved 
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books, loved reading them, and found that they brought lessons to life for me in ways that 
nothing else could.  The vast majority of Orthodox Jews today hold by the standards of the 
yeshivas described in the Times: secular studies are seen as a necessary evil, one which must be 
undergone either to prepare graduates for navigating a secular world or because the secular 
government requires it. 
My background, however, while that of devout Orthodox Judaism, is what has been 
termed “Modern” or “Centrist” Orthodox.  Rabbi Saul Berman (2001) writes that one of the 
major differences between right-wing Orthodoxy and Modern Orthodoxy is that the latter 
assumes that “Orthodoxy can preserve its integrity and passion, and even be enriched, by its 
intersection with modernity, and that the interaction will allow Orthodoxy to bring to the broader 
world a clearer vision of the grandeur of Torah.”  Berman reminds the reader, though, that “this 
approach does not deny that there are areas of powerful inconsistency and conflict between 
Torah and modern culture that need to be filtered out in order to preserve the integrity of [Jewish 
law].”   
Berman goes on to describe nine key differentiators between Modern Orthodoxy and 
right-wing Orthodoxy.  The most pertinent for me in this context is number one, which reads in 
part that 
While the Torah is entirely true, human reason applied to the study of all of reality 
can also produce truth. We are required to engage with and study both Torah and 
other knowledge in order to properly achieve love and fear of God. We are 
permitted to study any aspect of human culture that enriches our intellectual, 
spiritual, or aesthetic identities. However, where the application of these studies 
might lead to behavior that conflicts with Torah, we must submit to the authority 
of Torah. Engagement in this struggle is positive and results in a responsible 
learning, thinking, and spiritually vibrant community.  
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Berman is one of my most cherished mentors, and his short piece quickly became a 
seminal document in the definition of the small percentage of Orthodox Judaism.  Having chosen 
the career of educator, I was buoyed in 2001 when I read this piece.  He noted that  
Modern Orthodoxy is a difficult path that requires constant attentiveness to the 
maintenance of Jewish wholeness in the face of the distraction of material excess…  It is a path 
that requires filtering out the degraded values of the low culture while welcoming and integrating 
the advances in knowledge and understanding being achieved in the high culture. It welcomes 
the opportunities created by modern society to be productive citizens engaged in the Divine work 
of transforming the world to benefit humanity. 
This was how I was raised – only at the start I had no idea that I was living a life that, as I 
noted at the outset, defied the odds.  Berman’s words resonated for me when I began my career 
as an English educator in earnest.  I began my classroom life as a teacher of Judaic texts, and the 
contrast between the two classroom experiences led me to a realization about the power of an 
English class over that of other classes and of the moral educative power of the curriculum.  I 
will return to this epiphany in detail in chapter four.  For now, let me go back to my own 
beginnings. 
It began for me with Virginia Lee Burton’s Mike Mulligan and His Steam Shovel (1939).  
This children’s book (about the heroism of Mike and his trusty steam shovel, Mary Anne) was 
the breakthrough text for me: it was the book with which I learned to read.  I have no memory of 
this seminal event.  My mother, however, vividly recalls it.  She remembers reading to me as an 
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This photograph is telling.  A happy ten- or eleventh-month-old smiles for the camera, 
surrounded by books.  He does not fear that the photographer (who is almost certainly Dad) will 
be angry.  Books are already seen as sources of entertainment, at least on the tactile level, and 
they are within arm’s reach and descend to the floor.   
My mother attests to my “squeals of delight” as she would read to me or as I recognized 
letters from the stroller before age two.  My father, for his part, recalls that my room was 
furnished with wall-to-wall book shelving (as clearly the living room in the photo was – and still 
is – as well).  The books ran the gamut from classical works of Jewish law to science fiction 
novels.  My father also recalls that in my childhood home “the budget for buying new books was 
not limited.”  My mother also recalls my early letter and word recognition and that crucial text of 
Mike Mulligan.   
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For my part, I recall always loving books in both their physicality and their content.  This 
picture was not staged.  I was not pulling out pans and pots: for me, it was books.  Indeed, I 
cannot remember actually learning how to read.  I remember learning how to whistle, how to 
multiply, even learning to distinguish my right from my left – and I also remember the time 
before I could whistle, multiply, and tell right from left.  But before reading?  I have no 
recollection.  My memory begins with text.   
I was and remain a voracious reader, which I come by honestly: both of my parents are 
still avid readers.  According to my mother, both she and my father read to me “constantly.”  To 
this day, the living room and master bedroom of their apartment are furnished what are literally 
floor-to-ceiling and wall-to-wall books in specially designed bookcases.  I read cereal boxes; I 
read my parents’ magazines (for Dad it was Natural History; for Mom, Parents and Good 
Housekeeping); I read the now-defunct “Metropolitan Diary” in The New York Times.  But I 
most enjoyed – and do still – reading stories.  I read classic fiction, historical fiction, science 
fiction, mysteries, and horror.  I would jump into stories with both feet, eager to get lost in them, 
and would emerge – to mix metaphors – dripping wet on the other side, exhilarated, often with a 
small pile of quickly-browning apple cores littering the ashtrays of my parents’ living room 
(that’s not a metaphor – I have always liked to eat while I read).  Like me, Mom and Dad were 
(and are) both voracious readers.  Dad has an appetite for history and for science fiction; he has 
been learning Talmud with the same study partner each week for nearly fifty years.  Mom leans 
more to the modern novel and non-fiction.  Her Hebrew language background is less strong than 
Dad’s, but she never misses opening a day with her siddur, her prayer book.   
George Steiner (1970) writes that “A great poem, a classic novel, press in upon us; they 
assail and occupy the strong places of our consciousness.  They exercise upon our imagination 
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and desires, upon our ambitions and most covert dreams, a strange, bruising mastery” (10).  I too 
have experienced this mastery, and while it has not bruised me, it has certainly left its birthmark 
upon me: I have been influenced, buoyed, and altered by the impressions books have made upon 
how I think, how I feel, and how I make decisions of a moral nature. 
Birkerts (cited in Tatar 2009) writes that for young readers, reading “throws wide the 
doors to inwardness, and nothing could be more important” (225).  My early reading opened 
those doors for me: I have found reading literature not only to be a deeply enjoyable emotional 
and intellectual experience, but also one that has had a deep impact in forming who I am and 
what I hold dear.  I did not realize that this formation was a happy coincidence of history and 
culture: what were the chances, after all, that a Jewish kid from the Upper West Side of 
Manhattan would approach literature with a grounding in certain non-negotiable religious values 
and practices?  Statistically, I was more likely either to come from an assimilated, nominally 
Jewish family, the type Calvin Trillin has so adeptly depicted, one with little observance of the 
Sabbath or Kosher laws, or from a strictly Orthodox family, one without a television set, little 
access to newspapers, and no interest in having their son exposed to external ideas. 
But that’s not what happened: rather, reading literature put me in touch with who I am 
inside.  Indeed, in my years as a beginning reader, what I read actually helped form the core of 
concepts and values that I brought to later reading experiences.  Reading allowed me to expand 
beyond the limits of my own experience, as Rosenblatt (1995) advises when she writes that “If 
the student’s structure of attitudes and ideas is built on too narrow a base of experience, he 
should be helped to gain broader and deeper insight through literature itself” (101).  Reading 
allowed me to have what Rosenblatt (1995) describes as the chance “to participate in another’s 
vision – to reap knowledge of the world, to fathom the resources of the human spirit, to gain 
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insights that will make his own life more comprehensible” (7).  This study will present what this 
meant and continues to mean for me, for my students, and for other readers as well.   
Many of the insights literature has afforded me as my “doors to inwardness” have opened 
relate directly to issues of right and wrong, just and unjust, fair and unfair – in short, issues of a 
moral nature.  In chapter two I will begin to define the very term “morality;” the term’s 
limitations and possibilities; and the concomitant issues that and discussion of “moral education” 
by necessity raises.  For now, suffice it to say that my own reading often made me identify with 
the characters whose stories I read, a process which in turn often made me evaluate the decisions 
that they made – and made me think whether I would have done the same. 
Blau (2003) notes that many readers and teachers today, despite all the turns and 
developments of the past century plus of educational theory, still follow the tradition of Leavis 
and Arnold: i.e., that of seeing “literary education as a source of psychological and moral 
wisdom and a humanizing bulwark against the crass materialism, ethical obtuseness, and 
intellectual crudity of contemporary commercial and political discourse” (201, fn 1).  In my own 
experience as a reader, student and teacher, I have found that the literature classroom has the 
potential to provide such wisdom and to serve as such a bulwark, both with texts that I found on 
my own as well as those that were assigned to me, as I will detail below. 
 
II. The Company of Friends 
Booth (1988), whose theory I will revisit in detail below in chapter four, writes of the 
books providing a type of friendship “that is not only pleasant or profitable, in some immediate 
way, but also good for me, good for its own sake.”  We seek such friendship, he continues, “for 
the sake of the friendly company itself – the living in friendship” (173, italics in original).   The 
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very books themselves serve as artifacts when I think of the “friends” I have made in books.  
This began even before I can remember, as the snapshot above indicates.  And I am a collector: 
of authors, of ideas, and of the physical books themselves.  I am proud that I still have every 
actual book I have ever been assigned in elementary school, high school, college, and graduate 
school.  A bookcase in my bedroom today (we are constantly seeking new ways and new places 
to store books in our home; I have often said that I am sorry that there’s no way to somehow 
shelve them on the ceiling) holds a shelf of the works of authors Herman Wouk, Michael 
Chabon, and Mark Helprin.  Another shelf holds some of my beloved Tintin comics and the 
collected works of John Steinbeck.  A third shelf holds books of Yiddish literature and poetry 
and the collected works of Yiddish linguist Michael Wex.  A fourth shelf contains books on life 
in New York city; another holds Mary Norris’s Between You and Me: Confessions of a Comma 
Queen, John Lithgow’s collection of poetry The Poet’s Corner, Peter Mendelsund’s What We 
See When We Read, Sven Birkerts’s The Gutenberg Elegies, Saint-Exupery’s The Little Prince, a 
paperback set of the five books of Moses in Hebrew, a number of collections of commentaries on 
the weekly Torah portion, David McCollough’s The American Spirit, and three short works by 
C. S. Lewis.  While the overall population of this bookcase skews more heavily Jewish (I noticed 
in retrospect, for example, that all the novelists listed here are Jewish), my taste still runs beyond, 
seeking out the “wisdom of the nations.”  And each of these books is more than two covers 
holding pages together: they are a friend, who when time allows, will be invited back for a visit.  
Sometimes, it seems, they invite themselves. 
Chang (2008) writes that human subjectivity is made up of two elements: “lived 
experience” and “perspectives on the ‘physical, political, and historical context of that 
experience’” (103).  By revisiting the memories associated with each book, I connect the 
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experience and the context with the physical artifacts that engendered them.  Interestingly, I can 
sometimes more readily recall when and where I first encountered a book than I can its contents 
or their meaning for me.  There is a visceral connection as well as an intellectual or emotional 
one.  However, I can also often recall the context in which I first encountered these works: in the 
case of school books, I recall a context related to the academic experience or the teacher who 
“made the introduction;” with those books I found on my own, I often remember the bookstore – 
if they came from a physical store – where I first made their acquaintance.  Comparing the 
physical artifact of the book with the data I derive from my memory is a significant part of my 
method in this study.  The data, whether books, other documents, or memories, are Chang’s 
“lived experience;” the analysis of that data will provide the perspectives on the contexts of those 
experiences.  The goal throughout this study is to understand my own experience as a reader, 
how it has impacted how I understand and define myself, and how it has altered my own moral 
development.  I will then attempt to apply that understanding to a model of how others’ reading 
of literature can similarly impact and influence their own definitions of self.   
My tour of this bookcase (just like my analysis of the snapshot above) provides an 
additional piece of what Chang (2008) terms “external data,” which complements and confirms 
the “internal data” provided by my memory (55).  The books are at once containers of content 
and of associations, and they are also artifacts that verify my memories, my emotions, and – as I 
will discuss in what follows – the decisions they helped me learn how to make. 
Indeed, Bruns (2011) writes of an aspect of the psychological factors at play as we read.  
She posits that we ideally read literature to “move beyond” ourselves, to enlarge our being, to 
heal the loneliness of the self and (here she cites C. S. Lewis) to “correct its provincialism.” (15).  
Bruns argues that narrative itself becomes what psychology terms a “transitional object” (30), 
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thereby allowing the reader to get lost in the experience of that object.  This in turn loosens the 
boundaries between the self and the other, allowing for what Bruns describes as a re-working of 
the self (39).  For me, the physical books themselves serve as “transitional objects,” carrying 
mental and emotional associations for me for many years.  This brief tour of but one out-of-the-
way bookshelf is a somewhat generalized example of such associations, of the creation of some 
of my “transitional objects.” 
I can readily pull an example off this shelf: one such “transitional object” is Saint-
Exupery’s The Little Prince (1943).  My strong emotional connection to this novel, one which 
my mother initially introduced to me at age eight or nine, allowed me to begin to imagine other 
literal and figurative worlds.  In Bruns’s terms, I “got lost” in Saint-Exupery’s narrative, and that 
wonderful feeling of getting lost has not faded, nor have my memories of the Prince, his beloved 
Rose and Fox.  The theoretical and critical lenses that I will shortly discuss, borrowing from the 
theoretical and methodological work of autoethnography to help balance the unreliability of 
memory-data, help me understand how I have come to learn decision making from such 
memories and emotional associations.   
Maxine Greene (1995) describes her own reading as “pursu[ing] my own adventures into 
meaning.”  She writes that reading narratives allowed her “to conceive patterns of being” and to 
“imagine being something more than I have come to be” (86-87).  What my books have given 
me is that possibility to “conceive patterns of being” in my own life.  My books then are the 
breadcrumbs from my own journey, each imprinted with meaning and emotional connection.  
Those books that have left little or no impression are far outnumbered by those with deeply 
ingrained associations.  These associations are as strong for the narratives of the books I have 
read as they are for the physical books themselves as well, which takes Bruns’s idea a step 
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further.  A number of bibliopoles that I know speak similarly of the books that they own.  We 
agree that the books have seemed “sad” when space limitations required them to remain boxed 
away; and we think of the unpacking of books after a move as a “reunion” with friends.  The 
1970 baby pulling books off the shelf loves those books (and loves pulling them off the shelves) 
as much today as he did back then. 
 
III. What I Hope to Provide 
The essential question of this study is why read, why study, and why teach literature?  
Great literature arguably had great aesthetic value, but has it any value beyond the aesthetic?  I 
argue that it does – a tremendous value.  Indeed, it may well be a modality of offering a way of 
processing the world – indeed, a way of living – that seems sorely lacking in this young twenty-
first century.  By sharing how literature has mattered to me, I hope to show how that mattering is 
important and illustrative for others, be they students or teachers of literature.   
This study employs a hybrid research method.  My religious background has led me to 
find a great affinity for certain literary criticism, namely that which sees literature as a source for 
moral thinking and moral decision-making.  Did I come to literature because of my roots or did 
my accidental predilection for reading only reinforce extant but latent ways of thinking?  I 
cannot at this moment unscramble that omelet.  I offer a history of my transactions with texts, 
texts that were initially formative for me as a moral thinker, then useful for me in a variety of 
ways as a teacher of texts, then which I later began to appreciate in a more critical and theoretical 
way as I developed a deeper understanding of how those texts had influenced me and how they 
had – or had not – influenced my students.   
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I borrow heavily from the theory and method of autoethnography in this study, in the 
sense that I will examine a variety of “internal data” from my memories of books, teachers, and 
classroom situations, along with “external data” including interviews, report cards, lecture notes 
and exam questions, and will subject my data to a number of critical lenses with the goal of what 
Anderson (2006) describes as a commitment to “an analytic research agenda focused on 
improving theoretical understandings of broader social phenomena” (375).  Using the lenses of 
the literary theory and criticism of Wayne Booth, Martha Nussbaum, Robert Coles and Aharon 
Lichtenstein, I will analyze my experiences as a reader and teacher, and I explain how literary 
works I read and taught can serve as vehicles for the development of a student’s moral sensibility 
– and how teachers can help facilitate that development.  I use my own unique vantage point, 
that of an Orthodox Jewish boy who initially found friends in secular texts, then found that those 
texts were among his great teachers of values, to offer a singular perspective on the power of 
these texts.  These lenses, which are (to mix metaphors a bit) filtered through my unique 
perspective, provide an interpretation that will at first lead me to explore the field of moral 
education as a whole, if only because I shared many of its desired outcomes in my literature 
classroom.  After a brief overview of this field, I use the work of Hanan Alexander, David 
Hansen, Carl Rogers, Jeffrey Kress and others to present a more general yet nuanced account of 
how “spiritual awareness” and the humane fusing of reason and emotion can be fostered in 
students, with a flexibility and understanding that learning is a way to learn a process, not a 
process towards a specific set of intellectual goals.   
I would humbly call this hybrid method a literary-auto-ethno-pedogography, as I seek to 
produce a critical history of my education as a reader and teacher of literature.  My inquiry into 
my own reading and teaching has led me to understand my own and my students’ development 
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as moral decision makers; my next step is to expand the depth and quantity of moral 
conversations and bring them to the classrooms of others.  As such, my study includes ideas for 
how to bring about moral conversations in English classrooms, both through student writing and 
oral exchange, based on ideas from Sheridan Blau, Jeff Wilhelm, David Hansen, and others.  I 
conclude with the still unanswered questions that my study has raised for me and for other 
researchers who share my interest in the relations between secular and religious education and 
the problem of teaching literature to shape character and refine a reader’s moral sensibility. I also 
offer some concluding suggestions about how future students and teachers might build on and 







A Review of Literature  
 
I. Transacting through Four Lenses 
So how to proceed in my recounting of self and analysis thereof?  The unique nature of 
my situation demands a unique methodology, as discussed in the previous chapter.  This chapter 
will address a number of issues that arose as I conducted my research.  I first develop a theory of 
a moral classroom.  Then, even though my theoretical model is not one of “moral education,” I 
will provide a review of the field of moral education and the critiques of this field, since all 
discussions of moral classrooms can only be held against the backdrop of this field.  In the 
chapter that follows, I will address issues that the use of memory as data have raised, and I will 
discuss what elements of the field of autoethnography I seek to utilize in my study. 
This study is more than sentimental musings on half-remembered encounters with literary 
works; while such a work might be an enjoyable read (and would be something enjoyable to 
write), I have developed a more rigorous method.  Using Rosenblatt’s transactional theory as a 
baseline, I align her thinking with the critical lenses offered by several other theorists, thinkers 
whose approaches to literature dovetail not only with Rosenblatt’s understanding of the 
relationship between reader and text, but also of my own sensibilities of the impact literature has 
had on me and what I have seen it have on my own students.   
My theoretical research has led me to formulate four initial fundamental methods of 
transaction, for myself as a reader and as a teacher of readers.  These distinct approaches overlap 
in their understanding of the moral educative power of literature – after all, that’s not only my 
agenda, but one that I hope to show has a rich history in English education and can have one 
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today and in the future as well – but each offers a different model of how the transaction occurs 
for the reader.  Each approach is a distinct lens, I argue, through which to view the literature 
discussed.  I will briefly introduce each lens in this chapter, and I will expand on each in the four 
chapters that follow.  
The first lens comes from Wayne Booth, whose work leads me to think about the role 
that fiction plays in establishing “what-if” propositions in the mind of the reader (in this case, my 
own emerging reader’s mind) and how the reader’s impressions are then refined through 
comparison with those of other readers.  By taking on, as Booth (1988) describes, the mind of a 
book’s characters (139), seeing a book’s “implied author” (185), or both, what moral choices did 
I make as a reader – and what moral choices do I hope my students will make?  I will offer 
examples of my own connections to texts both assigned in academic contexts and freely chosen 
and of the connections I wanted my students to make (sometimes, I realize in hindsight, 
inappropriately) with texts that I taught.  Booth (1995) writes that he hopes for modern-day 
students “who engage fully in thinking about their emotional responses, moving toward deeper 
self-knowledge” and for teachers “who will educate students to resist passive absorption and 
develop active transaction” (xiii).  Booth addresses emotional transactions; in my own reading 
and my own teaching, through the model of the “what-if” proposition, I have experienced what I 
would call “moral transactions” as well and will detail and analyze them in chapter four.   
The second lens is rooted in the work of philosopher Martha Nussbaum, who writes 
(1995) of the power of literature to create a “judicious spectator,” i.e., a reader whose vicarious 
experience of reading of those in need brings him or her to go “beyond empathy” to a place 
where her or she is able to evaluate a character’s situation and decisions with healthy 
detachment.  A “judicious” reader ought to assess “the meaning of those sufferings and their 
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implications for the lives involved” (90).  But a reader should not get carried away; he or she 
should ideally reach what Nussbaum (2010) calls “literary neutrality,” which “like the reading of 
a novel, gets close to the people and their actual experience.  That is how it is able to be fair and 
to perform its own detached evaluation correctly” (90).  I often, but not always, achieved such a 
balance: at times I could care less about the characters and their situations, and at times I could 
not separate myself from identifying with them.  As a teacher, I was frustrated when I did not see 
evidence of my students’ empathic connection with the texts we read, but, as I will explain in 
what follows, I may not have been realistic in my goals. 
I will examine a number of vicarious experiences that I underwent as a reader, identifying 
instances of gains in empathy (which is admittedly difficult to quantify) as well as attempts to 
bring about similar gains in my own students.  I wanted them to care, which, as it turns out, was 
part of the zeitgeist at the time.  One of the “Six Pillars of Character” cited by Smagorinsky and 
Taxel (2010) as a foundation of the late 1990s / early 2000s federal call by the Office of 
Educational Research and Improvement (OERI) for character curriculum is “Caring,” which asks 
people to “Be kind; Be compassionate and show you care; Express gratitude; Forgive others; 
Help people in need” (143).  This was a character trait that I wanted (and still want) my students 
to have, and one that I hope I myself possess.  
Nussbaum (2010) describes a system of education wherein students learn a “relation to 
the world, mediated by correct facts and respectful curiosity” (81).  She lauds Dewey’s 
Laboratory School for helping children to be “more lively, more focused than when they are 
passive recipients,” adding that what Dewey “disliked was abstract learning uncoupled from 
human life” (86).  In my own reading of and transactions with texts I have always seen myself in 
the character’s shoes.  When teaching students, I tried to have them transact similarly by 
19 
 
bringing in real-world applications of values discussed in the texts we read and by applying those 
values.  I wish to mediate Rosenblatt’s (1995) concern that the student will “consider literature 
something academic, remote from his own present concerns and needs” (59).  Rosenblatt’s 
antidote is to attempt to enable the student to make both an intellectual and emotional connection 
to the text (72).  The texts to which I have most deeply connected and from which I have grown 
morally are those about which I both think and feel something.  I have hoped to foster similar 
depth of feeling and thought same in my students, and I will offer examples and analysis in 
chapter five. 
The third lens finds its source in the thinking of child psychiatrist and educational theorist 
Robert Coles.  Coles (1989) describes one of his former Harvard students, who went on “book 
binges” instead of drinking (134) when he felt sad about the “hollow” nature of his work as a 
corporate attorney (133).  For this student, Harold, “the library was a sanctuary, a place of moral 
refuge” (135).  Coles sees books as moral instructors, or what he variously calls “signposts” (68), 
“challenges to conscience” (81), and “kinsmen, kinswomen, comrades, advisers” (158).  In 
contrast with – or perhaps in support of – such a lens, Rosenblatt (1995) writes that books can 
offer the reader “an objective presentation of our own problems” (40).  In chapter six, I will offer 
examples of my experience of books as instructors.  I will detail the problems and solutions, the 
questions and answers, the back and forth, that my transactions with the texts presented to me.  I 
will then analyze when and how I also sought to use the texts I taught as instructors, finding 
moments of what I see as success and moments of great failure as well, for both students and 
teacher. 
The fourth lens can be most properly introduced after the first three have been fully 
explicated, so I beg the reader’s indulgence until we arrive at chapter seven.  Suffice it to say 
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while Booth, Nussbaum and Coles each offer distinct perspectives on the morally educative 
transactions I experienced and sought for my students, the fourth lens – that of Rabbi Dr. Aharon 
Lichtenstein – offers the perspective I found lacking based on my own unique vantage point as a 
Modern Orthodox reader and English teacher. 
I seek to create, as I will discuss below in chapter seven, what Ely, Vinz et al describe as 
a “third space,” one which “engenders various contextualizations of the data in order to yield 
different avenues of insight with the purpose of challenging, mixing, testing, and ultimately 
transgressing what the researcher or reader ‘knows’ (40).  I see this “third space” as one wherein 
the worlds of literary transaction and moral thinking intersect.  A space which, as Ely, Vinz, et 
al, describe, makes meaning for me and will allow me “to communicate that meaning with 
people in order to involve them in thinking about and living [my] research experiences” (61).  
What follows below are steps necessary for creating such a conceptual space.  Before those 
steps, however, and prior to delving into the perspective offered by each lens, though, I will 
introduce the theoretical model I have developed. 
 
II. Promoting Morality and Intelligent Spirituality through Literature and 
Education 
The best understanding for a teaching of “morality” is rooted in the thought of Hanan 
Alexander (2001), who focuses in no small part on the idea that such a curriculum buttresses 
democratic values.  He argues that what he terms a “spiritual” curriculum is necessary because in 
a democratic society, leaders are “spiritual educators,” and every citizen in such a society has the 
potential to become a leader “when they accept the responsibilities of self-control and self-
governance and when they teach by example.  Every democratic citizen is a potential spiritual 
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educator” (200, italics in original).  Alexander is a proponent of what he terms “intelligent 
spirituality,” and defines the democratic society as one that values “intelligence – critical 
judgment, freedom, and fallibility.”  Such a society will require what he terms “spiritual” – not 
religious – education.  If we wish to develop leaders and followers who uphold the values of 
democracy, open-mindedness, critical thinking and meaningful discourse, then we must refine 
the way we are training those leaders and followers.   
Alexander defines spirituality as “living according to a vision of the good,” a definition 
which resonates for me, as it does not fall into Haidt’s (2012) trap of “parochialism” in too 
narrowly defining morality, an issue discussed below in section IV.  Alexander notes that there is 
a “reciprocal relationship between spirituality… and education.”  Education thus “also needs to 
be grounded in a spiritual vision so that it, too, can be meaningful” (xi).  Such an education is 
vital for individuals and society as a whole.  This educational approach incorporates both a 
concern for individuals as well as “sociocentric” concerns.  Such qualities ideally produce a 
society where all are both “self-critical” and able to “sit in self-judgment,” in the words of 
Garrod and Bramble (1977), who believe that “every individual must learn to become an 
autonomous decision-maker” (105).    
  Alexander (2004) writes that “spiritual interest” has grown due to “the sense that 
schools and other contemporary educational institutions have lost their moral compass” (viii).  
He bemoans the artificial schism between knowledge on the one side and religion and ethics on 
the other, and feels that the relegation of spiritual values to home or places of worship, and their 
exclusion from “the public spheres of work or politics” (which includes most schools in the 
United States) is an unnecessary and ultimately detrimental outgrowth of the Enlightenment 
politics that have influenced our current system of education (viii).  I will return to Alexander – 
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whose definition of spirituality is somewhat different that than of Moffett (1994) – later in my 
discussion of Lichtenstein, in chapter seven.  
In prior eras, such values were inculcated in the church (or, in my case, in the 
synagogue).  Such moral conversation has moved to the school as fewer families maintain the 
level of religious practice that once held.  Here we see a continuation of a concern that goes back 
as far as the nineteenth century, when Matthew Arnold (as we will see in chapter seven), 
believed that “morals” and religious values were growing “tiresome” to his Victorian 
contemporaries and that and that literature could take up that baton.  He writes (1865) that 
“poetry is at bottom a criticism of life; that the greatness of a poet lies in his powerful and 
beautiful application of ideas to life, – to the question: How to live” (353).  Arnold’s view of the 
morally educative function of literature held great sway over the nascent curriculum of English 
in the Victorian Age: Applebee (1974) writes that Arnold thought that an education based on 
literary texts “…could be the source of a new principle of authority to replace the eroding bonds 
of class and of religion” (23).   Applebee also cites Arnold’s contemporary, Horace Scudder, 
who writes that “the place of literature ‘is in spiritualizing life, letting light into the mind, 
inspiring and feeding the higher forces of human nature’” (24).  G. Stanley Hall, another late 
nineteenth-century educator mentioned by Applebee, also “stressed the place of literature in 
moral development” (57).  I see these various labels so overlapping as to be practically 
synonymous, even though many of these terms carry different theoretical baggage. 
Indeed, a similar conception of the aim of education more broadly (as distinct from a 
specifically literary education) reappears in the late twentieth century not merely in the work of 
Alexander, but in the thought of Moffett (1994), who writes of the power of his “universal 
schoolhouse” model which “requires developing all levels of one’s being toward self-realization 
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and self-transcendence.”   For Moffett (and for me), “Spiritual education centers on personal 
growth” (58).  Moffett further adds that in addition to his model redeeming what he sees as the 
lost American “prosperity and democracy,” that “personal development may also be the main 
purpose of life” (330).   Carl Rogers (1995) lists a number of qualities of the “person of 
tomorrow,” which include “a yearning for the spiritual.”  Such people, explains Rogers, “wish to 
find a meaning and purpose in life that is greater than the individual.  The wish to live a life of 
inner peace… Sometimes, in altered states of consciousness, they experience the unity and 
harmony of the universe” (352).  These are lofty levels of engagement indeed.  Many of them, I 
contend, along with my Victorian predecessors, can come from the reading of literature. 
All of which then brings us to Booth who in the Arnoldian tradition, emphasized the 
ethical and implicitly moral dimension of literary experiences as well as the social and dialogical 
character of our education through literature, locating our ethical and moral thinking about 
literary texts in our transactions with other readers.  Booth, who I will examine in detail below, 
explains (1988) that as readers we neither deduce nor induce our appraisal of a text from any 
other sources, but rather “It is always the result of a direct sense that something now before us 
has yielded an experience that we find comparatively desirable, loveable, or, on the other hand, 
comparatively repugnant, contemptible or hateful” (71).  We have an almost visceral reaction to 
what we read.  As we will soon see, for Booth there is a second step as well: the impression that 
we form of literature and the lesson that we learn or we reject occurs through the vehicle of 
conversations among readers.  Nussbaum (1995) is perhaps the most influential of contemporary 
theorists in the Arnoldian tradition, defending “the literary imagination precisely because it 
seems… an essential ingredient of an ethical stance that asks us to concern ourselves with the 
good of other people whose lives are distant from our own” (xvi).  Literature has by theorists 
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both older and more recent been seen as a primer for thoughtful moral, spiritual decision-making.  
I will return to these concepts in fuller depth in chapters seven and eight. 
 
III. Mapping the Conceptual Terrain of Moral Education  
Before beginning this study in earnest, I must discuss the concepts inherent in a 
discussion of “moral education.”  Even though my model is in no way a proposal for a 
curriculum of “moral education” or “morality,” any analysis of “moral” anything in the 
classroom must be conducted against the backdrop of the last fifty years of such curricula: the 
shadow that these curricula cast, with ramifications both positive and negative, is far too 
influential both programmatically and nominally.  
I begin with the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, whose thought dominates the field since the 
1960s.  Kohlberg (1968) writes that a “child is born with very little patterning of personality or 
of mind.”  Therefore, he continues, “it is possible to teach a child almost any behavior pattern, 
provided one teaches in terms of the laws of association learning and provided one starts at an 
early age before competing response patterns have been learned” (1020).  Kohlberg (1977) posits 
that students can be led through six developmental stages of moral development, which are 
summarized as  
[1] The punishment-and-obedience orientation; 
[2] The instrumental-relativist orientation; 
[3] The interpersonal concordance or ‘good boy – nice girl’ orientation; 
[4] The “law and order” orientation;  
[5] The social-contract, legalistic orientation; and  
[6] The universal-ethical-principle orientation (54-55).   
25 
 
Kohlberg (1980a) is careful to reject traditional “notions of stages” as connected to a 
“conception of natural biological growth and unfolding.”  Rather, the stages he advocates are 
based in a “cognitive-developmental ‘theory of moralization,’” which, while it does attempt “to 
explain universals and natural trends in development,” also “specifies the kind of environmental 
conditions necessary to formulate moral development” (37 – 38).  He further explains (1977) that 
the six stages are each an “organized syste[m] of thought;” their order represents “an invariant 
sequence,” wherein “movement in always forward, never backward” (barring any trauma); and 
each stage includes the prior ones in what he calls “hierarchical integrations” (54). 
Kohlberg (1966) turns the goal of educators who wish to inculcate morals away from 
“administrative convenience or state-defined values,” and urges a focus on “the stimulation of 
the development of the individual child’s moral judgement and character as a goal of moral 
education” (19).   Indeed, Lickona (1991) remarks that “Kohlberg’s first contribution was to call 
attention to the child as a moral thinker” (239).   In Kohlberg’s (1980) classroom, students 
respond to moral “dilemmas” which are presented by the teacher.  The ensuing discussion allows 
the students to formulate and refine their moral values as individuals and as a group.  His 
approach “unites philosophic and psychological considerations,” fosters moral change with 
methods that have “long-range efficacy,” and is “in accord with a constitutional system 
guaranteeing freedom of belief” (17).   
Another important facet of his approach is the focus on what he terms the “hidden 
curriculum,” or “the fact that teachers and schools are engaged in moral education without 
explicitly and philosophically discussing or formulating its goals and methods” (23).  In other 
words, for Kohlberg, schools are already often conducting moral education: he simply formalizes 
that work and offers a framework for a more productive teaching of the goals already in place.  
26 
 
While Kohlberg’s approach is remarkable and revolutionary, it has some serious limitations as 
well. 
The questions raised against Kohlberg vary in intensity and vehemence.  Smagorinsky 
and Taxel (2010) cite Gilligan’s famous dispute of Kohlberg’s all-male sample.  In 1983, 
Gilligan replicates his methods with women, finding that “because of their communication 
orientation they typically did not reach Kohlberg’s highest levels of morality, which privileged 
an individual’s abstractions of laws at the expense of a more relational contextualization of 
issues.”  Kohlberg’s sample thus “did not correspond to the population as a whole” (29).  Wilson 
(1980) further argues against Kohlberg’s data, noting that since the very concept of morality is 
difficult to define and cannot be objective, as it will by definition vary from society to society 
(217).  Wilson argues that the language used by children responding to researchers when they 
explain their moral reasoning is by nature indeterminate.  For example, when a child answers the 
question of “why is a particular act wrong to do?” with a sentence beginning “Because…,” the 
child’s answer may have several meanings: 
The child may understand (i) what other people think or say is wrong… (ii) what 
other people actually avoid doing is wrong; … (iv) what he actually avoids doing 
is wrong; (v) what he thinks he himself ought not to do is wrong… (221, italics in 
original). 
Since it is neigh impossible to fully comprehend and quantify subject results, Wilson 
says, Kohlberg’s data is flawed. 
 Other criticism of Kohlberg is more philosophical than it is scientific.  Wallwork 
(1980) writes that “it is safe to conclude from public discourse and the testimony of social 
scientists that most Americans believe morality to be dependent on religion, in some sense” 
(272).  In a post-Victorian world without faith at its center (as it was in prior eras), this is a 
challenge, especially for a teacher of general studies like me who would like to bring moral 
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conversations into the English classroom.  Another philosophical critique is offered by Haidt 
(2012), who rejects Kohlberg as too biased towards what he terms WEIRD (Western, educated, 
industrialized, rich and democratic5) (112), writing that “If you see a world full of individuals, 
then you’ll want the morality of Kohlberg… a morality that protects those individuals and their 
individual rights.  You’ll emphasize concerns about harm and fairness” (114). 
Kohlberg’s attempts to create a curriculum in moral education are thus not without their 
share of controversy.  While educators seem to consistently and strongly feel the need to teach 
some type of curriculum in moral education, they seem to be equally consistent and strong in 
their opinions as to what model of such a curriculum, whether Kohlberg’s or another, is correct.   
Haidt (2012) argues for a vastly different model of moral development than that of 
Kohlberg.  Haidt criticizes Kohlberg and other moral philosophers of his generation, saying what 
they “were really doing was fabricating justifications after ‘consulting the emotive centers’ of 
their own brains” (38).  In the words of neuroscientist Gary Marcus, Haidt argues for a certain 
innateness to human morality.  We are born with “a first draft, which experience then revises.”  
What Haidt calls the “righteous mind” is thus “’organized in advance of experience’” and 
“revised during childhood to produce the diversity of moralities that we find across cultures – 
and across the political spectrum” (153). 
Haidt resonated for me as I reflect on my own moral development and how ideas that 
made complete sense to me at earlier points in my life now seem provincial, limited, and even 
prejudiced.  Stories have been the key to developing many of these ideas and opinions.  This 
development has taken place internally: therefore, I cannot claim to have seen it take place in any 
                                                          
5 Based on the work of Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan (2010) 
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of my students.  I am ever hopeful – based on my own experience – that it has happened for them 
the way that it happened for me. 
Haidt cites Darwin, who writes that our sense of morality, our conscience, is a “highly 
complex sentiment.”  It begins in “social instincts,” relies on how others approve of our acts and 
speech, and “rules by reason, self-interest, and in later times by deep religious feelings, and 
confirmed by instruction and habit” (226).  What I explore in this autobiographical project, using 
the four critical lenses detailed below, is how some of that evolution took place in my own mind, 
and how I hope to help it takes place in the minds of those I teach. 
Indeed, the very act of writing this study has enabled an articulation of my own self-
narrative, which describes me as a person who has been helped and whose ability to make moral 
judgments has developed immensely by reading literature.  When I fold in my background of 
Orthodox Judaism and its concomitant baggage, then consider the phenomenon of Modern 
Orthodoxy’s openness to wisdom which comes from outside the world of Torah, I realize how 
unique such a position is for someone like me.  I realize not only a desire to define my interests 
and predilections, that I have a strong desire to help others grow and develop similarly, whether 
they share my background or not.  Hansen (2001) writes that “teaching entails a moral, not just 
academic, relation between teacher and student” (10).  This describes the type of connection I 
seek to foster with my students.  Kruger Levingston (2009), in a study of overt and implicit 
moral education in both public and private school settings, notes that how the teacher treats both 
the subject matter and the student reflect the quality of this moral relationship (101).   
Kruger Levingston explains that the messages from the teacher are twofold: first, a 
teacher can demonstrate moral values when relating to students as people, such as when a teacher 
expresses concern over a student’s health when she is absent, which models caring for other 
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students (4); secondly, the very curricular and pedagogic choices that the teacher makes can help 
students hone their own morality: when commenting on classroom methodology, Kruger 
Levingston notes that moral questions offered by the teacher can “lead students to consider 
weighty issues that could have an impact on their own understanding of friendship, love, hate, 
conflict, and peace” (117).  Kress (2012) cautions Jewish educators not to falsely distinguish 
between influencing their students’ “heads” and ignoring their “hearts.”  The assumption that one 
can differentiate between the “cognitive” and the “socioaffective aspects” of education may well 
be false.  “Cognitive appraisal,” writes Kress, citing Eric Jensen’s work, “can shape an emotional 
experience” (25).  Citing Kress and Elias (2008), Kress adds that “Jewish education aims to toch 
cognition, affect and behavior,” or, in other words, “to build Jewish identity” (29).  This agenda 
definitely influenced my own as an English teacher, a role I will discuss in chapters four and 
five. 
Probst (1988) identifies five kinds of knowledge that can be gained from literature: 
“knowledge of the self, knowledge of others, knowledge of texts, knowledge of contexts, and 
knowledge of processes (of making meaning)” (27).  These for me are vital categories, and ones 
that speak to the reader’s moral development.  A reader must know him or herself and know 
others in order to make meaning of his or her life and his or her interactions with others. Probst’s 
categories of “knowledge of self” and “’knowledge of others,” however, are subtle when 
compared to categories such as “self-discipline” or “best effort” that are coined by right-wing 
educational theorists Lickona and Davidson (2005) under the overarching label of what they 
term “Performance Character” (18, also cited in Kruger Levingston 117).  These “character 
strengths,” write Lickona and Davidson, “enable us to pursue our personal best – whether the 
outcome is realized or not” (18).  Lickona and others of his political and philosophical bent seek 
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to inculcate specific moral values through what Smagorinsky and Taxel (2010) call “didactic” 
character education, one in which the “power of adults and cultural icons is central,” where 
“adults have unassailable authority in providing direction to young people’s moral development” 
(43).  While, as I will explain, I may not agree with many of Lickona and Davidson’s politics 
and educational goals, their categories do resonate for me, and are as desirable for me to help my 
students create as are those of Probst.  I want students to have knowledge of self, but I also want 
them to strive to be straightforward and honest in their interactions with others and to be 
hardworking and committed in their work ethic.  Suggestions for how to help students attain 
these goals are the substance of chapter eight.   
I saw and continue to see the need to bring Probst’s categories as well as (a tempered 
version of) Lickona’s into the curriculum.  Buckley and Erricker (2004) identify a modern-day 
psychological and emotional issue, writing that “young people are existing [sic] without 
metanarrative.  There is no coherent ‘story’ that tells them how they should live… They have 
choice, and who tells them how to choose? (182).  The missing “metanarrative,” for Buckley and 
Erricker, is that of what moral decisions to make – and how best to make them.  In a world with 
a wide variety of options, young students are told and feel pressure to make wise decisions, but 
they are not consistently taught how to do so.  Such confusion strongly argues for constructing a 
curriculum that helps students learn values and how and when to apply them into effect.    
As I alluded to, much of the recent pressure for curricular instruction of fixed, specific 
moral values comes from the political right.  In his summary of the “case for values education,” 
Lickona (1991) writes that “Transmitting values is and always has been the work of civilization,” 
adding that “[t]he great questions facing both the individual person and the human race are moral 
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questions.”  Lickona sees the issue as a vital missing piece in the reform of the educational 
system, writing that 
[t]he school’s role as moral educator becomes even more vital at a time when 
millions of children get little moral teaching from their parents and where value-
centered influences such as church or temple are also absent from their lives. 
Although I disagree with Lickona’s conclusions, some of his complaint rings true.  
Indeed, Lickona sees moral education as an overarching need – and void – in schools for a 
number of reasons.  Commitment to moral education is essential “to attract and keep good 
teachers,” who should be encouraged that “values education is a doable job” (20 -22).   I am not 
as panicked as Lickona: Smagorinsky and Taxel (2010) sanguinely point out that although 
Lickona and others see the current state of affairs as a “crisis,” pointing to “the breakdown of the 
family, an epidemic of violence, the deterioration of civility, rampant greed… dishonesty at all 
levels of society, a rising tide of sleaze in the media,” among other problems (20), such worry is 
not unique to the twenty-first century.  Smagorinsky and Taxel (2010) argue that not only is the 
“for-character approach to education… older than written history,” but that, according to James 
Davidson Hunter, “every U.S. generation for at least the past two centuries has believed its youth 
to be in a state of crisis” and in need of “moral development” (23).  
Smagorinsky and Taxel (2010) describe the spectrum of discourses of recent State 
curricula from across the Unites States seeking to address character education.  The authors write 
that the Southern States they studied tend to “position adults and the young in authoritarian 
relationships,” wherein “moral adults guide individual students toward virtuous behavior of the 
sort long lost in our increasingly coarse and vulgar society” (122).   The approach is “primarily 
didactic” (122), based on a yearning for the “good old days” (74) when morals were more 
universally shared, and morals are, for many conservatives, “the province of the Almighty, rather 
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than a mortal construction” (34).  The Midwestern States studied, on the other hand, “rely on a 
set of discourses that emphasizes a communitarian set of relationships,” with adults both 
modeling behavior for the young as well as engaging in “reciprocal exchanges,” with “the 
community” at the “locus of attention.”  The Midwestern States felt that students need to 
understand the plurality of perspectives of community members (122), and many of the 
Midwesterners believe that “truth, rather than being absolute, is constructed by individuals based 
on their experience with what life offers them” (34).  (My own partialities, as I will discuss in the 
following section, fall out somewhere in between.)   
Since the very source of morality is itself an agenda in the Culture Wars, defining the 
term “morality” becomes slippery as well.  Haidt (2012) notes that there is a challenge inherent 
in choosing which values are “moral,” noting that “[a]ny effort to define morality by designating 
a few issues as the truly moral ones and dismissing the rest as ‘social convention’ is bound to be 
parochial” (315). 
Thus, despite a number of diverse thinkers acknowledging its importance, the definition 
of “morality” remains elusive.  Still, I stubbornly seek to inculcate values in my students that are 
not only related to the rights of the individual, but which can be categorized under what Haidt 
(2012) calls “sociocentric morality,” which places the “needs of groups and institutions first, 
often ahead of the needs of individuals” (114).  The traditional Jewish values of community and 
of mutual responsibility with which I myself have been inculcated inform my own set of values, 
and as a student and then as a teacher in Orthodox Jewish private schools, I sought (and seek) to 
develop such priorities in my students.  In section V below I will explore the Jewish educational 




IV. Criticism of Moral Education 
How then to proceed, whether as proponent of a curriculum in moral education, or even 
as one suggesting to add a moral bent to an English literature classroom?  The definition of 
“morality” – let alone figuring out how to teach it – still remains murky.  Chazan (1985) 
summarizes some of these challenges, writing that the “definitive stance on the social origins of 
morality as an objective fact is the source of much of the discontent of current approaches to 
moral education.”  Lickona and others of his stance would claim that morality is divinely rooted.  
Here’s the problem: I think so too.  I am therefore, in Chazan’s words, “uncomfortable with the 
notion of morality as a body of social norms and conventions that are arbitrarily imposed on the 
young” (10).  Chazan resonates for me as I straddle, in both my personal and professional lives, 
the worlds and the outlooks of the yeshiva and the academy.  Morality, to me, is not simply a 
“body of social norms,” but part of a greater, innate human quality, one that is innate because 
God placed it there.  I thus align with Haidt more than with Kohlberg, and with certain limited 
aspects of Lickona and Davidson.  I will return to this discussion in chapter seven. 
Regardless, however, of where one thinks morality originates, three major classroom 
challenges remain if one wishes to teach “morality.”  For one, educators cannot simply present 
the subject as a set of facts or set of skills to be taught like they would teach geography or how to 
measure the hypotenuse of a triangle.  A further critique of a curriculum in “morality” per se is 
offered by educational philosopher John Wilson, who is concerned “with the presentation of a 
notion of morality as a procedure for confronting moral issues, rather than a set of mores of a 
particular society…”  Rejecting an overt curriculum, Wilson instead strongly feels that students 
need to develop “a series of abilities,” which he calls “the moral components” that will allow 
them to process and judge moral issues independently (30, italics in original). 
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Thirdly – and here I likely divert from Lickona – I believe that teachers need to avoid 
indoctrinating students.  Discussions need to be as much student-driven as teacher-driven.  
Students need to process (and “buy in” to) such a curriculum for it to expand their worldview 
successfully.  This is what Rogers (1969) means when he urges subject matter that is relevant to 
the student (a topic to which I will return in chapter eight).  Rogers writes that “A person learns 
significantly only those things which he perceives as being involved in the maintenance of or the 
enhancement of his own self” (158).  In addition to such classroom challenges, there are a 
number of outright arguments against the teaching of morality in schools that I will address as 
well. 
Chazan (1985) lists a number of critics of developing a values curriculum, critics from 
across historical, geographical and cultural spans (91).  Bereiter, for example, argues that schools 
should not impose societal values on a student (which make him or her into “a socialized agent 
of that society”), but rather can only care for children and train them in specific “skills.”  These 
“skills” include not only reading, writing and math but also “learning how to speak honestly 
what is on your mind, learning how to take the point of view of others, and learning how to 
distinguish between a viola and a violin.”  Such education “does not come to shape the whole 
person according to some speculative world-view, but rather to provide him with true, non-
speculative knowledge…” (94-95). 
The “individualist” critique, according to Chazan (1985), claims that “moral education 
impedes genuine moral development in the young, rather than advancing it”  (96).  Students need 
to develop their own moral sense, runs this argument, rather than having it externally impressed 
upon them.  A teacher, therefore, must enable students to develop their own moral sensibility, 
whether by modeling critical, open-minded thinking or by encouraging such thought through 
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class assignments and assessments; a teacher of literature must do both of the aforementioned, in 
addition to choosing texts that foster such discussion.  This position is supported by Rogers 
(1969) when he advises that the student ought to participate “responsibly in the learning process” 
and argues on behalf of “self-initiated learning,” which he defines as involving “the whole 
person of the learner – feelings as well as intellect.”  This kind of integrated learning, Rogers 
concludes, “is the most lasting and pervasive” (162).  These are powerful critiques; an 
individualistic or targeted moral curriculum would not succeed.  On the other hand, students 
need to develop a moral sense and an ability to make moral decisions.  I will argue, based on my 
own experience as a reader and teacher, that the English classroom can fill this need.  
Indeed, even Kohlberg, who Haidt has criticized as too WEIRD (Western, educated, 
industrialized, rich and democratic), explains why a high school must provide some type of 
curriculum in morality, explaining that we cannot assume that a student will simply develop a 
moral sensitivity through post-educational “spontaneous experience.”  (Clearly, Kohlberg would 
like his own model to be adopted.)  Kohlberg (1980) writes that a high school graduate without a 
specific moral education is unlikely to be in a position to have the capacities and motivation to 
enter positions of participation and public responsibility later: “He or she will… avoid such 
situations, not seek them” (466), because without direct moral instruction of some kind, he or she 
will not have the tools to make the decisions necessary to succeed in such situations. 
Though I agree with Haidt, who rejects Kohlberg’s approach as too narrowly situated, I 
cannot but agree with the need that Kohlberg has identified.  Bereiter’s “true, non-speculative 
knowledge,” e.g., knowledge like knowing how to speak honestly and how to take other’s points 
of view, is valuable.  But it is nowhere near as valuable as the slightly more nebulous “intelligent 
spirituality” of which Alexander writes, which enable the success of a democratic society writ 
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large.   I always wanted to encourage my students to develop their own, independent moral 
sensibility, but strongly feel they can only do so if they are able to make their own choices rather 
than have specific values inculcated in them.  I align with Noddings (2002), who advocates 
providing a solid moral education by “bringing relations into caring equilibrium, balancing 
expressed and inferred needs, and helping children understand both our actions and their own” 
(154).  Direct instruction of “how to be moral” does not work.  Rather, the best way to create 
such an equilibrium, I maintain, is through the transactions offered by literature and the 
imagination.  Greene writes of the power of the imagination, in Virginia Woolf’s words, to 
“bring the severed parts together.”  Imagination, Greene writes, can create “new orders,” and 
“may be responsible for the very texture of our experience” (140).  For me, the reader’s 
imagination can serve as the gateway to the development of moral sensibility.  I have felt this as 
a reader and have conducted my classes with this potential in mind.  I bear this power of the 
imagination in mind as I begin below to look at my own experiences as reader and teacher. 
 
V. Jewish Education and Moral Education 
 
Interestingly, Levisohn (2001) writes of the need for Jewish educators to approach texts 
with Gadamer’s “historically effected consciousness,” which means to approach a text with an 
“openness,” one that “acknowledges a text as possessing a claim to validity… in such a way that 
it has something to say to me” (23).  What does such an approach mean for an educator with a 
moral agenda?  I wanted students to have moral takeaways whenever possible; balancing that 
with the idea of the text saying something to them, however, could be precarious.  Levisohn does 
add that for Gadamer, “interpreting from within a particular tradition is not a philosophical 
embarrassment, and does not represent a failure; in fact, it is the only option open to us” (23).  If 
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the Jewish approach (or my own Jewish approach at the very least) entails finding a moral 
outcome, I am well situated. 
Jewish schools often explicitly focus on developing not only their students’ minds but 
their “hearts” and “souls” as well.  Kress (2012) notes that such schools experience a tension 
“between maintaining group norms and providing for individual interpretation and meaning,” but 
balancing such a tension – between the socialization-focused “explicit” approaches to religion 
and the individualization-focused or “implicit” approaches – is all “part of the Jewish tradition 
that should be preserved in educational efforts” (124).  A classroom exploring a text for its moral 
lessons would therefore need to allow space for each student’s voice and reaction to a text while 
simultaneously seek to generate a communally agreed-upon moral “lesson.”  I though that such a 
classroom could exist. 
My English classroom in the Modern Orthodox schools in which I taught sought to both 
bring students to a specific set of values while allowing them to find their own way(s) to arrive at 
those values.  Holtz (2003) notes that traditional Torah learning is “intended to move people 
toward action” (90, italics in original).  He explains that for teachers of Jewish text, such 
“action” begins with an application of biblical ideas to one’s own experience.  This in turn 
becomes what some Jewish educators call “character education” (90).  While Holtz uses this 
point as a springboard to explore a variety of approaches to Bible educations, the same can easily 
be said for the English classroom. 
Holtz (2013) presents the model of what he calls a “didactic” or “moralist” approach, one 
which makes overt connections between the text and the life of the reader.  A teacher using this 
approach wants to teach moral messages that apply to all students (42).  At times, the has been 
my own approach in the literature classroom. 
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Holtz (2003) also introduces the model of the approach of “personalization,” which seeks 
to find meanings in the text with an orientation that is either psychological, political, or spiritual.  
“The goal,” he writes, “is to see the relationship between text and the life of today” (94).  Again, 
while such an orientation describes the approach of a Bible class, this description fits my own 
approach in my literature classroom as well.  As Levisohn (2013) points out, a teacher’s 
orientation is not a method or technique of teaching, and “not merely an attitude held by the 
teacher.”  Rather, an orientation is “a teacher’s fundamental stance toward a particular subject 
that encompasses the teacher’s conception of the purposes of teaching that subject and a set of 
paradigmatic teaching practices” (58).  I have already begun to discuss my conception of the 
purposes of teaching, and I will mention the set of practices I have employed in what follows 




A Discussion of Methodology 
 
 
I. Autoethnography as Resources and Inspiration for This Study  
What I seek to do in this project is to study my own perspective as a reader and as a 
teacher of literature in order to understand how my own moral decision-making developed and 
how it was influenced by that literature.  Ultimately, this project, in the words of Winograd 
(2002, quoted in Hughes, Pennington and Makris, 2012) “is not the creation of any new claims to 
knowledge, but, rather, a representation of my experience so others may ‘imagine their own uses 
and applications [Clandinin and Connelly 2000, p. 42.]” (214).  I will utilize autobiographical 
writing as well as other personal artifacts as data for analysis and interpretation.   
The particular form of autoethnography from which I borrow is what Anderson (2006) 
calls “analytic autoethnography,” the distinguishing features of which all apply to me and my 
study.  For Anderson, such an approach has three criteria: first, the researcher must be “a full 
member of the research group or setting.” This criterion applies to me in that I certainly belong 
to the group I identify as “students of literature” and also to that of “teachers of English,” both of 
which I will be subjecting to close analysis.  Second, Anderson says the researcher must be 
“visible as such a member in the group’s published texts.”  Here too, my work qualifies, since 
the entire enterprise of publishing my literary-auto-ethno-pedogography demands my presence in 
the data that I will interpret, all of which are either documents about me or memories I have of 
my own experiences.  Publishing this work will make me “visible.”  Anderson’s third criteria is 
that the researcher is “committed to an analytic research agenda focused on improving 
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theoretical understandings of broader social phenomena” (375).  This study will both provide 
better theoretical understanding of my reading and teaching, as well as offer observations and 
suggestions for how that theory may be advanced and put into classroom practice by others.  The 
“social phenomena” I hope to study are instances of potential confluence of the study of morality 
with the study of English literature – a confluence that, as I have already noted, has been taken 
for granted for virtually the entire history of literature and literary criticism.  
Some context on Anderson’s approach is warranted.  Anderson traces the history of the 
development of autoethnography, noting that the Chicago School ethnographers of the early 
twentieth century had “enduring personal connections with the social settings and groups that 
they studied,” but adds that “they seldom, if ever, took up the banner of explicit and reflexive 
self-observation” (375).  Those researchers “were neither particularly self-observational in their 
method, nor self-visible in their texts” (376).  The 1960s and 1970s yielded some attempts at 
more explicit self-observation and analysis, which offered what Anderson calls “potential 
direction for the development of autoethnography in the realist or analytic tradition” (376), but 
this was largely derailed by Carolyn Ellis, Arthur Bochner, and others, who advocated the 
narrative approach of “evocative autoethnography,” which rejects “traditional realist and analytic 
ethnographic assumptions, voicing a principled belief that the value and integrity of evocative 
autoethnography is violated by framing it in terms of conventional sociological analysis” (377).  
Ellis’s and Bochner’s approach, in Denzin’s words (1997, quoted in Anderson 377), seeks to 
“bypass the representational problem” – i.e., the impossibility of using one’s words to accurately 
reflect experience.  Their approach does so “by invoking an epistemology of emotion, moving 
the reader to feel the feelings of the other.”  Anderson, on the other hand, argues for an approach 
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“that is consistent with traditional symbolic interactionist epistemological assumptions and goals 
rather than rejecting them” (378). 
Anderson’s “key features” of analytic autoethnography include “complete member 
researcher (CMR) status,” “analytic reflexivity,” “narrative visibility of the researcher’s self,” 
and a “commitment to theoretical analysis” (378).  Anderson explains that an “opportunistic” 
CMR is one who “may be born into a group, thrown into a group by chance circumstance… or 
have acquired intimate familiarity through occupational, recreational or lifestyle participation.”  I 
meet this criterion: as discussed in chapter one, beginning even as a pre-reader, my love of books 
and of reading literature – and ultimately, of my professional involvement with it as a teacher – 
would grant me lifetime membership in this group. 
Anderson explains that analytic reflexivity requires “self-conscious introspection guided 
by a desire to better understand both self and others through examining one’s actions and 
perceptions in reference to and dialogue with those of others” (382).  While the sections of my 
study that pertain to my own development as a reader by definition exclude “direct dialogue with 
others,” my discussion of others’ reading experiences (first discussed in chapter four), and my 
analyses of my own teaching and of samples of student work certainly involve interactions with 
others and the meaning of those interactions. 
Anderson requires a visible and active researcher in the text, which is a reaction to the 
“crisis in representation,” where critics note the invisibility of the traditional ethnographer, one 
who can be “a hidden and seemingly omniscient presence in ethnographic texts” (383).  My 
hybrid method entails incorporating my “own feelings and experiences” into my text and looking 
at them as “vital data” to understand the world under observation (384).  In addition to 
borrowing aspects of the method, I accept some of the warnings that accompany its use as well: I 
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am cognizant of the danger of falling into what Anderson calls “self-absorption,” and attempt to 
balance my own self-narrative with measured analysis throughout the study.  My writing style 
and tone throughout seek to connect with the reader to “inform and change social knowledge 
(Davies [1999], quoted in Anderson 386).   My commitment to theoretical analysis, another of 
Anderson’s “key features,” is what makes up the bulk of chapters four through seven. 
Anderson’s approach is not without its critics.  Denzin (2006) fears that Anderson’s call 
for a “return to the basics, to traditional symbolic interactionist assumptions,” will lead to a 
“negation of the recent poststructural, antifoundational arguments” of the late twentieth century, 
which are “the very arguments that support CAP [creative analytical practices]” (421).  Ellis and 
Bochner (2006) go a step further, fearing that “journal reviewers could reject autoethnographies 
if they didn’t have a Discussion section of make claims for generalizability” (443), for which 
they see Anderson advocating.  Ellis and Bochner write that Anderson’s model is one of “aloof 
autoethnography” (436) and remind him and the reader that what they do in their “evocative 
autoethnography” is both “evocative and analytical,” but that the difference is that they “use 
stories to do the work of analysis and theorizing” (436).  The difference between the approaches 
may be in the understanding of autoethnography as a whole.  “We think of autoethnography as a 
journey,” they write.  “[Analytical autoethnographers] think of it as a destination” (431).  
Ultimately, however, Ellis and Bochner are willing to reconcile with Anderson, allowing that 
“analysis and story also can work together,” and that “there’s no reason to preclude adding 
traditional analysis to what we do, as long as it’s not treated as necessary to legitimize our 
stories” (444).  They conclude by disagreeing “without being disagreeable” and by honoring 




Rosenblatt (1995) writes that a reader “needs to understand himself; he needs to work out 
harmonious relationships with other people.  He must achieve a philosophy, an inner center from 
which to view in perspective the shifting society around him…” (3).  Using the critical lenses 
introduced in section I above, aided by the methodology lent me by analytic autoethnography, I 
will analyze the ways that literature has allowed me to go beyond the world of the Torah’s 
wisdom to influence my moral development and, subsequently, the goals I set for my literature 
students.   
Indeed, as I begin to write and to unpack my stories, this study has been revelatory.  
Creswell (2007) cites Muncey, who defines autoethnography “as the idea of multiple layers of 
consciousness, the vulnerable self, the coherent self, critiquing the self in social contexts” (73).  
The memories detailed in the following chapters, along with the physical artifacts and 
documents, allow me to access those layers of self.  Muncey further adds that each of these 
layers “contain the personal story of the author as well as the larger cultural meaning for the 
individual’s story” (73).  The very act of writing these memories during the research for this 
study has helped old, semi-forgotten chapters of my story to resurface, and I have found a 
number of “larger cultural meanings” for my story.  The interaction between the physical 
artifacts and my memories has provided what Richardson (cited in Ely, Vinz, et al [1997]) 
describes as data “crystalizing” (as opposed to the more positivist notion of “triangulating”), 
thereby reflecting “the complex, partial, and multi perspectives that refract meaning for and from 
the reader” (35).  
Squire, Andrews and Tamboukou (2013) distinguish between “event-centered” narrative 
and “experience-centered” narrative, noting that the boundaries between the two are “porous and 
overlapping” and that both are “individual, internal representations of phenomena – events, 
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thoughts and feelings – to which narrative gives external expression” (5, italics in original).  My 
narrative contains both events and experiences.  In chapter eight, I will discuss Blau’s (2003) 
ideas about the power of writing in the literature workshop.  I have experienced the power of 
writing while working on this study.  Witherell (1991) writes of the uses of narrative in both 
teaching and counseling, and notes that self-narrative finds an internal logic when it integrates 
“value, purpose, and meaning.”  She explains that “value represents the valence we attach to the 
present, purpose entails our sense of future possibility and aspirations, and meaning is our 
memory and interpretation of the past” (93).  Writing this self-narrative has allowed me to focus 
on my value, purpose, and meaning as a reader in a deep and meaningful way.   
Neither the process nor the outcome of reading for any reader can or should be glossed 
over or taken for granted.  Rosenblatt (1995) describes how a reader draws on “past linguistic 
and life experience” then “links the signs on the page with certain words, certain concepts, 
certain sensuous experiences, certain images…”  The personal connections, “submerged 
associations,” and the reader’s own immediate needs and physical state and mood are what make 
a personal reading.  This “never-to-be-duplicated combination determine his interfusion with the 
peculiar contribution of the text” (30).  Each time I would read, at each stage of my development 
as a reader, I accessed the text with a distinct set of “submerged associations,” traits, memories, 
needs and preoccupations.  When refracted through the prism of the text at hand, these all, as 
Rosenblatt writes, begin to crystallize into “ultimate attitudes, either of acceptance or of 
rejection” of the ideas and values of that text (19).  Do any of those ideas, values or beliefs either 
validate an existing facet of my identity or personality?  Do any offer a new insight heretofore 
unimagined?  When I read Juster’s The Phantom Tollbooth (1961), for example, which I will 
discuss in chapter four, I began to imagine new possibilities for myself in how I helped or would 
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help others in need, much as Juster’s protagonist, Milo, set out to help the Princesses Rhyme and 
Reason. 
Analytical autoethnography offers helpful methods for exploring these questions: as 
Squire, Andrew and Tamboukou (2013) point out, “narratives signify unconscious emotions, as 
well as conscious cognitions and feelings” (10).  In my study I explore my own “cognitions and 
feelings,” and the creation of “new patterns of being” (à la Greene) that have happened (and 
which still happen) for me as a reader and as a teacher of readers.  Before beginning to explore 
those patterns in earnest however, I must first address the issue of using memory as data. 
 
II. Memory as Method 
Since I am using my own memories as the source for much of the data produced by this 
study, I must make a few important points on memory, reality and honesty and take up the 
problems of representation and questions of validity that are inherent in the kind of project I am 
undertaking and the research method I am employing.  First, one can never regain a full memory: 
as Smith and Watson (2010) note, "narrated memory is an interpretation of a past that can never 
be fully recovered" (22).  They add that “life narrators may present inconsistent or shifting views 
of themselves” (15).  While my recollections may seem perfectly coherent and accurate to me, 
they cannot be: it is impossible to replay that which took place with full accuracy.  Maxine 
Greene (1995) puts a specific literary spin to this issue, writing that “recollection of literary 
experiences cannot but be affected by critical and other cognitive judgements (my own and 
others).”  However, she gives some hope when she adds that “such judgements can be bracketed 
out, put in abeyance while we reach for the prereflective experiences that art can make accessible 
if we attend” (78).  Memory has limits and limitations, and there are real challenges inherent in 
recording and reporting it.  Moon (2016) points out that “poststructuralists rethink the 
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conventional understandings of memory in which an individual simply retrieves ‘facts’ from his 
or her ‘memory storage’” (37).  Memory, he adds, is “always contextual and what the subject 
remembers is not an isolated fact but situated associations with a specific time and place” (37).  
What I think I remember, therefore, may not be what occurred, and even if it did, I may be 
remembering it selectively: Moon adds that “what is remembered and valued in memory is not 
neutral but political” (37).  These are not insignificant challenges. 
Haug (2008) further complicates matters in her distinction between “truth” and 
“memory.”  Memory, for Haug, is by definition unreliable for political reasons: she writes that 
“memory itself should be conceived of as contested; it… is constantly written anew and always 
runs the risk of reflecting dominant perspectives” (538).  She adds that the question of “what 
really happened” is unimportant.  Haug is not interested in memory as an “image of 
authenticity,” but rather in the “formidable power of the construction of perception, its subjection 
under dominant ideologies, the accompanying construction of self, and in all of this the fragile 
ability to act…” (540).     
Haug’s view of the memory as unreliable yet politically or ideologically informative 
anticipates the insights and valuation of memory as a resource for theorists who argue for the 
legitimacy of autoethnography as a method for research.  Borrowing from the logic of such 
theorists, I acknowledge that my memory is inaccurate. But this does not mean that it lacks the 
virtue of being true to what might have happened and a representation that has the quality of 
imaginative truth – the kind of truth found in good fiction.  According to Denzin (2014), there is 
in autoethnographic representations a special kind of “[v]alidity,” that “means that a work has 
verisimilitude.  It evokes a feeling that the experience described is true, coherent, believable, and 
connects the reader to the writer’s world” (70).  Indeed, as Smith and Watson note, "we 
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inevitably organize or form fragments of memory into complex constructions that become the 
changing stories of our lives" (22).  So even if the memories I recall (or think that I recall) and 
then report are thus twice skewed – in the recalling and in the retelling – as long as the world that 
they create is coherent and believable, it provides material worthy of analysis.   
This approach, incidentally, also addresses a related concern which is raised by Halse and 
Honey (2010), who argue that “[t]he investments, dilemmas, and implications of researchers’ 
ethical decisions and moral choices are usually secreted away, buried, concealed, and hidden 
from public scrutiny…” (124). I hope that by making my own history and practice into the 
subject of my research that I will be able to avoid some of the secrecy and concealment feared by 
Halse and Honey.  This allows me to acknowledge and even to embrace the fallibility of the 
memories of early (and even relatively recent) reading that I attempt to access in the course of 
this project.   As Muncey (2010) notes, “Subjectivity doesn’t infect your work, it enhances it” 
(8).   
In defense of what might at first glance seem an outrageous claim for a researcher to 
make, Muncey (2010) observes that a key element of autoethnography is the inclusion of “the 
researcher’s vulnerable self, emotions, body and spirit” which together yield “evocative stories 
that create the effect of reality” and produce a discourse that constitutes a “fusion between social 
science and literature” (30).  While I do not claim that my literary autobiography or what I am 
taking the liberty of calling my “literary-auto-ethno-pedogography” (to include my pedagogical 
history and reflections) can be classified as a  kind of autoethnography, I do want to cite the 
legitimacy of authoethnography as an academic genre that might authorize the subjectivity and 
self-disclosure and reflexivity of the story I tell in this study of my own literary, spiritual, and 
pedagogical development.  If I can thereby provide the reader with an account of my experience 
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that is both literary and academic, fusing elements of social science with those of literary 
narrative, I will regard my project as  successful, especially since my foundational hypothesis is 
that literature  has been instrumental in shaping and informing the social and spiritual self that 
defines my identity as a teacher both in the religious and secular senses  that I inhabit those 
social and spiritual roles (or, put another way, the word “rabbi” literally means “teacher”).  
My goal is therefore unapologetically literary insofar as it seeks to connect the reader of 
my self-study to my own internal world as a reader and teacher of literature, as Denzin (2014) 
describes, “in a way that moves others to ethical action” (70), much in the way that I have been 
altered my own thought and action through reading literature.  That is to say, I want to write “a 
text that does not map or attempt to reproduce the real” (which addresses the issues raised by 
Moon and Haug), but rather one that does create “an experiential text that allows me (and you) to 
understand what I have studied” (83). Ultimately, I find that, like Muncey (2010), I have “a 
plethora of experience that is being repressed in [my] desire to conduct ‘proper’ research” (1).  
But by borrowing from the autoethnographic approach (which I will discuss in more detail 
below), I hope to address this issue and liberate that experience. 
Haidt (2012) notes that the “human mind is a story processor, not a logic processor.”   He 
adds that “Among the most important stories we know are stories about ourselves… These 
narratives are not necessarily true stories – they are simplified and selective reconstructions of 
the past, often connected to an idealized vision of the future.”  Nonetheless, those stories, or what 
I am currently recalling as memories, “still influence people’s behavior, relationships, and 
mental health” (328).  While I acknowledge that the memories I now recall are reconstituted and 
reworked in ways I do not even realize, whether to illustrate particular points or fit specific 
models that I seek to explore, I still believe in the human validity of the data and its analysis.  
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Memory, by its very nature, is flawed; I acknowledge that what I think I remember may not be 
accurate, but it is data nonetheless, and subject to analysis as it exists now, as I recall it, however 
imperfectly.  I would add that the additional supporting data I have found, which include 
childhood report cards, interviews with my parents, and my classroom lecture notes, among other 
artifacts, serve as an attempt at triangulating the subjective (yet still very real) data offered by my 
memories.   









The First Lens: What If? 
 
I. Coduction and What-If Propositions  
 The Talmud is rife with narrative of the “what-if” model: not only are many of the two 
thousand of its pages filled with aggadata, or stories, but the very heart of the Talmud, the case 
law that drives its discussions, are mini-tales of “what-if.”   What if a camel carrying flax in the 
public domain accidentally pokes the flax into a store, causes the flax to catch fire and burn 
down the building?  The camel’s owner is liable if the lamp was inside the store; the storekeeper 
is liable if the lamp was outside the store – but Rabbi Yehuda adds the caveat that if it was 
Chanukah and the lamp was a menorah, then the storekeeper would not be liable.6  The Talmud 
often spins a short narrative to make such a juridical point.  
Booth (1988) writes that a reader takes in the literature that he or she reads through a 
process that he calls “coduction,” a term that he invents after rejecting the inadequate imagery of 
“weighing” and “judging.”  “Coduction,” according to Booth, suggests:  
the reliance (rational but by no means logical in any usual sense of the word) on 
the past experiences of many judges who do not have even a roughly codified set 
of precedents to guide them… Coduction will be what we do whenever we say to 
the world (or prepare ourselves to say): ‘Of the works of this general kind that I 
have experienced, comparing my experience with other more or less qualified 
observers, this one seems to me among the better (or weaker) ones, or the best (or 
worst).  Here are my reasons’ (72 – 73, italics in original).  
 The process is facilitated and influenced first by the reader’s prior knowledge and 
opinions.  This is akin to Rosenblatt’s (1995) explanation of aesthetic reading, in which the 
reader draws upon life experience, linking signs with certain words (30).  For Booth, these initial 
                                                          
6 Baba Kama 62b. 
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impressions are subsequently enhanced by the feedback given the reader by teachers and others 
who read or have read the same texts.  For both Booth and Rosenblatt, what the reader brings 
with him or her in the moment is what creates the aesthetic reading or the coduction.   
As an engaged reader, I would identify with the characters and situations of which I read 
and put myself in their place, asking myself what I would do in such circumstances.  This formed 
my initial impression.  The coduction would take place when I compared my decisions with 
those of others.  One example of such a reading experience occurred for me when I first 
discovered a particular text on my own, then re-encountered it in school: Norton Juster’s The 
Phantom Tollbooth (1961).  Maxine Greene (1995) writes of the reader “going intentionally in 
search of something and seeking out the kind of understandings needed for the search, for 
moving toward what is not yet known” (175).  This search happened for me both figuratively and 
literally when I first encountered Juster’s text.  I was eight years old.  My younger sister and I 
were visiting friends in our apartment building.  While searching a closet for toys, I stumbled 
across the hard-covered, dog-eared volume, which seemed to be meaningful to someone.  Did it 
belong to one of the parents?  The family’s children did not seem to know or care much about it.  
I remember the sensation of being drawn in by both the book’s title and Jules Feiffer’s cover art.  
“In this search,” continues Greene, “a refusal of the comfortable is always required, a refusal to 
remain sunk in everydayness” (175).  I was curious to learn what this odd-looking volume was 
all about.  While not quite uncomfortable, it decidedly did not look “everyday” to me.  I took 
down the book, held it, began to read – and was unable to stop.  It was one of the first page-
turner experiences I had ever had.  It would not allow me to “remain sunk in everydayness.”   
I recall reading while the other children continued to play around me.  I am sure I did not 
read the entire book in one sitting – they must have let me borrow it – but it feels like I did, so 
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engrossed was I in Juster’s fantasy and imaginative wordplay.  I loved Juster’s protagonist, Milo, 
with whose weltschmerz I thought I could identify (although I had not felt particularly 
weltschmerzische prior).  I loved the characters who were Milo’s companions, the loyal dog 
Tock and the reluctantly heroic Humbug.  I was drawn in by Milo’s quest to save the beautiful 
and wise princesses Rhyme and Reason.  I couldn’t wait to find out how it all worked out.  I was 
simultaneously and equally enthralled by the characters and by the plot; the wordplay and puns 
only added to my enjoyment.  By entering Milo’s world – in Booth’s words, by actually thinking 
Milo’s thoughts “as I read” (275) – I made connections to ideals I held (global, overarching life 
values, such as the belief in peace and justice) and reinforced my faith in those values.  This was 
but the first stage of Booth’s coductive process: of connecting with prior experience and belief 
systems.  Rosenblatt (1995) identifies a similar process of connecting to relevant memories, 
experience and interests, a process which makes reading itself possible (77). What remained to 
take place for me (and which later did) was the comparison with the impressions of other 
readers.   
I have already mentioned Probst’s identification of five kinds of knowledge that can be 
gained from literature: “knowledge of the self, knowledge of others, knowledge of texts, 
knowledge of contexts, and knowledge of processes (of making meaning)” (27).  As I made my 
way through The Phantom Tollbooth, my knowledge of how to read improved as my vocabulary 
and appreciation of mechanics and style grew; my knowledge of texts and contexts also 
expanded, as it did with each book that I read.  But my knowledge of self and of others grew as 
well: I learned more about what I believed and what values I held dear.  In rooting for Milo to 
save the Princesses and bring peace to the Kingdom of Wisdom (a cause for which the author 
clearly wanted me to root), I reinforced ideals of harmony and righteousness that I had learned at 
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home and in school.  In the Rosenblattian sense, the reading was thus “made possible” by 
connecting my reading experience to my previously existing values.  Indeed, Rosenblatt writes 
(1994) that readers “often pay attention first to the feelings and ideas accompanying the 
emerging work,” adding that the experience may stimulate the reader “to clarify his own values, 
his own prior sense of the world and its possibilities” (145).  This happened for me reading 
Norton Juster.  
Booth adds that the process of coduction requires the presence of other readers – in a 
classroom this could be both instructors and/or fellow students – to fully absorb the lessons of 
that which is read.  “How,” each reader ought to ask his or her fellow readers, “does my 
coduction compare with yours?” (73).  This, interestingly and frustratingly, did not fully 
materialize for me with Juster’s text.  At the time of my initial reading, I simply knew no one 
else who had read the book or had even heard of it.  Then, when the book was finally assigned to 
my fifth-grade class, some three years later, I remember feeling excited that my friends would 
now enjoy the same journey I had (and I also remember a distinct superiority to them at having 
read the book already and some three years earlier).  Some of my classmates seemed to enjoy 
that journey as much as I had – which means that they expressed similar emotions to mine; I 
could not understand, however, why all of them hadn’t.  Some found the book “just okay.”  
Some preferred Chuck Jones’s 1970 cartoon adaptation that we viewed in class to the actual 
novel.  I could not fathom why every single student was not as magically transported by the text 
as I had been – at least as far as my eleven-year-old self could determine.  To me, they seemed 
not to coduct as deeply or as fully as I had, and this bothered me.  They read for plot, but they 
did not connect or identify with Milo; they did not think his thoughts or dream his dreams.  Since 
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I had connected in this way – and continued to do so with each subsequent re-reading of the book 
– I was disappointed that, in my perception, this was not a shared experience.    
Booth (2010) writes that fictions “offer an experience that changes the lives of their 
readers, those readers who engage themselves sufficiently to find a life in the works” (85).  In 
retrospect, I think that what bothered me was that my classmates – even those who were my 
close friends – did not all choose to be as “sufficiently” engaged as I had.  They either did not 
coduct as deeply or were unwilling (or unable) to share their coductions with me.  This 
unwillingness or inability to engage frustrated me – and has continued to do so since that time.  
As a teacher, I have sought myriad ways to forge student connection with the text being taught, 
but I have found that the students don’t always want to connect.  In class, I will mention current 
films and television shows that parallel aspects of the text at hand in attempts to draw in my 
students.  When teaching tenth grade English in 2001, I recall how I seemed to find for every 
text, from Macbeth to The Picture of Dorian Gray, a connection to the previous summer’s hit 
movie Shrek.  It became a running class joke.  Some students enjoyed the parallels and were 
thereby able to connect; others, less so.  Their coductions were less robust than my own and less 
meaningful than I wanted for them.  I recall them openly expressing that they found the text 
“boring” or “dumb.” 
The feeling of frustration I have experienced is worth deeper analysis, if only because it 
has recurred often throughout my reading life and my teaching-of-reading life.  Ellis and 
Bochner (2000) write of “systematic sociological introspection and emotional recall” as a means 
“to understand a way of life” (737).  I attempt to achieve such an understanding of this particular 
frustration.  What ways have I found to either bring about connections for friends, family, or 
students (all of whom I have tried to encourage to connect to various texts at various times)?   
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There have been instances where I have given up: with friends or family, I sometimes simply 
don’t discuss the text I am reading, thinking that the effort required to explain what I see in such 
a text is beyond me at the moment.  Whether out of laziness or impatience, I am certainly 
unwilling to try to get those family and friends to connect.7  This demonstrates more of my own 
unwillingness to share than it illustrates others’ attitudes.  It may well be that others can and 
would connect with these texts, either immediately or even later in their lives.  With my students, 
I have also found myself frustrated when trying to enable such connections.  Greene (1995) 
dreams of “classroom situations in which significant dialogue might be encouraged once again, 
the live communication out of which there might emerge some consciousness of interdependence 
as well as a recognition of diverse points of view” (177).  She is describing a classroom of 
coductions being shared, something I attempted to do in my own class, as I will detail below.  
Before looking at my classroom, however, the impact of another author from my childhood 
warrants analysis. 
II. But What-If Things Get a Lot Worse?  Reading Stephen King 
My longtime attraction to the work of Stephen King has enabled me to vicariously 
experience a number of “what-if” situations that I would never want to actually endure.  It was 
the books themselves as well as King’s writer’s persona that drew me in from an early age.  At 
age eleven or twelve, the librarian at the local public library bent the rules and allowed me to 
check out books from the adult section of the library; I went for Stephen King.  I cannot recall 
which novel of King’s was my first.  I remember reading such books as The Shining (1977) and 
                                                          
7 Jasper Fforde’s series of Thursday Next novels, for example, which bend genre between mystery, science fiction, 
and satire, and are peopled with characters from classic literature, are difficult for me to explain to people who are 
not fans of all these genres.  Another example: the appeal of such books as Seth Grahame-Smith’s Pride and 
Prejudice and Zombies has also been challenging to explain. 
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Cujo (1981) and feeling simultaneously unable to continue reading out of sheer terror and being 
unable to stop turning the pages.  King’s afterwords, small essays which appear in his later 
works, are always addressed to his “Constant Reader,” a moniker which I have always felt was 
directed to me personally.   
King’s horror fiction attracted me for its gory detail, the psychological thrills it offered, 
and the consistent bravery of its characters in the face of malevolence.  I liked experiencing the 
triumph of good over evil, which is how these books generally concluded.  Steiner (1970) writes 
that fiction’s appeal “allow[s] it entry, though not unguarded, into our utmost” (10).  When I first 
read The Stand (1978, 1990), King’s epic tale of the end of civilization from infection and the 
battle between good and evil that is fought by the survivors, I wondered, in my “utmost,” what I 
would do if (1) I was the only survivor of my family; (2) whether I would choose to side with 
good or with evil; and (3) why I was so happy when the good guys won.   Rosenblatt (1995) 
writes that “Literature fosters the kind of imagination needed in a democracy – the ability to 
participate in the needs and aspirations of other personalities and to envision the effect of our 
actions on their lives…”  Through vicariously experiencing the horrors experienced by King’s 
characters, I vividly envisioned the needs of others.  What I would do to impact their lives if 
given the chance, though, was not a question that I often considered.  Rosenblatt continues: 
“Literature, through which the adolescent reader encounters a diversity of temperaments and 
systems of value, may free him from fears, guilt, and insecurity engendered by too narrow a view 
of normality” (212).  The worlds that King opened up to me as a reader definitely widened my 
view of normality, although it may have added to my fears and insecurity: I often had nightmares 
during and after reading these books. 
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Rosenblatt elsewhere (1994) notes the existence of “popular texts which make few 
demands on their readers and whose readers make few demands on the text or on themselves.”  I 
am not sure that applies to my own experience of reading King, as I feel it impacted me greatly, 
despite its popularity and accessibility.  I should add that Rosenblatt continues, saying that 
“Paradoxically, it is probably among these readers that the freest, most honest, and most personal 
literary transactions occur” (140).  This was definitely the case for me, as illustrated by ne 
experience of reading The Stand (1978, 1990). 
The Stand was a novel I returned to again and again, rereading passages that particularly 
moved me, and ultimately re-reading the novel in its entirety when an “uncut” version was 
published in 1990.  Its epic nature appealed to me, as the narrative spanned the entire United 
States of America, and its appealing (or completely unlikeable) characters were easily accessible.  
As I spent my summers at the time in a vacation home in rural Connecticut, I identified both with 
King’s largely rural New England settings and with his urban ones, as I will discuss below. 
The Stand has elements of both fantasy and realistic fiction, as does much of King’s 
oeuvre, both of which appealed to me equally.  Booth (1988) notes that readers “willingly 
suspend disbelief about some matters but not about all.”  The characters and their relationships in 
the novel were real to me.  That King’s villain Randall Flagg can perform actual magic in no 
way impeded my connection with the novel’s realistic elements.  I still remember a chapter 
describing Larry Underwood, one of the novel’s protagonists, as he travels through a pitch-black 
Lincoln Tunnel to escape a post-apocalyptic New York City filled with the corpses of disease 
victims.  My admiration of this character’s resolve (a trait which ultimately enables him to 
emerge redeemed as a hero) remained with me as much as did the terror of the situation.  As 
Booth continues, “most authors would be distressed if we said, after our reading, that nothing we 
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found in it carried over to our ‘real’ selves” (151).  The resonance of the terror and Larry’s bold 
resilience made an impression on me some thirty-five years ago, one which has not yet faded.   
That I independently chose to read The Stand clearly strengthens my memory of it as well 
as its impact upon me.  Rosenblatt (1995) notes that ideas and insights from literary experience 
“tend to be assimilated into the individual’s active equipment because they are embedded in a 
matrix of emotional and personal concern” (226- 227).  Perhaps the very act of selecting this 
book rather than having it assigned in school made it more impactful for me.  The messages that 
I took from The Stand still resonate with me.  I have been inspired by the stamina and the 
courage of King’s protagonists, flawed though many of them are.  “Narratives,” writes Muncey 
(2010) “are people’s identities…”  King’s narratives became my own stories.  I read and re-read 
them, re-telling them to myself.  Muncey adds that “the stories people tell shape and construct 
the narrator’s personality and reality as the story is retold and reconstructed throughout that 
individual’s life” (43).  Greene (1995) adds that  
We all have memories of our worlds opening outward through encounters we 
have had with other human beings, with texts, with works of art… If we were 
fortunate, we were able to develop open capacities – meaning the kind of 
capacities that enabled us to move on from particular texts to other texts and other 
modes of representation (181). 
As I now retell the story of reading King, I extract meaning from telling that story, a 
memory that has for many years lain dormant.  My middle school years, when I first encountered 
King’s work, were not enjoyable (nor are they for many).  I was stressed; school was difficult 
both academically and socially; an attempt to spend a summer at an overnight camp had resulted 
in terrible homesickness, to the point where I refused to go back and summered with my parents 
instead.  The “capacities” to be heroic and to confront evil were magnetically attractive for me as 




III. What-If in the Classroom: You Be the Jury 
The approach of the “what-if” proposition was one I employed as a teacher as well.  
When teaching Reginald Rose’s Twelve Angry Men (1954) to middle schoolers, I overtly and 
transparently attempted to get my students to ask “what-if” questions as we made our way 
through the text.  The play covers the tense jury deliberations of a murder trial.  One juror (all the 
characters are nameless throughout) casts doubt on what at first seems a clear-cut set of facts, 
and personal issues quickly cloud the discussion.  I taught the text by assigning students to act 
the parts of the various jurors, reading out the script over several days of class.  In my lecture 
notes, I planned to impress upon the class what I termed the “gravity of the situation.”  I wrote 
that the play is a “celebration of justice” that highlights “one person standing up for what he 
thinks is right and true.”  I asked the students, “why not be prejudiced?” as we focused on a 
number of jurors who demonstrated significant prejudices and even what I termed “reverse 
discrimination.”  Students seemed to enjoy acting out the drama and seeing a civics lesson unfold 
around them.  When I asked them the obvious “what-if” question – if you were one of the jurors, 
which would you be – the vast majority chose characters who were unbiased.  However, when I 
asked the students if they would have the nerve to stand up to a room full of strangers and push 
for a fair discussion of the facts, i.e., to stand up to peer pressure (a question with which they 
were familiar from countless informal programs on the topic), they seemed less confident 
overall. 
The dramatic aspect of the text no doubt helped students more readily connect; if the play 
were a novel or a short story, rather than a text that they acted out in class, I wonder if they 
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would have as easily accessed it emotionally and intellectually.  Rosenblatt (1995) writes that the 
student 
should be encouraged to bring to the text whatever in his past experience is 
relevant: his sensuous awareness, his feeling for people and practical 
circumstances, his ideas and information, as well as his feeling for the sound and 
pace and texture of language (270). 
My students could definitely draw upon their feelings for “people and practical 
circumstances” as they acted out this drama, much as the jurors they played had been urged to by 
the judge in the play itself.  My students were, as Wilhelm (1995) describes, each going “beyond 
simple comprehension of story action to evoke the text and elaborate[ing] upon it as a ‘story 
participant’ (121). 
The approach I adopted of trying to make ethical decision-making connections for my 
students paralleled that of Kohlberg (1980), whose educational model, as we mentioned earlier, 
has students respond to moral “dilemmas” presented by the teacher.  The ensuing discussion 
allows the students to formulate and refine their moral values as individuals and as a group.  
Admittedly, at the time, I did not apply a Kohlbergian lens to my class; I simply tried to get them 
to identify with various members of the jury.  I hoped that the “what-if” model would allow me 
to enable a class-wide sharing of Boothian “coductions.”  I had moved this Boothian lens from 
my own coduction of texts as a reader and attempted to introduce it to my students as a teacher.  
I was disappointed to see that my own process of coduction – relating the script to issues of peer 
pressure and prejudice – seemed to ring less resonantly for a number of the students.  Their 
coductions seemed to remain within the plot and the facts of the case discussed in the play, even 
after we screened the 1957 film and once again discussed the decisions made by the various 
jurors.  It became clearer to me that projecting my own coduction onto others and expecting 
them to make them their own was both ineffectual and wrong.  David Hansen (2001) writes of 
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the need for teachers to have “moral attentiveness,” which means “Being alert to students’ 
responses to opportunities to grow as persons – for example, to become more rather than less 
thoughtful about ideas and more rather than less sensitive to others’ views and concerns” (10).  
Despite having what I consider an empathetic nature, I cannot in full candor admit to having 
consistently done as Hansen advocates.  I was too interested in fostering – and forcing – 
empathy.  
In sum, the “what-ifs” offered by authors as diverse as Reginald Rose, Stephen King and 
Norton Juster have allowed me to make decisions about values and ideas without needing to live 
through the situations endured by the novels’ characters.  I choose these particular stories 
because I draw upon aspects of autoethnography in my method.  As Denzin (2014) notes, a 
“critical autoenthnographer” should enter “those strange and unfamiliar situations that connect 
biographical experiences (epiphanies) with culture, history, and social structure” (53).  In this 
case, the situations are not all lived; some are lived vicariously through reading literature.  Booth 
(1988) writes that ultimately “every reader must be his or her own ethical critic” (237).  By 
reading a wide variety of books, by coducting their values and ideas, and by asking myself 
“what-if” questions as I read each one, I have become my own best ethical critic.  In addition to 
helping me ask such questions, though, reading and teaching readers has also allowed first for 
the development of an empathy with the characters I read – and then for an empathy for actual 
people.  Chang (2008) writes that “what makes autoethnography ethnographic is its intent of 
gaining a cultural understanding” (125).  In looking at my own experience as reader and teacher 
of text, I hope to gain an understanding of my own personal culture and to offer a model that 
other readers can apply to their own reading or teaching lives as well.   
62 
 
The great challenge for me as a teacher of text – as for many literature teachers – is how 
to enable my students to develop their own sense of ethical criticism.  Rosenblatt (1995) writes 
that teachers “affect the student’s sense of human personality and human society.”  She adds that 
teachers of literature “foster general ideas or theories about human nature and conduct, definite 
moral attitudes, and habitual responses to people and situations” (4).  That’s no small amount of 
pressure.  The “what-if” model worked for me as a reader, and my hope as a teacher was (and is) 
that it would enable the ethical critic or the “definite moral attitudes” of which Rosenblatt writes.  
She notes that “teaching becomes a matter of improving the individual’s capacity to evoke 
meaning from the text by leading him to reflect self-critically on this process [i.e., of reading 
itself]” (25ff).   
Wilhelm (2008) grapples with a similar challenge as he seeks to encourage students “to 
think of the meaning of reading as something outside themselves” (19).  Like Wilhelm, I was 
“especially troubled by the students who appeared to be reading but who did not find it 
meaningful” (41).  I did not try some of Wilhelm’s methods (unaware of them as I was at the 
time) such as asking students to dramatize the works that they read, which he claims to be “an 
effective technique for achieving entry into a texted world” (145), although when my class 
actually performed a play, as we did with Twelve Angry Men, we did use such a method.   This 
and other methodologies, to which I will return in chapter eight, have since become key tools for 
me in fostering my students’ (and my own) coductions.  None of these coductions are perfect: 
Greene (1995) writes that “no novelistic reality can ever be complete or wholly coherent… We 
are left, therefore with our open questions – about practice, about learning, about educational 
studies, about community.  They may be the sorts of questions that lead us on more and more 
far-reaching quests” (187).  Another lens for the quests I undertook follows next.  
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Chapter Five   
The Second Lens: The Judicious Spectator 
 
I. Becoming the Judicious Spectator  
The second lens through which I view my literary transactions is that of the experience of 
reading that creates what Nussbaum (1995) calls the “judicious spectator” (90).  The reader that 
feels a degree of empathy – not merely sympathy – for the characters and situations that he or 
she encounters in books makes for a better citizen, explains Nussbaum.  She further (2010) 
explains that an “empathetic perspectival experience” can teach a young reader that aggression to 
another can be harmful.  “Empathy is not morality,” Nussbaum adds, “but it can supply crucial 
ingredients of morality” (37).   I vividly recall a number of moments, first as a reader and then as 
a teacher, in which I experienced – or sought to help others experience – vicarious moments, 
moments that would lead to empathy.  We defined this term more fully earlier, but for now I 
would call it a balanced combination of thought and feeling that lead to good judgement in how 
one treats others, oneself, and one’s surroundings.8 
As I grew older, I became more ambitious in the selection of novels that I selected on my 
own.  At age twelve, I found a dog-eared copy of Herman Wouk’s novel The City Boy (1948) 
among my father’s many paperbacks.  My father, through both character and reading habits, has 
had considerable influence upon me and my own habits as a life-long reader.  As long as I can 
remember, he has been constantly reading: books on American or European history; Hebrew 
                                                          




books on Israeli law or ancient Judaic customs; journals on points of law or American, European 
or Israeli culture.  He is a science fiction buff, and as an eleven or twelve-year-old I scooped up 
his collection of novels by such authors as Arthur C. Clarke and Isaac Asimov, titans of the 
genre from the 1940’s through the 1980s.  The picaresque narrative of The City Boy made me 
laugh and connect with its protagonist Herbie Bookbinder in his quest to impress his Beatrice, 
Lucille Glass.   
“Literary understanding,” writes Nussbaum (1995), is unique in that it “promotes habits 
of mind that lead toward social equality” (92).  I was able to empathize easily with Herbie 
Bookbinder and develop such “literary understanding.”  Like Herbie, I was bookish, intellectual 
and unathletic.  By this age I already had tasted unrequited love from my fifth-grade crush, Sarah 
S., and could vicariously feel Herbie’s pain of rejection by his beloved as I read.  I was not the 
son of an iceman from the year 1919, but Wouk’s vivid prose enabled me to connect with his 
characters and live vicariously through them.  Sumara (2002) writes that narrative allows the 
reader “to engage in the imaginative acts of reconsideration and creative invention” (85).  
Through reading of Herbie’s exploits and thinking his thoughts, fearing his fears, and desiring 
his desires, I became him while I was reading.  I wanted to impress Lucille as much as Herbie 
did and felt heartbroken when my love was unrequited.  Nussbaum explains that a novel “gets its 
readers involved with the characters, caring about their projects, their hopes and fears.”  This 
leads the readers to realize “that the story is in certain ways their own story, showing possibilities 
for human life and choice that are in certain respects their own to seize, though their concrete 
circumstances may differ greatly” (31).  My eleven-year-old Orthodox Jewish self connected 
with Herbie’s more assimilated self, and I felt our differences outweighed by our commonalities. 
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Nussbaum here recalls Greene’s (1995) observation that “Knowing ‘about,’ even in the 
most formal academic manner, is entirely different from constituting a fictive world 
imaginatively and entering it perceptually, affectively and cognitively” (125).  I cannot truthfully 
say that reading of Herbie’s boldness and cleverness made me bolder and cleverer with Sarah S. 
or with the crushes that followed.   But knowing that others (even if those others were fictional) 
had suffered what I had undergone and had managed to emerge triumphant gave me great hope, 
great encouragement, and great joy; I had gone beyond “knowing about,” to a deeper experience. 
 
II. Developing Further Empathy 
Reading and loving The City Boy made me want to tackle – and enjoy – more works by 
this author (at a certain point I had realized that one book I enjoyed by a specific author would 
often lead to more enjoyable books by the same author – it was like finding a new and untapped 
diamond mine).  I thus undertook to read Wouk’s The Winds of War (1971) and War and 
Remembrance (1978).  I took on both of these books in succession in seventh grade.  Wouk’s 
love of story seemed to match my own, a connection that was later articulated for me by Booth 
(1988), who notes that the connection exists not so much between reader and book as much as 
between readers and writers.  Having used the term “friends” for books (a term I have long since 
felt appropriate as well), Booth expands it to describe writers as well.  Writers are “friends”  
who demonstrate their friendship not only in the range and depth and intensity of the relationship 
they offer, not only in the promise they fulfill of being useful to me, but finally in the irresistible 
invitation they extend to live during these moments [of reading] a richer and fuller life than I 
could manage on my own.   
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Booth adds that the idealized author is a far superior moral being to the “disorganized, 
flawed creature” (223) who is the actual writer.  It is this idealized version of the writer who can 
– and does – successfully influence the reader.  I would eventually read everything and anything 
by Wouk that I could find.  Wouk’s works were among the first volumes of “adult” literature that 
I read, and they engaged me in ways that the teen and children’s literature in which I was steeped 
could not.  Years later, as I will discuss, I would actually connect with Wouk himself, which 
only strengthened my feelings of connection and close identification with the author as a person. 
I felt a deep empathy for Natalie and Aaron Jastrow, two of Wouk’s fictional characters 
from The Winds of War (1971) and War and Remembrance (1978) who travel from the safety of 
the United States to war-torn Eastern Europe in the midst of the Holocaust.  Aaron dies in 
Auschwitz; his daughter Natalie survives and is reunited with her husband and son.  Wouk’s 
weaving of fictional characters into historical reality further engaged me on the emotional level.  
Nussbaum (2010) desires readers to attain “the faculties of thought and imagination that make us 
human and make our relationships rich human relationships, rather than relationships of mere use 
and manipulation” (6).  Connecting with and feeling the pain of Wouk’s Henry and Jastrow 
families helped developed my empathy.  It’s likely that such empathy was already there and 
merely honed by the reading experience, but it may well have remained latent without my 
reading to trigger it.  Nussbaum further adds that such faculties are the very root of democracy, 
which “is built on respect and concern, and these in turn are built upon the ability to see other 
people as human beings, not simply as objects” (6).   I saw these characters as real people, a 
process aided by their appearing in a realistic historical setting, and I felt compassion for their 
pain.  No doubt my own Jewish heritage and identity added to my feelings of connection. 
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In a letter that I wrote to Herman Wouk in June 1994, I wrote of my “blatant” admiration 
for his work.  I praised his “combination of humor, eloquence, fear of Heaven and style.”  I 
asked Wouk, who is to this day one of my literary idols, to provide “any advice or stories or 
jokes or criticisms (sic) or warnings or anything you deem relevant and appropriate” to one 
planning to teach both Judaic Studies and English literature.  I was concerned that I would be 
spreading myself too thin.  Wouk (1994) did reply to me, encouraging me to “[g]o for it,” writing 
that my “worry about falling between two stools is groundless, providing you give the challenge 
in both fields your all.”  This exchange is nothing if not an extreme example of Booth’s (1988) 
“friendship” that extends an invitation to live “a richer and fuller life than I could manage on my 
own.”  I found Wouk’s advice extremely encouraging, and I often thought of it during my years 
in the classroom.  I reconnected with Wouk again in the summer of 2017, when I felt that the fact 
that one of my literary role models was still alive and alert (at age 102, no less) was an 
opportunity that could not be passed up.  I wrote to him, summarizing some of this study, and 
said, in part that   
One of the formative authors of my life is, well, Herman Wouk… 
Your characters and your books have become my friends.  As part 
of my research, as part of my own development as a reader and 
teacher, and purely to express my [appreciation], I wonder if you 
would be willing to meet with me at your convenience to discuss 
any and all of these ideas. 
 
Wouk, terse but prompt, answered the same day.  (The response time itself, not to 
mention the Courier font that he used, gave me extreme pleasure.)  He wrote, in part:  
Good letter. I'm not up to interviews, but within limits I 
can answer queries...  
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That my literary “friend” was once again willing to dialogue with me brought back many 
of my feelings of admiration for his books, his characters, and their tone and style.  Indeed, that 
Herman Wouk had even written me the two words “Good letter” gave me tremendous pride.  I 
immediately drafted a follow-up question, which was, in retrospect, one that would only garner 
an obvious response.  I told him a bit about the school I lead and asked him if when writing he 
had “specific educational or moral intent for [his] readers in creating specific books.”  I added 
that I was “thinking less about the overtly didactic works like This is My God (1959) or The Will 
to Live On (2000) and more about [his] historical fiction.”  I asked him: 
Did or do you want your reader to come away from War and 
Remembrance [(1978)] or even Inside, Outside [(1985)] or The 
Lawgiver [(2012)] with specific moral insights or ethical sense? … 
I'm talking about a moral or ethical authorial intent.   
I'd love to read whatever you are willing to share on the topic. 
Wouk responded, “not much, this time,” then continued 
My answer to your question is "Of course!" Mark 
Twain once said, to this effect, "All I ever do 
is preach." 
Discerning the teachings is a teacher's job, like 
yours, while I go on with current work. 
I had two reactions to this response, which, incidentally, I found delightful.  First, I found 
Wouk’s words to be a validation of my own critical approach to literature: every reader ought to 
be reading in order to grow in his or her empathy, whether through Booth’s coductive process or 
by ways that Nussbaum identifies (which I will discuss in the next section).  If every reader 
ought to be reading that way, was it not fitting that a writer (whether Twain, Wouk, or others) 
write in order to make a moral point (“to preach”)?  My second reaction was to mull over the 
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challenge I felt as an educator: how could I bring a student to the emotional and intellectual point 
where contact with a favorite author would give them the feeling I had, of feeling like a star-
struck teen seeing the Beatles at Shea Stadium, screaming (perhaps not literally) with disbelief 
and delight?  I believe that my own experience as a reader is not unique; indeed, the mass 
numbers of books sold by Wouk and Stephen King, among others, prove that it is not – or at 
least their power to connect to readers, to become their “friends” in the Bothnian sense, is not 
limited to me.   
Blau (2003) writes of the “intentional fallacy,” which is “one of the foundational 
principles of the New Criticism,” explaining that “a writer’s intention – contrary to 
commonplace ideas about meaning – is not reliable as a source of authority in determining the 
meaning of a text” (107).  In essence, it does not matter what Wouk’s stated or unstated intention 
was in writing his works; what matters is what transaction I or any other reader makes when 
reading.  This point notwithstanding, Wouk’s brief distinction between the author and the teacher 
resonates for me.  While he goes on with “current work,” my role is to “discern the teachings.”  
But how to get my students to the same level of “judicious spectatorship” at which I found 
myself was (and is) not always so simple. 
 
III. The Novel as Vehicle for Empathy Education 
As a teacher, I found that although poetry could often convey what my ninth grade 
English teacher called an emotional snapshot of insight, I still thought that novels were the ideal 
vehicle to inculcate empathy.  The lengthier narrative of a novel, which allowed for a deepening 
of character and situation, gave me as a reader (and, I thought, gave my students) more 
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opportunities to connect emotionally and intellectually with the stories.  We had more chances to 
encounter what Rosenblatt (1995) calls “a diversity of temperaments and systems of value” and 
to “envision the effect of our actions” on the lives of others (212).  
Indeed, Nussbaum (1995) notes that the novel may well be one of the most succinct ways 
of conveying and inculcating empathy.9  Writing about Dickens’s Hard Times, she notes that a 
novel’s storytelling “gets its readers involved with the characters, caring about their projects, 
their hopes and fears, participating in their attempts to unravel the mysteries and perplexities of 
their lives.”  This is Rosenblatt’s aesthetic transaction, as Nussbaum acknowledges all but in 
name as she continues: “The participation of the reader is made explicit at many points in the 
narration.  And it is brought home to readers that the story is in certain ways their own story, 
showing possibilities for human life and choice that are in certain respects their own to seize, 
though their concrete circumstances may differ greatly” (31).  I sought constantly to show my 
students that the story was “in certain ways their own story” through the discussion questions I 
asked in class and the writing prompts that I assigned them.  (Some examples follow below.)  I 
was sometimes successful, and saw that students made connections between the text we studied 
and their own lives beyond the classroom.  Sometimes, however, no connection seemed to be 
made.  It is easy (and a bit snobbish) to assume that no connection ever took place; I can only 
report on what data I had at the time of assessment.  It may well be that connections occurred 
that I did not see or that seeds were planted for connections made weeks, months or years later. 
When writing to Herman Wouk, one of the texts I cited was Sir Philip Sidney (2004), 
who notes that that although “the philosopher teacheth… he teacheth those who are already 
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taught.  But the poet is the food for the tenderest stomachs: the poet is indeed the right popular 
philosopher” (18).  Is my intellectual stomach tender today thanks to my voracious reader’s 
appetite?  Perhaps.  Sidney is talking to – and about – me.  Booth (1988) notes that “all works do 
teach or at least try to” (152).  I don’t know if I saw literature as a vehicle for conveying ethics 
when I was an emergent reader; that idea really only developed for me when I began teaching.  
But the seeds were sown in the love that I felt for the power of story as a child and the 
intoxicating pull it had over me.  Did my Orthodox Jewish background have anything to do with 
this?  In the sense that both my parents highly valued education and reading per se, yes; I can 
hardly claim, however, that such values are exclusive to Orthodox Judaism.  The repeated 
challenge was trying to bring the love and awareness that I possessed to younger readers who 
were not yet at my point in life.  As an educator, I firmly believe that such an awareness is 
teachable at age-appropriate levels – indeed, a student’s experience of reading would be much 
more powerful with that awareness.  I myself possessed it to a degree as an adult, but only 
because I had brought it to my own attention.  I did not want to rely on the possibility of students 
discovering this for themselves.  I wanted more of a sure thing.  
When I finally and ecstatically began teaching both Judaic Studies and English literature, 
I thought that each of these curricula would inspire my students, albeit in diverse ways.  I was 
teaching in the Manhattan school I had myself attended from kindergarten through twelfth grade.  
Some of my former teachers were now my colleagues; it was difficult to address some of them 
by their first names.  I had daily flashes of déjà vu, and I enjoyed the “coming home” aspect of 
my teaching career immensely: now I could give back to the place that had given me so much.    
The experience of time folding upon itself only redoubles exponentially in my current 
recall and retelling of those moments.  Tappan and Brown (1991) write that “when an individual 
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tells a moral story about an experience in his own life, he must necessarily reflect on that 
experience.”   Thus, “such reflection also entails learning from the event narrated, in the sense 
that the individual has the opportunity to consider what happened, what he thought, felt, and did, 
and how things turned out” (182, italics in original).  This study has allowed me to accomplish 
such reflection.  Haidt (2012) writes of the “narratives that people create to make sense of their 
lives.”  He explains that “these narratives are not necessarily true stories – they are simplified 
and selective reconstructions of the past, often connected to an idealized vision of the future” 
(328).  Muncey (2010) adds that “Our current world view may be seen to be a distillation of life 
so far, coloured by an anticipation of what life may hold in the future” (13).   My current 
interpretation of my early teaching days and early reading days is most certainly colored by my 
agenda of engendering empathy through the reading and teaching of literature.   Although the 
“coloring” in this case is retrospective, not prospective, Muncey and Haidt’s principles remain 
the same.  And the issue of self-revisionism is, for me, largely irrelevant: as Haidt (2012) further 
writes, “even though life narratives are to some degree post hoc fabrications, they still influence 
people’s behavior, relationships, and mental health” (328).  This hearkens back to my discussion 
of the unreliability of memory in chapter three.   
After starting to teach, I soon felt that the classroom give-and-take in my Judaic courses, 
which had overtly moralist agendas, had appreciably fewer meaningful discussions of issues of 
moral decision-making than did my English classes.  In my Judaic Studies classes, I taught Bible, 
Jewish law, and classical Jewish philosophy.  Students seemed to simply take notes, ask 
clarifying questions, take tests, and move on.  There was little evidence of internalization of the 
overt values that we studied.  Indeed, the impact of what we studied seemed negligible: the 
regard in which they held the traditional texts that we studied – or in which, at least, they acted 
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as if they held these texts – seemed to place these texts in virtual museum-like, alarmed glass 
cases.  The texts were sacrosanct, and therefore the transactions, the coductions, the empathy-
creation, were at a minimum.  English classes, however, had much less of a stigma of 
untouchability: students reacted strongly, whether verbally or in writing, to the choices made by 
Jane Eyre, Lady Macbeth, or Atticus Finch; indeed, they did so far more than they did to those 
choices made by Moses, King David or the rabbis of the Talmud.  My teaching methodology and 
enthusiasm, to my mind, were constants, as they did not vary significantly from one course to the 
other; the curriculum, therefore, must have been the critical variable.  If my goal was not merely 
to teach texts for skills and content, but rather to teach ideas and thoughtful, reflective decision-
making, my English classes were the better places to foment such learning.  T. S. Eliot (1964) 
cites Ben Jonson’s description of literature as “the absolute mistress of manners, and nearest of 
kin to virtue” (46).  This became a key epigram for me, because moments of literature serving as 
the catalyst to a discussion of manners and or virtue occurred far more often in English class than 
in Bible class.  
Indeed, it was an essay in English class, not a Bible class, where one tenth-grade student, 
Erica, confessed that she had been struggling with issues of anorexia.  As students wrote about 
journeys they had taken (after we had read The Canterbury Tales and The Remains of the Day), 
this student chose to write about the journey of her battle with food and her body image.  I was 
used to my English students opening up regarding their own connections to the text.  Rosenblatt 
(1995) reminds us that when the reader draws on “past linguistic and life experience,” he or she 
“links the signs on the page with certain words, certain concepts, certain sensuous experiences” 
(30).  Erica had connected the texts we had read with her own journey and had come up with a 
narrative of her fears about her weight.  This was both a psychological connection as well as a 
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moral one for Erica: she saw this issue as a choice between right and wrong.  In Rosenblatt’s 
(1995) words, Erica drew upon the texts’ “special meanings” and “submerged associations” (30).   
When, after nervously receiving coaching from the school psychologist, I discussed the topic 
with Erica and later, with her father as well, both pooh-poohed my concerns: this was merely an 
essay for English class, I was told.  Still, I remained unconvinced that she had left this journey.  
Her writing was too compelling.  For me, as a rabbi and teacher, the moral issues raised for me 
by this confession required me to act responsibly, with what Rogers (1980) calls “realness” 
(271).  I will return to this concept in chapter six. 
Erica is fine today: I attended her wedding a few years ago (she married another former 
student, no less).  She recently became a mother herself.  But the essay that she wrote some 
fifteen years ago – in what is her own mini-autoethnography, I suppose – came to light in the 
context of English class, not in an informal weekend retreat session or in a Jewish law or 
philosophy class.  It occurred in the class where she felt comfortable discussing how she felt and 
what she thought.  The moral issues raised by students abounded in such classes. 
When I taught Dickens’s Great Expectations over several years to tenth graders, I found 
myself time and again focusing on the moral elements of the story: namely, those aspects that 
addressed the character’s interpersonal relationships and evaluations of their behavior, choices 
and ethics.  For example, on one essay assignment, I asked students to choose between topics 
that included comparing two parent-child relationships in the text (“characters need not be 
biologically related,” I added); comparing “different models of homes that Dickens creates in the 
novel,” which asked students to “discuss Dickens’s vision of a perfect home;” and discuss “the 
influence of money on the characters” in the novel.   
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My goal in this assignment was to have students think beyond concrete questions of 
vocabulary, plot, and dialogue and instead to make connections between characters and think 
about those characters’ relationships.  Ultimately, I wanted them to draw connections to their 
own lives and their own relationships.  Rosenblatt (1995) reminds us that in “a turbulent age,” 
students need to learn to understand themselves and to “work out harmonious relationships with 
other people” (3).  She reminds us that while in another age such “development of emotional 
attitudes” would have been the job of the home, this has now become the job of the school (161).  
Another of my exam prompts therefore read: 
We have discussed that the protagonist of this novel may not be its most heroic 
character.  Why do you think this is so?  Why would Dickens place the principles 
that he values in characters other than Pip’s?  
 Each of these topics was designed to bring students to think along lines of values – of 
judging the choices made by the novel’s characters and evaluating them as good or bad.  The 
agenda of inculcating moral decision-making through the understanding of literature was clearly 
already part of my educational goals for my class.  I say this with confidence, relying on Chang’s 
(2008) postulate that by studying what I recall and what data I choose to present, I can “discover 
how [my] present thoughts and behaviors are rooted in past events” (134).  Although I only 
began to be able to articulate this personal educational philosophy when I found the language to 
do so while in graduate school, the connection was nonetheless there.  Blau (2003) makes a 
critical distinction between students and teachers.  The latter have “a fairly sophisticated capacity 
to recognize and talk about the condition of our understanding.”  He explains that teachers who 
are sophisticated readers typically “know the difference between what [they] do and don’t 
understand and to what degree [they] do or don’t understand. [They] are, in other words, 
metacognitively aware” (41).  My students were not able to articulate their transactions at 
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whatever level they were occurring.  Despite these developmental differences, I still wanted 
students to begin to articulate their own sets of values, to begin becoming metacognitive.    
The theory of Booth and Nussbaum enables me to better understand the way I am a 
reader and the way I want my students to become readers as well.  The compassion that I felt for 
the characters I read and taught, from those of Wouk to those of Dickens was the empathy of the 
“judicious spectator” that I had developed as a reader and teacher of text.  It is the lens of Robert 
Coles, whose work spurred me not only to feel for the characters I read but actually influenced 







 A Third Lens: The Kinship of Books 
 
I.  Kinsmen and Advisers: Literature as a Values Teacher 
I understood intuitively what Coles (1989) means when he writes that stories “can not 
only keep us company, but admonish us, point us in new directions, or give us the courage to 
stay a given course.”  Coles sees this power of stories in his classes at Harvard College and 
Harvard Medical School.  He adds that stories “can offer us kinsmen, kinswomen, comrades, 
advisers – offer us other eyes through which we might see, other ears through which we might 
make soundings” (159).  As I gained reading independence and I began reading novels, I became 
conscious of developing an identity as a “reader,” i.e., someone who found reading pleasurable, 
and I enjoyed having that identity.  I added it to my list of personal characteristics: oldest sibling, 
only son, New Yorker.  Muncey (2010) writes that “multiple identities and reflexivity give us the 
capacity for empathy and entry to another’s world of meaning” (23).  I found a new identity to 
add to my own persona, which deepened my empathy.  I began to develop an awareness of the 
needs, likes and dislikes of others, and the books I read helped me to do so.  While this was not 
yet a purely moral lens, it was definitely the beginning of my development of one. 
Muncey (2010) writes that “what makes autoenthnography different from normal 
autobiographies is that an autoethnographic account should attempt to subvert a dominant 
discourse” (31).  The dominant discourse of Language Arts and English classes in my own 
education had been the inculcation of skills and knowledge; I sought to subvert that discourse 
and replace it with one of moral decision-making.  In my case, I am not so much accomplishing 
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this through autoethnography as much through my own reading and teaching life. Current trends, 
as we will see, do not see reading and English education in this way, but for a long time prior 
they were indeed seen this way.  From Sidney to Arnold, and on in many ways to Rosenblatt, 
Greene and Blau, literature has been seen as a primer for making ethical or moral evaluations.   
However, my own literature education, at the elementary grades at least, reflects the 
current “dominant discourse.”  On my fourth-grade report card, the “Language Arts” section is 
divided into the categories of “Reading,” “Grammar,” Spelling,” “Composition,” and 
“Handwriting.”  There is no meaning-making in sight.  (Indeed, what does “Reading” even mean 
here?  It is a vague category, and likely refers to mechanical aptitude, but it does not seem to be a 
category gauging deep reflection.) 
Figure 2. 
 
The teacher’s comment, after complimenting me on “two very good book reports,” goes 
on to say that “Considering his ability, he’s made very little progress in [unintelligible] reading 
skills work.”  My teacher, Mrs. Shaw (whom we all loved and feared; she was a legend at 
school) concluded with a reminder to “make a greater effort to improve his cursive writing.”   
79 
 
There is no mention of whether I was an empathic reader or whether I was able to coduct the 
texts that we studied.  The entire focus of the commentary and the categories of grading seems to 
be skills-based.  I loved to read, to think about the ideas about which the narratives made me 
think, and (when I found it possible) to discuss my impressions with others.  I remember writing 
my first-ever “book report” in fourth grade, on a biography of Alexander Graham Bell.  I recall 
summarizing key facts from the book, spending a long time trying to create an attractive cover, 
but very little time reflecting on what ideas or values the book raised for me.  I do not fault Mrs. 
Shaw for teaching us in this way, and I do not recall ever trying to share my values or 
impressions with her – but I do not recall ever being asked what the books we read made us think 
about, what values or ideas they addressed, challenged, or reinforced. 
 My fifth-grade report card presents similar criteria. 
Figure 3. 
 
The categories are the same as those of the prior year.  The comment, from my teacher 
Mr. S., now reads that my “abilities in Language Arts are quite extensive.”  Although I did 
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produce “some truly excellent work,” I need to “maintain the high standards” that I was “capable 
of more consistently.”  I think he was referring to the independent creative work that was 
assigned.  In class, we read assigned texts (more on that below), and also had the option of 
selecting independent texts for creative group work.  Mr. S. allowed us to be imaginative in the 
group projects that we produced.  Wilhelm (2008) notes that “little emphasis has been placed on 
what readers actually do to go beyond simple comprehension of story action to evoke the text 
and elaborate upon it as a ‘story participant’” (121).  Indeed, Mr. S. had an elaborate points 
system that awarded students “Reading Points,” which were awarded based on what level reader 
the teacher had rated each of us, and “Project Points,” which were based on creativity and on our 
attention to detail – and which were relatively more objective.  I vividly recall the project I 
worked on with two classmates, creating taped interviews of characters from Roald Dahl’s James 
and the Giant Peach (1961).  We all received high “Project Points” for creativity and attention to 
detail; my classmates received much higher “Reading Points” for reading this book than did I.  
This stung, because I had already begun to realize that certain books were “too easy” for me and 
were not “too easy” for some of my classmates, and I found this difference to be a burden – it 
was being held against me.  I do not think such a system taught me to reflect on the values of the 
books I was reading, nor do I remember ever being asked to provide such reflections.  If 
anything, it taught and encouraged the commodification of books. 
While Mr. S. in fifth grade took a more creative approach than did Mrs. Shaw in fourth 
grade, neither teacher demanded of me to access the moral impressions that were already 
accruing in my psyche.   (In Mr. S.’s defense, I will add that he did attempt to have students 
access their creativity in ways that other teachers did not.  An aficionado of creative student 
response, Mr. S. would play record albums for us in class to stimulate creative writing and 
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assigned our class a “Freedom Project” which explored the concept of freedom in literature and, 
by extrapolation, in our own experience.  Wilhelm and Novak (2011) cite Elbow, who writes that 
“When we teach students to write, that which they write is itself a literary text and an 
introduction to the literary community” (42).  Mr. S. believed so.)  Still, the overt empathy of 
which Coles writes, the identity of Nussbaum’s “judicious spectator,” and Booth’s coduction 
were all missing from my student experience – despite the fact that it was beginning to occur for 
me spontaneously. 
Rosenblatt (1995) writes that teachers of literature have greater impact on students than 
do other teachers, because “they foster general ideas or theories about human nature and conduct, 
definite moral attitudes, and habitual responses to people and situations” (4).  It is unclear from 
either of these documents if my teachers did or did not subscribe to such a philosophy.  The 
categories and comments certainly do not indicate any emphasis on developing what Rosenblatt 
(1995) calls “an inner center from which to view in perspective the shifting society” (3).   These 
categories were deliberately established by teachers and administrators.  But did those teachers in 
fact attempt to help me make connections to develop what Rosenblatt (1995) calls the “social 
imagination” (179)?  Leavis (1958) similarly writes that the study of literature “is, or should be, 
an intimate study of the complexities, potentialities, and essential conditions of human nature” 
(184).  Was that taking place in my fourth and fifth grade classrooms? 
Not much of the dominant discourse has changed: in the school which I now lead, fifth 
grade report cards have the following categories for Language Arts: ’Just Right’ Book Reading 
Level; Spelling Usage; Vocabulary; Listening; Comprehension; Oral Expression; and Written 
Expression.  Additional categories are Displays Organization; Shows Effort; Follows Directions; 
Works Independently; Completes Homework; Class Participation; Completes Classwork; 
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Respects Others; and Shows Self-Control.  I am saddened but not surprised that there are no such 
categories as Coducts Well with Others or Transacts Deeply and Thoughtfully. When mentoring 
new teachers at the elementary and middle school levels, I have tried to introduce the idea of 
“asking thinking questions” as a means to engaging students at the ideological or proto-moral 
level, but they are not always able (or willing) to do so, as they are often more concerned with 
their students attaining specific reading and decoding skills than they are with students’ moral 
growth. 
Teachers in my private school come by such reluctance honestly: our school in Great 
Neck directly competes with some of the best public schools in the country.  The district’s 
curriculum is Common Core driven, and our teachers must teach the same materials and 
approach if we are to retain students.  The dominant discourse of the current ELA Common Core 
Standards ignores the moral dimension of literature entirely.:   
The 2018 Common Core English Language Arts Standards look to teach “the ability to 
gather, comprehend, evaluate, synthesize, and report on information and ideas, to conduct 
original research in order to answer questions or solve problems, and to analyze and create a high 
volume and extensive range of print and nonprint texts in media forms old and new.”10  There is 
no mention of the potential moral or ethical influence of literature.  In order for students to be 
prepared for college and career, they need to be “proficient in reading complex informational 
text independently in a variety of content areas.”  Much of what these students will need to read 
in college and beyond, note the authors, is going to be “informational in structure and 
challenging in content.”   
                                                          
10 See http://www.corestandards.org/ELA-Literacy/introduction/key-design-consideration/, accessed 4/1/18. 
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The Core Standards argue for a return to mechanics, one where students will 
“demonstrate independence,” “build strong content knowledge,” “respond to the varying 
demands of audience, task, purpose and discipline,” “comprehend as well as critique,” and 
“value evidence.”11  While these are all inarguably admirable curricular goals, there is nothing 
about the character growth that students could – or should – attain through encountering 
literature.  While students do “come to understand other perspectives and cultures,” they do so in 
order to “communicate effectively with people of varied backgrounds” and to “vicariously 
inhabit worlds and have experiences much different than their own.”  This is the closest the 
Standards come to any type of moral awareness, but the trajectory is more utilitarian than 
morally directed: wide reading will help the reader effectively navigate a variegated world; it 
will not help them alter their values or thinking. 
Searches for the terms “judgment” and “morality” within the Standards returned no 
results.  A search for the term “moral” returned the following from the Grade 2 Reading: 
Literature Standard: students need to be able to “Recount stories, including fables and folktales, 
from diverse cultures, and determine their central message, lesson, or moral.”12  A similar 
Standard appears in Grade 3, which adds that students should also be able to “explain how it is 
conveyed through key details in the text”13  So although the Standards do acknowledge the 
existence of morals, the “moral” is little more than yet another textual element to be proven and 
analyzed.  This is far from the definition of “moral” with which I have been operating but is one 
with which teachers across the country are saddled.  Interestingly, I would further add that the 
                                                          
11 See http://www.corestandards.org/ELA-Literacy/introduction/students-who-are-college-and-career-ready-in-
reading-writing-speaking-listening-language/, accessed 4/1/18. 
12 http://www.corestandards.org/ELA-Literacy/RL/2/2/, accessed 4/1/18. 
13 http://www.corestandards.org/ELA-Literacy/RL/3/2/, accessed 4/1/18. 
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dominant discourse of the Judaic Studies sides of both my own elementary school report cards 
and those employed by my school today have categories that are largely similar to those of the 
language arts categories listed above, with one important exception: students’ aptitude and 
ability in Hebrew decoding and comprehension is paramount.  However, there is an additional 
grade given for tefilla, “prayer,” which essentially asks teachers to observe and report on how 
seriously and fervently their students pray each day.  An analysis of how that might be accurately 
observed is beyond the scope of this study, but the uniqueness of the additional category is 
noteworthy. 
By scrutinizing my own report cards from 1979 and 1980, I see that in my elementary 
years I was not overtly held to the standards of coduction or empathy which I came to see years 
later were (or at least should have been) the goals for my reading life, and I understand the 
context in which my teachers operated and in which educators today continue to operate.  
Despite my fuller understanding, I still see a tremendous gap.   
 
II. Lost Opportunities 
When I became a teacher and eventually became a graduate student and researcher, I 
slowly gained an adult perspective on the phenomenon of readers who choose to engage in texts 
at varying intensities, but what still bothered me was the lost opportunity for the text to impact 
them.  Rosenblatt (1995) would say such readers’ reading was “efferent,” i.e., focusing 
“primarily on the impersonal, publicly verifiable aspects of what the words evoke” (xvii).   I 
wanted everyone to evince an immediate (and ideally dramatic) “aesthetic” reading, one which 
focused on and experienced “the moods, scenes, situations being created during the transaction” 
85 
 
(xvii).  As Booth (2010) writes, “The change may endure for only the few hours of the reading 
encounter… Or the effects may be more lasting, with spillover into my actions tomorrow or even 
for the rest of my life…” (85).   I wanted everyone to experience the latter.  While in elementary 
school, I was bothered when my friends did not seem to be as entranced by the books we read as 
I was.  I recall the sense of frustration, echoes of which I still feel today, although I have long 
since resignedly accepted it as reality: why couldn’t my friends see the same agent for change 
that they held in their hands that I saw?     
At the same time, I readily acknowledge that this is an unfair assessment: how can I 
know another reader’s transaction, and how can I know that it did not take place in a different 
way – or perhaps even at a different time?  Perhaps the specific texts we were reading did not 
speak to them as other texts did or would later in their reading lives: Coles (1989) notes that 
different readers find different texts that address their emotional and psychological needs.  Other 
students connect with other texts.  As Coles also notes, “Obviously, even a novel or story that 
produces moral implications for some readers can fail to have such an influence on others” (181).  
At the time, I did not understand this: for me, every book seemed to be impactful, sharpening and 
influencing my values. Like the voracious reader described by Davis (1992), I often felt (and still 
do) “addicted” to reading.  He writes that “Of course literally his life did not depend upon 
reading.  But it was as if psychologically, emotionally, spiritually – call it what you will – it was 
true: he was reading for dear life” (xix).  This was how I felt when a new book fell into my 
hands; my life depended on reading it.   
  Of course, not all my school reading experiences were thrilling or ecstatic romps.  I 
think many students undergo a split in their reading lives: there is the literature that they are 
assigned and the literature that they enjoy – and the twain seldom overlap.  I vividly recall the 
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first book I was assigned in school that I did not enjoy: Conrad Richter’s The Light in the Forest 
(1953), in the same fifth grade class mentioned above.  Unlike the independent reading option 
that allowed students to choose the books for points, we also were assigned texts to be read by 
the entire class.  I found the pace of Richter’s novel slow and the story uninteresting.  I did not 
care about the plight of the main character, a boy who had been raised by Lenape Indians who is 
reunited in young adulthood with his natural family.  I remember feeling guilty that I could not 
summon more empathy, but I just could not forge a connection with the characters or the 
situation.  Nonetheless, I was committed to completing the reading even when I did not enjoy the 
text.  It was revelatory for me that it would be difficult to connect to a book assigned in school.  
At the time, I thought this depressing, but anomalous.  I vividly remember the first time I 
skimped on assigned reading was not until my first year of college, when I ran out of time to read 
Virgil’s Aeneid before the final exam in my Literature Humanities course at Columbia College.  I 
read a summary instead.  I still feel guilty – and like I missed out on something really good – to 
this day.  (And, in full disclosure, I have not yet returned to that text.)  The assigned texts often 
did not have the same pull for me as did those I chose on my own.   
Rosenblatt (1995) writes that a “reader seeks to participate in another’s vision – to reap 
knowledge of the world, to fathom the resources of the human spirit, to gain insights that will 
make his own life more comprehensible” (7).  I avidly sought with each reading to “reap 
knowledge,” and find that I still do today as my reading life continues.  Rosenblatt describes an 
ideal reader, one that I often felt that I was, but not one I could always be, as the assigned 
reading would occasionally feel fathomable, but more often the literature that I chose for myself 




III. Welcome Back, Kobrin 
When I began teaching English after several years as a Judaic studies instructor, I wanted 
my English classroom to be a space where students analyzed right and wrong, good and evil – 
and learned how to make thoughtful choices.  Arnold (1865) famously argues that “poetry is at 
bottom a criticism of life; that the greatness of a poet lies in his powerful and beautiful 
application of ideas to life, – to the question: How to live” (353).   My tenth-grade students were 
curious, and genuinely wanted to learn “how to live.”  Coles (2010) writes that certain books 
“treat these questions: How does one live a life?  What kind of a life?  And for what purpose?” 
(181). I was – and remain – convinced that my English class could help my students find the 
answers to some of these questions or, at the very least, help them learn how to better articulate. 
I vividly recall the first day of teaching English.  I had already established myself and my 
reputation in the school as a Judaic Studies teacher, but it was clearly somewhat jarring for the 
students to meet me in their English classroom.  In the school, Ramaz, a Modern Orthodox 
Jewish high school (and my alma mater) teachers were for the most part easily categorized: 
Judaic studies classes were taught by rabbis or Orthodox Jewish women, and General studies 
courses were taught by teachers who either did not practice their Judaism or were not Jewish.  
The English department was no exception; and students were initially not sure what to make of 
me as their teacher.  One, who had seen from her schedule that she would be seeing me again 
later in the day in a Jewish law class, asked, “Do we need to call you ‘Rabbi’ in English class 
too?”  At the time, I found this funny – but in retrospect I began to think that if a “rabbi” was a 
teacher of moral decision making, then I could be a more successful “rabbi” by using English 
texts than I sometimes could using traditional Jewish texts. 
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Coles (1989) writes of Richard, one of his undergraduate students at Harvard, who, when 
diagnosed with a tumor, found solace and support in reading works of fiction.  Richard told his 
father that he was consulting with a group of people, and humorously revealed that their names 
were a list of famous novelists.  Coles describes how Richard “was trying, really, to imagine the 
unimaginable, with the help of those who are quite good at putting the imagination to work.”  
Richard did so “not only for aesthetic reasons but for an urgent moral reason: how ought I bear 
myself, if at all possible, under these extraordinary circumstances?” (186-188).   In many ways, I 
saw my students as potentially similar to Richard (fortunately not medically).  I wondered if 
there was there a way to bring them to make such connections.  I could not imagine that it 
requires a life-threatening experience to bring about such an ability or such a desire; it had not 
taken any such experience for me to ask myself these questions.  I wondered if I had thought this 
way at my students’ age with or without realizing that I did. 
Kress (2012) writes of the pitfalls that befall teachers who seek not to approach “youth as 
partners” but rather to “fix” their students’ attitudes and ideals.  I was (and to a degree remain) 
guilty of such a mindset.  But as I discussed in Chapter 2, I rely on Holtz’s (2003) “didactic” 
approach to inculcating moral values as a guideline for my own approach. 
 
IV. Literature as a Primer 
There is a deep tradition of seeing literature as a potential primer for teaching values or 
ethics.  One of the earliest sources is Aristotle (1987), who in the Testimonia describes music 
(which, in his classification, includes poetry) as containing “especially close likenesses of the 
true natures of anger and mildness, bravery, temperance and all their opposites, and all of the 
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other [traits of] character…”  He adds that “we are moved in our soul when we listen to such 
things” (58).  As a reader, I had been “moved in my soul” by such authors as Norton Juster, 
Stephen King, Herman Wouk, Harper Lee, and Arthur C. Clarke.  I continued to be moved by 
authors both new and familiar, both those assigned in school and those chosen independently.  
This became a goal for me as a teacher and a researcher: I wanted to develop literature as a 
primer. 
When, as a graduate student and more experienced classroom teacher, I deepened my 
understanding of this ideology by reading Nussbaum (1995), who argues that reading novels 
allows readers to “investigate and embrace” the lives of ordinary citizens.  This investigation and 
embrace allows readers to feel deep empathy for others.  As Nussbaum explains, “an ethics of 
impartial respect for human dignity will fail to engage real human beings unless they are made 
capable of entering imaginatively into the lives of distant others and to have emotions related to 
that participation” (32).  It seems to me a noble goal to imbue students with respect for human 
dignity.  The literature classroom can be much more than just a training ground for critical 
readers. 
In my lecture notes from those years (ca.1997 – 2000), when I was teaching tenth graders 
at Ramaz, I find references to overt points of “moral sensibility.”  In my notes on Oscar Wilde’s 
The Picture of Dorian Gray, for example, I wrote “[Lord] Henry doesn’t believe in sin – Morals 
are fear of society; Religion is fear of God – [it is] all based on cowardice.”  I felt it important to 
highlight the passages of Wilde’s novel that directly addressed the topic of morality.  My notes 
continue: “[He wants to] deny sin’s reality – ‘The only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield 
to it.’”  Apparently, I was not content to let this point stand on its own.  Immediately below this, 
with a large bold arrow, I wrote: “[This is the] opp[osite] of [Maimonides], where greater 
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[reward] is given to those tempted who [nonetheless] deny temptation.”  While I cannot recall 
the class discussion this engendered (or didn’t), my clear goal was to make a moral point.  This 
was one of my goals in teaching across the curriculum from Judaic studies to General studies, 
and I made such points consciously.  After all, I was a rabbi in English class too. 
I followed up such discussion with assessments.  On an in-class writing assignment dated 
September 10, 1997, one of the optional topics was “Critics in the 1890’s called The Picture of 
Dorian Gray ‘a poisonous book.’  Do you agree?  Is the book a bad influence?”  I was clearly 
inspired to use English class for such thinking.  On an exam, one of the statements to which 
students could opt to react read as follows: “When the Rabbis said ‘a sin creates [another] sin,’ 
they could have been talking about Dorian Gray.”14  By including rabbinic phrases and concepts, 
sometimes in the original Hebrew, I clearly sought to have my students make certain connections 
between the text and their outside knowledge.  This is the idea that Coles describes as he writes 
that  
the whole point of stories is not “solutions” or “resolutions” but a broadening and 
even heightening of our struggles – with new protagonists and antagonists 
introduced, with new sources of concern or apprehension or hope, as one’s mental 
life accommodates itself to a series of arrivals: guests who have a way of staying, 
but not necessarily staying put (129). 
I wanted the lens that I brought, whether from traditional Jewish sources or from other 
sources of literary criticism, to provoke my students into thinking about what their “guests” had 
made them consider – and to heighten and broaden their struggles.  When this worked, it was 
very satisfying.  When it did not, I was very frustrated at the missed opportunity for growth.   
                                                          
14 The original Hebrew (which is how it appeared on the exam) is הרבע תררוג הרבע, which literally translates “one 




I could not understand why my students did not adopt my own lens.  Greene (1995) 
writes that “most of us are finding out how necessary it is to discover the things we want to teach 
appear to young people who are often so unlike our remembered selves.”  This was indeed my 
experience.  As she continues, 
Listening to them, we frequently find ourselves dealing as never before with our 
own prejudgments and preferences, with the forms and images we have treasured 
through much of our lives.  What we have learned to treat as valuable, what we 
take for granted may be challenged in unexpected ways (188). 
This was to be an ongoing challenge for me, as it had been since I began reading 
alongside others.  What follows is one example of my experience. 
 
V. Teaching Mockingbird in Great Neck: A Case Study 
When the time came to teach Harper Lee’s (1960) novel To Kill a Mockingbird, I was 
ready for my students to make direct Colesian “heightening and broadening” of their struggles 
through the text.  The Jewish community in Great Neck is a mélange of cultures and ethnic 
groups; the school in which I teach and am Head of School, the North Shore Hebrew Academy, 
is a microcosm of the larger community.  Some sixty percent of the school’s student body is 
composed of students of Iranian descent, some of whom are first-generation Americans.  The rest 
of the students are relatively landed gentry, descendants of Ashkenazi (Western European) Jews 
whose families have been in America for at least two generations.  Although at first blush the 
two ethnic groups (and sub-groups within each group) would seem to share many religious 
values, in reality their immediate customs, practices and values systems – fueled by a disparate 
thousand years of cultural history and experience – often highlight their differences rather than 
their commonalities.  Not only are the traditional foods and languages different: the diversity 
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runs even deeper.  For example, while the Ashkenazi group has many members whose 
immediate ancestors are Holocaust survivors, none of the Iranian counterparts can relate to such 
a formative experience, as their entire community did not experience the Nazi occupation at all.  
Indeed, each group has its own synagogues, organizations and social networks.  Indeed, in the 
small-town Jewish community of Great Neck, one of the only meaningful shared spaces of 
interaction between these diverse ethnic groups is the school itself.   
The small town of Lee’s fictional Maycomb County, Alabama, with its intricate social 
hierarchy and exclusivist (or, more accurately, racist) social policies has many parallels to my 
students’ community in Great Neck.  Indeed, middle school students in general, extremely 
conscious of their social groups, often create exclusive cliques or groups populated by those of 
their cultural and historical background and interests.   I thought that all that remained was for 
me to open the eyes of my eighth graders to Lee’s lessons and the stereotypes would begin to 
erode before my eyes. 
The overtly moral text of Mockingbird seemed the perfect vehicle for teaching the evils 
of prejudice and racism.  My goals were straightforward: after identifying easily with the novel’s 
characters and its situations, students would be able to learn vicariously through those characters’ 
experiences.   I wanted first to foster connections between my students’ understanding of 
themselves and their community with those of Lee’s characters in 1930’s Alabama; and then to 
encourage and facilitate a Colesian “broadening and heightening” of their “struggle” (129).  
After providing students with a brief history and cultural overview of the Depression-era 
South and introducing such terms as bildungsroman and “Southern Gothic,” discussion of the 
novel began.  We discussed narrative voice, plot and character, but my real agenda was to give 
over the ethical concepts of the evils of succumbing to peer pressure; of admiring the individual 
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who stands up for what she believes is right; of the evils of prejudice and racism; of the positives 
and negatives of small town community life; and of parallels to the students’ own lives in Great 
Neck. 
In determining how best to teach these moral objectives, I first identified thematic tropes 
from Lee’s novel: for example, Atticus Finch’s advice to his children to see things from 
another’s point of view (30, 154, 157) or Atticus’s ideal of equality for all in the eyes of the law 
(205).  The passages mentioning these tropes were read aloud in class and were discussed at 
length.  The readings were accompanied by my overt focusing explications such as “this is very 
important,” “make sure you underline this passage,” or “this is a main theme in this book.”  In 
retrospect, I realize that such directions were too heavy-handed.  Blau (2011) notes that teachers 
can fall into the trap of wanting their students to derive particular wisdom or insight from 
particular texts, which causes those teachers to “short-circuit the process” that the students must 
undergo to attain those insights and wisdom for themselves (6).  Wilhelm (2008), mentioned 
above, advocates for the use of dramatization to engage students (145).  He notes that use of 
drama helps move students into Vygotsky’s Zone of Proximal Development (150).  Using 
drama, which had been effective when I taught the drama Twelve Angry Men, would have been a 
less direct mode to bring about an emotional connection with the text for my students – but I did 
not think of it at the time. 
I next sought to find points of connection between the students’ experience and that of 
the novel’s characters.  Such points ranged from those that were specific to the school and local 
community to those that related to being a teenager seeking definition of self.  Examples 
included mentioned the setting of the overtly religious community of the fictional Maycomb 
County, with such sects as the town’s “foot-washing Baptists” (44), and compared them to the 
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religious groups with which students were familiar in their small town of Great Neck; we 
analyzed the relationship between Atticus Finch and his children, Jem and Scout, and discussed 
what makes an effective parent; we spoke of the double life that the children’s African-American 
housekeeper, Calpurnia, reveals when she takes them to her church (44), and discussed if anyone 
in class has such diverse ways of relating with different people in their lives; and we discussed 
the need that the novel’s children (and many other characters) have of accurately categorizing 
others as “black” or “white” or “poor” or “country,”15 and commented that many eighth graders 
(and others) feel the need to do the same in our school.   We also spent a great deal of time 
discussing racism, both within the novel and beyond it.  Again, if I could do it all over again, I 
would ask the students to generate their own lists or questions, perhaps while working in small 
groups, which would enable them to obtain their own knowledge and experience of the text 
rather than what Blau (2011) calls “borrowed knowledge,” which is not their understanding of 
the text, but rather is only an understanding of the teacher’s understanding (4).   
This may well explain why some students were frustrated when reading To Kill a 
Mockingbird.  Some found the book’s vocabulary and length difficult.  In an anonymous survey 
response, one wrote that the book “was a slow read and did not make me want to know what 
happens.”  Another wrote that “although parts were interesting and exciting[,] the majority of the 
book was slow and boring.”  But while some students had difficulty accessing the text, I 
experienced different frustrations as their teacher.  I thought that the connections between the 
novel and the students’ experience would be as blatant for the students as they seemed to be for 
me; these connections, however, did not always seem to resonate for the class.  Blau predicts this 
                                                          
15 For example, when Mr. Dolphus Raymond, a white character with a black wife, is introduced, Jem and Scout 
have difficulty determining where in the community he would fit (161). 
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as well, noting that teachers who have decided on a particular understanding or meaning of the 
text will resist any questions or lack of enthusiasm, seeing them as challenges to their own 
authority as teachers (5). 
On the other hand, the experiences reported by students of feeling disconnected from the 
text and its messages were not universally negative.  One student wrote that he liked the book 
“because it was filled with suspense.”  This was not the connection for which I had hoped, but it 
was something.  In the Rosenblattian (1995) sense, this was a connection of verbal stimuli to a 
kind of “intense experience” out of which “social insights” would hopefully “arise” (31).  And 
indeed, they did arise: on a deeper level, the same student added that he could relate to the book 
because “I’m a Jew and the book is filled with racism.”   
One immediate challenge that arose was the difficulty of assessing the successful 
teaching of a moral lesson.  If such growth occurs when a belief or value alters within an 
individual, can such learning even be assessed at all?  In a paper that I wrote in spring of 2011 
for a graduate school course, I asked: “Are there specific formats of questions for a unit test?  Is 
an essay superior to short answer questions in determining student knowledge – or, more 
accurately, absorbing – of such lessons?  The best way of determining student moral growth in a 
written (or even oral) assessment is unclear.”  I would add the following questions today: are 
there multiple formats that could be used – and what might each format yield for my students?  
What, for example, would an essay provide that short answer questions would not, and vice 
versa?  I had students write mini-paragraphs of two- to three- sentence reactions to specific 
prompts at arbitrary points during class discussion, and I asked them to write an essay on an 
instance of racism that they had experienced and their reactions to it.  Students also took part in a 
non-graded, anonymous survey six weeks after finishing the novel.   
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I did not see the mini-paragraphs.  Students only them read out loud on a volunteer basis, 
and they served as self-reflective assessments rather than as graded ones.  The essays, on the 
other hand, provided me with much more data.  The prompt for the student’s essays was the 
following: 
An act of racism is when someone says something or does something to someone 
else based on assumptions about their color, religion or nationality. 
In four or five paragraphs, briefly describe an incident where you were either 
party or witness to an act of racism.  After your brief description, explain how you 
felt at the time (or afterwards). 
Students wrote essays during class time to ensure that they submitted their own work and 
were not helped at home by others or by internet research. 
A number of the essays were insightful.  One student described an incident of an anti-
Semitic comment to his friend and the impact of the comment on the victim.  He concluded: “I 
saw how much racism can change a person, so after that day I made a vow to never make a 
stereotipical [sic] comment again.”  Another wrote of her grandmother’s unintentionally loud 
racist comment about her African-American caregiver.  These and similar responses were 
satisfactory to me in that they demonstrated that students had an understanding of the term 
“racism” as we had defined it and they had made a successful connection to outside knowledge, 
all of which are the beginning of Wayne Booth’s “coductive” learning experience and show a 
Colesian process of “heightening and broadening.”  As Rosenblatt (1994) explains,  
the reader’s attention to the text activates certain elements in his past 
experience… Meaning will emerge from a network of relationships among the 
things symbolized as he senses them.  The symbols point to these sensations, 
images, objects, ideas, relationships, with the particular associations or feeling-
tones created by his past experiences with them in life or in literature (11). 
This “making of meaning” was what I hoped was taking place.  
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It was difficult, however, to determine fully from the student writing if an emotional 
awareness and actual moral learning was achieved.  “When a person is racist in our generation it 
is scary and confusing,” wrote one student. “Everyone feels uncomfortable in racist situations 
[sic] and you have to learn to ignore them.”  The student did not elaborate on what such a 
situation might be.  Was this written from the perspective of a victim, or that of a bystander?  
Another student wrote that racism is “a gruesome thing and it can lead to physically destroying 
whole races at a time, as well as mentally damaging someone, from the inside out.”  I was (and 
remain) curious about what past life or literature experiences this student drew upon – but the 
student did not share them.  I would love to be able to help students to articulate that process for 
themselves as they learn to become more “aesthetic” readers.   Rosenblatt (1994) writes that such 
a reader “pays attention to the associations, feelings, attitudes, and ideas that these words and 
their referents arouse within him.”  The reader’s attention is thus “centered directly on what he is 
living through during his relationship with that particular text (25, italics in original).  It is 
difficult for an emerging reader, with little ability to be metacognitive, to describe his or her 
transactional process. 
Blau (2003 and 2011) suggests that students create their own lists of questions as they 
read specific texts rather than respond to teacher-generated queries.  With the caveat that “many 
students are also unwilling to do the work that would be required for a thoughtful interpretation” 
and can produce quick and “inattentive and irresponsible” interpretations (2011, p. 7), they still 
need to be pushed to have their own experiences of literature, if only so that they will understand 
that a “strong reader” does not mean a reader without questions (8).  The student responses 
indicated an understanding that racism is evil, but they lacked a more subtle and nuanced 
comprehension – one of which I felt my students capable.  Perhaps, however, the comprehension 
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was achieved, and students were unable to express it – which reminded me again of the 
inadequacy of such assessments.   
Blau urges teachers to help students learn the “value of the interpretive problems, 
confusions, and questions they encounter in their reading” so they will see such moments as 
opportunities to grow in their own understandings of texts, rather than seeing them as “obstacles 
to their success as readers” (11). Wilhelm and Novak (2011) suggest that students email or post a 
“transactional journal” the night before they come to class to allow the instructor to prepare for 
the class discussion (133.)   The teacher can then show students how they are each reading the 
text differently and assist them in what Booth would call comparing coductions.  I did not 
employ any such methods in this instance.  Kress (2012) cites Smith and Denton, who note that 
some teachers are shy about teaching teens about religiosity.  There is “a curious reluctance 
among many adults to teach teens when it comes to faith.”  Adults do not want to seem “uncool” 
and therefore will only “expose” teens to religion and will not openly teach it (141).  I wondered 
if I had a similar reticence and therefore stopped short of fully engaging the students in the text. 
The student surveys were completed some six weeks after the Mockingbird unit ended.  
Students were assured that responses were anonymous, and the students were therefore more 
likely to respond with candor.   The survey consisted of the following four questions: 
1) What I remember most from To Kill a Mockingbird is: 
2) I think that the moral of To Kill a Mockingbird is: 
3) I liked / did not like this book because: 
4) I could / couldn’t relate to this book because: 
 
Students had varied responses.  In their responses to the first question, some remembered 
plot (“When Bob Ewell attacked them in the woods.  It was fantastic.”); some remembered 
characters (“Atticus”); some appreciated the representation of the 1930’s Southern setting.  
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Others remembered what seem to be moral lessons.  One student wrote that “What I remember 
most from TKAM is when Atticus said you don’t understand a person till you truely [sic] walk in 
their shoes.” 
Interestingly, even those students who firmly stated that they could not relate to the text 
had no difficulty making an ethical connection to the book.  The same student who responded 
that she could not relate because she is “growing up very differently than Jem and Scout and I 
have never experienced the same things as them” also wrote that she “liked this book because it 
is realistic and it teaches good lessons…” and added that “the moral of TKAM is… you can 
judge people once you already get to know them.”  Although some lessons (insofar as they were 
assessable) may have been learned, overall this proved an unsatisfying experience for me.  I 
wanted the students to experience the connection that I had made, to achieve what Rosenblatt 
(1995) calls their “inner center” (3) through the lens provided by Lee with To Kill a 
Mockingbird.  Noddings (2002) writes that “stories… play a central role in establishing identity 
and in both moral and political education” (62).  I wanted my students to establish their 
identities, but perhaps I was too ambitious, or perhaps they were not yet ready.  Or perhaps my 




 A Lens, but of Torah 
 
I. The Missing Link 
Each of the lenses detailed in the preceding three chapters have been very helpful in 
framing the modalities of my transactions with texts as well as the transactions I hoped to foster 
for my students.  But a gap still yawned for me on a personal philosophic level.  I firmly believed 
in the divine origin of the Biblical texts.  As such, how could these texts themselves not be the 
most inspiring?  How could they not be the best vehicles for conveying morals and the ability to 
make moral decisions?  In short, if I really believed the adage of Ben Bag Bag quoted in chapter 
five of the Ethics of the Fathers which reads הב אלוכד ,הב ךפהו הב ךפה – “search in it, and search in 
it, since all is in it,”16 what excuse did I have for looking to general literature for its moral 
educative power?  Could it be that my attraction to secular literature and my observations of its 
efficacy were merely second-rate compromises?  Rabbi Dr. Aharon Lichtenstein’s theology, 
ideology and philosophy bridged the gap for me. 
During my college years, Lichtenstein became a role model for me in how to see 
literature as a means to teaching good decision-making – although he does not frame terms as 
such.  Lichtenstein is a Matthew Arnold man; Arnold (1865) defines poetry as “nothing less than 
the most perfect speech of man, that in which he comes nearest to being able to utter the truth” 
(346).  The Victorian Arnold sees ethical education dimming: “morals” are losing their luster and 
have become “bound up with systems of thought and belief which have had their day; they are 
                                                          
16 The reference is to the Torah.  The maxim continues, “and in it you should look, and grow old and be worn in it; 
and from it do not move, since there is no character trait greater than it.” 
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fallen into the hands of pedants and professional dealers; they grow tiresome to some of us” 
(354).  How, then, to instruct students in the values that befit citizens of an ever-expanding 
world?  Arnold wants literature to fill this void, and, as we have seen, writes that “poetry is at 
bottom a criticism of life” and should answer “the question: How to live” (353).  Arnold’s ideas 
were encouraging, but the gap still yawned.  Arnold’s sentiment is echoed by Winters (1987), 
who writes that “the moral intelligence is merely the knowledge and evaluation of evil; and the 
moral intelligence is the measure of the man and the poet alike” (101).  I defined my use of the 
terms “moral” and “morality” in chapter two.  Before accessing Lichtenstein’s thought, however, 
the terms “moral” and “morality” require some further explication.  
 
II. A(nother) Brief Glossary of Terms 
As noted in chapter two, Hansen (2001) and Alexander (2001) provide the underpinning 
of my use of the term “moral.”  Hansen explains that “moral sensibility” is a combination of 
reason and emotion; teachers should seek to inculcate such in students.  Hansen explains that this 
sensibility is a fusion of “humaneness and thought” in the way one both “regards and treats 
others.”  Reason and emotion, he explains, must “mutually inform each other” (32).  Without 
such a fusion, one would either err on the side of sentimentality or harshness.  This appeals to 
me: it echoes the famous rabbinic description of God as balanced between םימחר, or mercy, and 
ןיד, or justice.  Hansen urges teachers to be morally “attentive,” which he defines as “being alert 
to students’ responses to opportunities to grow as persons – for example, to become more rather 
than less thoughtful about ideas and more rather than less sensitive to others’ views and 
concerns” (10).  This was the idea I invoked when dealing with Erica’s confession of anorexia 
described in chapter five: her tale required me to be attentive to her needs.  Erica was seeking a 
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growth (or, in this case, a healing) opportunity.  This was a moment for mercy, not justice.  
Hansen urges teachers to display “moral responsibility and moral seriousness,” which 
“encompass a concern for the impact on others of one’s beliefs and knowledge” (55).  This 
responsibility and seriousness, for me, is complemented by Rogers’s (1980) reminder that a 
teacher must also exhibit “realness, or genuineness,” which he explains means that the teacher 
enters into a relationship with students “without presenting a front or a façade.”  This enables the 
teacher to come “into a direct, personal encounter with the learners, meeting each of them on a 
person-to-person basis” (271).  The human connection is what teaching has always been about 
for me in both English and Judaic studies settings.   
As a teacher of Judaic texts, ideas and ideals, Hansen’s and Roger’s philosophies of 
education deeply resonate for me.  The agendas of Hansen and Alexander align with that of 
Nussbaum: all three see an improved society emerging from such an education.  This definition 
is my own hybrid creation: Ely, Vinz et al. (1997) describe how a researcher can act as 
“bricoleur,” who selects   
from a vast storehouse of existing theory, perhaps devising a new theory of one’s 
own, and relating theory to theory in a manner that best helps to interpret one’s 
findings among the various perspectives that compose for us circles within circles 
of theory (230). 
(Indeed, mixing-and-matching has been my methodology throughout this study, and 
throughout all of my research.  My hybrid method of literary-auto-ethno-pedogography is most 
certainly of the bricoleur school of theory.  What Lichtenstein offers is the missing piece that 
bridged my internal worlds and completes my understanding of literature and its effectiveness.) 
Like Hansen, Alexander sees the inculcation of such values within the purview of the 
teacher: “Teaching,” he writes, “…is a moral activity… in the sense that it strengthens the moral 
103 
 
agent within, empowering students to make moral choices more intelligently on their own” 
(143).  Although neither Hansen nor Alexander delineates a particular discipline in which their 
ideas can be best enacted, a successful literature classroom would certainly serve.  There is of 
course no guarantee that such any classroom, whether studying literature or any other subject, 
will succeed in inculcating moral sensibility.  George Steiner (1970), who worries about the 
example of Nazi death camps run by highly literate and educated individuals, writes that  
Unlike Matthew Arnold… I find myself unable to assert confidently that 
humanities humanize.  Indeed, I would go farther: it is at least conceivable that 
the focusing of consciousness on a written text, which is the substance of our 
training and pursuit, diminishes the sharpness and readiness of our actual moral 
response (61). 
The challenge for readers and for teachers of readers is to make the leap from the text to 
the “actual moral response.”  Whether this is accomplished through a Colesian lens, by 
Nussbaum-like empathy or by a Boothian coduction of a what-if scenario – and both I and my 
students experienced all three, at various points – the connection between reader and text ought 
to lead to “intelligent spirituality” and to what Hansen (2001) describes as a student “who can act 
in the world rather than merely being acted upon.”  Someone like this, he continues, is “a person 
who not only can think and judge but who also connects and embeds thought and judgment in 
actual conduct” (60).  Wilhelm (2001) writes that literature teachers should worry less about 
teaching books and more about “processes with which to approach books” (181).  If these three 
lenses through which I have viewed the reader’s transaction all follow parallel paths, there is a 
fourth lens as well, one which has had a major impact on my reading and teaching life, and in 
many ways complements and bridges the first three with my Orthodox Jewish sensibilities.  This 




III. A Fourth Lens  
The late Rabbi Dr. Lichtenstein was the leader of Yeshivat Har Etzion, an Israeli 
Talmudic academy, or yeshiva, in which I spent two years of study upon completing my BA at 
Columbia.  Lichtenstein’s educational background is atypical for a classic rosh yeshiva (the dean 
of a yeshiva).  He proudly held a doctorate in Milton from Harvard; his writings and talks are 
peppered with references to general culture, literature, philosophy, and history.  A polymath, 
Lichtenstein believed in the utility of general culture – and literature, specifically – as a vehicle 
to better understand God’s word and God’s world, two non-negotiable tenets of his belief 
system.  
For Lichtenstein, the study of literature complements and augments the study of 
traditional Jewish texts; the point of studying those traditional texts is both an attempt to explore 
the mind of God and to understand how to conduct oneself.  Studying general culture, he 
explains, can help one reach those goals.  Lichtenstein (2003) writes that “Secular studies 
possess immense intrinsic value insofar as they generally help to develop our spiritual 
personality.  Time and again, they intensify our insight into basic problems of moral and 
religious thought” (93).  For Lichtenstein – and for me – the study of literature thus becomes a 
spiritual act.  (His definition is more religiously traditional than that of Alexander’s [2001] 
“intelligent spirituality.”)  In this Lichtenstein is akin to Winters (1987) who writes that he 
cannot help believing in a greater power.  Winters writes  
If experience appears to indicate that absolute truths exist that we are able to work toward 
an approximate apprehension of them… then there is only one place where those truths may be 
located, and I see no way to escape this conclusion (14). 
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Religious spirituality and the reading of literature are not contradictory; rather, they 
complement one another.  Lichtenstein connects the previous lenses for me as well, as when 
Coles (1989) writes that he saw literature as a “spiritual mainstay” for his Harvard Medical 
School students “throughout their education” (99). 
 By deepening my understanding into how people think, feel, and relate with others, I 
have a better appreciation of the world, one that I believe God created.  I would smile and wince 
simultaneously each time I taught my class and re-read aloud the passage in chapter four of 
Dickens’s Great Expectations (1861) where Pip’s simple but good-hearted brother-in-law, Joe 
Gargery, repeatedly tries to mollify Pip’s hurt feelings as Mr. Pumblechook, Mr. and Mrs. 
Hubble, Mr. Wopsle, and Pip’s sister, Mrs. Joe take turns criticizing him.  All the inarticulate and 
outnumbered Joe can do is ladle more onto Pip’s plate.  Each time I read Pip’s repeated 
observation of how “Joe gave me more gravy,” I would feel Pip’s embarrassment and Joe’s 
compassion, and I appreciated the uniquely Dickensian combination of sweetness and pain that 
was at once comical and true to life.  This is what Nussbaum (1995) observes when she writes 
that “the reader’s delight in this novel has yet a further moral dimension as a preparation of 
moral activities of many kinds in life” (42).  For me, the moral and the spiritual are inextricably 
linked: a truly spiritual person is one who is truly moral as well.  Vicariously feeling Pip’s pain 
and Joe’s kindness made me want to avoid feeling such embarrassment (and to avoid 
embarrassing others) and made me want to show others kindness as well.  Lichtenstein’s thought 
gave me a way to connect the feelings evoked by the text with the values of Torah. 
Greene (1995) explains that art can be “a way of knowing.”  It offers a completely 
different means of accessing ideas.  As she continues, “The experience and knowledge gained by 
this way of knowing opens new modalities for us in the lived world; it brings us in touch with 
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our primordial landscapes, our original acts of perceiving” (149).  Reading Dickens – and then 
teaching and reteaching Dickens – connected me with my own “primordial landscape.” 
Noddings (2002) writes of the need for an “exercise of ethical imagination that forces us 
to consider the conditions under which we might lose our very way of being in the world” (50).  
Retelling this story accesses memories of such exercises – and causes me to perform them again.  
While I cannot say if Lichtenstein and Nussbaum are universally applicable to or resonant for 
every reader and every teacher of readers, their thought certainly applies to and resonates loudly 
for me.  But even were I to deny what the religious overtones seen by Lichtenstein and Winters 
offer me, I can fall back on Moffett’s (1994) explanation that “Spirituality is connectedness.”  As 
Moffett elaborates, a spiritual person “identifies with the rest of humanity and nature and sheds 
feelings of boundaries.”  He continues: “The more we identify with others, the better we treat 
them… Selfishness merely indicates an early stage of individualism, and one outgrows it by 
going forward, not backward” (71).  Moffett would undoubtedly take issue with Steiner (1970), 
who as I mentioned seriously questions the ability of the humanities to “humanize” (61).  Moffett 
writes that “highly developed individuals become necessarily more moral” (71).  I would argue 
that by utilizing a Lichtensteinian lens, one is less likely to emerge a Nazi than to emerge as 
Moffett’s morally connected individual.  
 
IV. The Profundity of Reading 
Whereas one might think that science, rather than literature, might shine greater light 
onto God’s handiwork, Lichtenstein (2003) demurs.  He writes: “History and the sciences show 
us the divine revelations manifested in human affairs and the cosmic order.  The humanities 
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deepen our understanding of man: his nature, functions, and duties” (93).  Elsewhere (1997), he 
adds that  
the humanities... deal with homo sapiens proper: with his existence and 
experience, his responses and reflections, with the insights of his rational faculties 
and the progeny of his creative powers… the humanities’ basic shared concert 
confers common spiritual import – and hence, to a degree, common status – as a 
complement to Torah (242). 
 
As discussed above, I see no contradiction between the search for meaning in text and the 
source of meaning in Jewish religious tenets and texts.  Carmy and Zuckier (2015) quote 
Lichtenstein’s reflection on appreciation the best in culture: “There are human beings… whose 
historical mission is a mission of creativity – literary creativity, moral creativity.  There are 
people in whom you see greatness, greatness of soul, moral greatness” (309).  My own love of 
literature is a love of such greatness, but it is ultimately a love of people – of their foibles, their 
thoughts, and their feelings.  To study literature is to study people: both those detailed within it 
and those responsible for creating it.  Lichtenstein (1997) writes that “the study of great literature 
focuses on a manifestation, albeit indirect, of [God’s] wondrous creation at [the cosmos’] apex” 
(245).  This was my experience as a reader and teacher of readers. 
Noddings (2002) cautions that “To produce good people we must provide a morally good 
education” (154).  By inhabiting the minds of the characters that I read, whether characters I 
adored from realist fiction such as Dr. Farrokh Daruwalla from John Irving’s A Son of the Circus 
(1994) or those of fantasy fiction such as Tolkien’s Hobbits, I gain a deeper understanding of 
actual “characters” – i.e., actual people – which has been a major part of my own “morally good 
education.”  Booth (1988) writes that “… we are all equipped, by a nature (a “second nature”) 
that has created us out of story, with a rich experience in choosing which life stories, fictional or 
“real,” we will embrace wholeheartedly (484).  What we read forms who we are.  Whereas 
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Tennyson’s Ulysses is “a part of all I have met,” a reader is the mirror image: every part of a 
reader is composed of a book her or she has “met.”  My reading has introduced me to any 
number of stories that have deepened my understanding of others and thereby made me who I 
am.  I seldom if ever think about the choices I (or those recommending or assigning me books) 
made along the way – the Hardy Boys series; Isaac Asimov’s science fiction; the Harry Potter 
novels – and what impact those choices had on my character.  But they have: Booth (1988) cites 
Paul Hunter, who questions how much “of modern human history has gone the way it has 
because people at crucial moments have said or done a certain thing in imitation of some 
character in a novel?” (229).   
Reading is thus a profound experience for me.  Lichtenstein (1997) writes that “great 
literature, from the fairy tale to the epic, plumbs uncharted existential and experiential depths 
which are both its wellsprings and its subjects” (244).  Without entering into a discussion of how 
to define “great literature,” I have been impacted upon and my perspective altered by Stephen 
King and Clarke as well as by Shakespeare and Dickens.  Akin to Nussbaum, Lichtenstein writes 
that “Literary exposure to a broad range of social, historical, and personal experience helps us 
transcend the insular bounds of our own time and space.”  This allows us to “disengage the local 
and accidental from the permanent and universal, to understand both intellectually and 
empathetically, situations we had not otherwise confronted or possibly even envisioned” (255).   
This brings me to what is for me one of Lichtenstein’s greatest ideas: even though the Torah 






V. Why not the Torah? 
Nachmanides, Rabbi Moses ben Nachman, the medieval commentator and kabbalist, 
teaches that each דוי לש וצוק, each decorative textual flourish in the Torah’s text, is what 
Lichtenstein (1997) describes as “part of an all-embracing concatenation of ineffable divine 
names” (252).  It is a matter of faith for me that all wisdom is contained in the Torah.  For 
Nachmanides, all knowledge – scientific, philosophic, everything – is “literally embedded within 
the Torah’s words and script” (251).  However, not everyone has the keys to unlock such 
wisdom.   
Indeed, there are limitations and challenges to teaching Jewish traditional sources.  Holtz 
(2003) points out that such texts by nature reflect a “theistic conception of the world;”  they 
assume a set of “divinely ordained rules” by which we are to live our lives; they have a 
“particularistic consciousness about the world,” wherein the Jewish people have a special 
relationship with God; the Torah – as we have noted – is viewed as the ultimate source of 
wisdom, which Holtz calls an “exclusivism about the nature of truth;” and finally that Jewish 
tradition is “powerfully oriented toward the community rather than the individual” (27).  These 
difficulties inherent in teaching Jewish texts as sources of wisdom are part of the challenge.  
Other sources of insight can and must be found – and, at least within the Modern Orthodox 
worldview, alternate roads to wisdom do exist.  Modern Orthodoxy embraces secular wisdom: 
science and medicine are studied, not rejected.  What literature offers is a tool to unlock the 
moral wisdom embedded in the Torah. 
Literature is a more direct and therefore quicker way to attain Hansen’s fusion of reason 
and emotion and Alexander’s spiritual awareness.  It is accessible, and it deepens our 
understanding of the Torah’s text: Lichtenstein points out that Milton helps us better understand 
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the character of the blind biblical Isaac.  The Talmud also tells of Rabbis who were blind – Rabbi 
Sheshet and Rabbi Yosef are repeatedly mentioned as suffering from this affliction in various 
contexts of Jewish law.  But, as Lichtenstein points out, they never wrote about how it felt to be 
blind.  Milton, on the other hand, provided us with “On His Blindness” (255), a heartfelt 
reflection on his struggle with this handicap.  While Rabbi Sheshet may have agreed that “they 
also serve who only stand and wait,” he never told us about it; Milton, on the other hand, quite 
eloquently did.  Lichtenstein, in a moment of Colesian empathetic connection, notes that for this 
reason it was Milton, not Isaac, Jacob or Rabbi Sheshet, who helped him understand the pain that 
his own father endured when he suddenly lost his sight at the age of eighty-one (254).  Literature 
helps us understand the human condition itself in more immediately accessible ways than Torah 
can.   
This is the counterpoint to what Holtz (2003) describes when he asks teachers of Bible to 
be mindful of the ways in which their culture shapes and influences how they teach their texts.  
These texts get “rewritten” by living in a non-Jewish culture.  “How,” asks Holtz, can we teach 
the Lord’s song in a strange land?”  (11, italics in original).  My experience with English literary 
texts is the mirror image of what Holtz describes, and I ask myself how I can teach those songs 
in a Jewish context. 
For me, any insight that helps understand the how one copes with a given situation (not 
merely insight into understanding a Biblical or Talmudic text) is an insight that I appreciate and 
often try to share with others.  This is Moffett’s (1994) concept of “connectedness” (71) that 
comes from a “totally cosmopolitan” spirituality, which is based on a “cosmic framework [that] 
is all-inclusive” (xix).  When I read and taught of the impact of Pip’s unforeseen great 
expectations on his character or of The Stand’s (1978, 1990) Larry Underwood’s trek through the 
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Lincoln Tunnel, I gained human insights that have remained with me.  “If we regard literature 
and the other arts not just as works to be understood,” writes Moffett (1994), “… but as 
experiences to be undergone,” then they can “cast a spell” (75).  The spell has been cast on me 
by many of the works mentioned, and by many I have not had space – or recall – to mention. 
 
VI. And Therefore…    
Leavis (1958) writes that the study of literature “is, or should be, an intimate study of the 
complexities, potentialities, and essential conditions of human nature” (184).  Booth supplies the 
lens of “coduction,” which allowed me as a reader and teacher to create “what-if” scenarios for 
myself and for my students, scenarios such as “How would you thank Miss Havisham if you 
were Pip?” or, after reading such works as Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales and Ishiguro’s The 
Remains of the Day, asking students to “Describe a journey you have taken and its impact on 
you.”  Nussbaum provides the lens of the “judicious spectator,” which is the kind of person that I 
hope that I have become and that I have helped students become.  Coles offers a model of books 
as advisors, giving me a framework through which to view my own and my students’ ethical 
development.  Finally, Lichtenstein’s lens uses literature to appreciate the best that man and God 
have created, and it provides the key link for me between my own philosophical and ideological 
worlds.  Each of these lenses has been and continues to be a way I have intimately studied 
Leavis’s “complexities” and “potentialities.”   
Through the integration and overlapping of these various lenses, I have sought to create 
what Ely, Vinz et al. call a “third factor” or “third space,” which “are places where multiple 
perspectives coexist” (264), and which occur when “perspectives are in dialogue with each 
other” (265).  This is based on the work of Homi Bhaba, who calls it “hybridity,” which  
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underscores new articulations of perspective by delimiting and determining how 
any one position might fail to explain a ‘reality’ and might more essentially 
contain conceptual prisms through which we attempt to see into new spaces (40).  
  
Indeed, I have sought throughout my work – and this is how my brain seems to work in general – 
to “hybridize” the theory I have learned and to emerge in this “third space.”  
Ellis and Bochner (2000) write that autoethnographic work ought to be a “systematic 
sociological introspection and emotional recall” which leads one “to understand a way of life” 
(737).  Through the presentation and interpretation of internal recollections and external artifacts, 
I have attempted to reconstruct my journey thus far and to understand my “way of life” and to 
find a way to explain the power of literature specifically for a product of Modern Orthodox 
Judaism.  Farrell (2004) sees reading as a “pedagogic” experience.  Through reading, he claims, 
“we become aware more reflectively of our patterns of identification and investment, of the ways 
in which we set ourselves in relation to an ethical world, and through reading we develop more 
complex versions of these patterns” (21).  My own relationships to the world and to others have 
only been deepened by my life as a reader, and I have seen no contradiction between that world 
and the world of my religious beliefs.  I have overtly expressed to my students that I wish the 
same for them through their own reading lives.   
One of the first sources I encountered when beginning my research into the literature on 
English literature’s utility as a teacher of ethical sensibility was Sir Phillip Sidney.  Sidney, who 
is in many ways the progenitor of the models of Booth, Nussbaum, Coles and Lichtenstein writes 
(2004) that the “ending end of all earthly learning” is “virtuous action” (13).  For Sidney, the 
best way to attain that learning is through the reading of literature.  He explains that “This 
purifying of wit, this enriching of memory, enabling of judgment… the final end is to lead and 
draw us to as high a perfection as our degenerate souls, made worse by their clayey lodgings, can 
113 
 
be capable of” (12).  Thus far, I have attempted to recount and analyze pieces of my own 
journey, of my perceived purifications of my wit, enrichment of my memory or enabling of my 
judgment.  What follows is a series of suggestions of how other reader and other classrooms may 





 A Methodology of Reading Literature and Life – and a Vision for the Future 
 
I. What Do We Want? 
Based on my own development as a morally thoughtful individual through my reading of 
literature, I want to attempt to repeat the process with and for my students.  I have found a 
balance between my Orthodox Judaism’s stress of Torah as the source of all wisdom and the 
insight offered by general culture, and I have seen that the literature of the latter can be an 
excellent teacher of the moral decision-making of which the former would approve.  I have tried 
to become a teacher of what Chazan (1985) calls “a process of moral deliberation.”  While some 
theorists, he argues, would like the teacher to serve as a transmitter of values or as therapist, 
others advocate for the teacher “to develop in children that process of judgment or deliberation, 
which constitutes the essence of morality” (116).  Chazan’s model appeals to me in that it allows 
for individual judgement and opinion.  It is thus distinct from the ideal offered by Lickona 
(1991), who writes that teachers can serve as “models” of good ethics and morals and should 
“serve as ethical mentors” (72).  Lickona would have teachers go beyond an academic 
connection and offer their students “personal moral commentary that helps students understand 
why behaviors such as cheating, stealing, bullying and name-calling are hurtful and wrong” (80).  
This seems to me intrusive; it will not help form independent and nuanced thinkers and feelers.  
It may not be the “realness” that Rogers demands of a teacher.  Lickona advocates assigning 
values to certain behaviors in a mathematical way; for me, the world is more complex.  
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Teaching is more than the mere imparting of information, skills, or even specific value 
assignments.  As noted in chapters two and six, I cast my lot instead with thinkers like Alexander 
(2001), who writes that teaching is inherently “a moral activity, not in the sense that it entails 
endorsing a particular doctrine, but in the sense that it strengthens the moral agent within, 
empowering students to make moral choices more intelligently on their own.”  But this is not 
only about teachers: Alexander adds that “Genuine learning is likewise a moral activity” in that it 
consists of the acquisition of moral skills (143).  Students need to learn how to think and act 
morally just as they need to learn any other academic skill.  I would add that the learning of 
literature, if properly done, cannot but become a simultaneous learning of morality.  Whatever 
lens, whatever model the instructor chooses (and I will suggest a number below), the student 
should come away with more than a mere appreciation of the text’s literary elements – there 
should be a moral takeaway as well. 
Kress (2012) cites Walter Feinberg, who cautions against the dogmatic teaching of 
morality because “it can overwhelm individual moral intuition and moral novelty with premature 
commitments to established moral theories.”  Kress then cites Steven Glazer, who counterargues 
that “material identity” is already being imposed upon students by the media, especially 
television and film (127).  There is a need for the learning of morality – albeit one that is 
questioned and thought through by the student – to counter some of popular culture’s 
indoctrination.  Although this admittedly edges closer to Lickona territory, I believe there is a 
middle ground.  
Thus, the ultimate goal of such an educational project is not to create moral robots, but 
rather to create independent thinkers and doers, à la Alexander.  Holzer (2016) explains that the 
study of text (although he refers to rabbinic texts, the idea is the same), or what he calls the 
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“interpretive encounter,” has the power “to move the reader in two directions: a backward 
direction, in making her aware of some of her own prejudices, and a forward direction, in 
causing her to deepen, expand, or alter her own view of the topic” (29).  An understanding of 
self, and creating what Kress (2012) calls “self-schema” (see below, section VII), is key for 
fostering such intellectual and moral development.  Rogers (1969) writes that an educated person 
has “learned how to learn… how to adapt and change … who has realized that no knowledge is 
secure, that only the process of seeking knowledge gives a basis for security.”  Rogers coins the 
term “Changingness,” which is “a reliance on process rather than upon static knowledge, is the 
only thing that makes sense as a goal for education in the modern world” (104, italics in 
original).  This “process” is vital to inculcate in students, and it is one which I received from my 
own reading.  From reading the works of Stephen King to those of Herman Wouk, and those of 
Charles Dickens to that of Harper Lee, I feel that I have always been – and continue to be – in a 
process of change. 
Greene (1994) notes that students must learn “to look through multiple perspectives,” 
which is something I tried to give my students when reading Twelve Angry Men or To Kill a 
Mockingbird.  Doing so, says Greene, will help them “build bridges among themselves” so that 
“they will be provoked to heal and to transform” (167).  Classroom dialogue, the theory and 
practicalities of which we will explore below, is the key to achieving such cross-pollination.  
Greene dreams of classrooms in which “there might emerge some consciousness of 
interdependence as well as a recognition of diverse points of view” (177).   On the best days at 
the best moments, my classroom attained such a level.  This is the Boothian “coductive” 
experience, one where each student connects to the text, then shares that connections with others, 
compares it, and grows from the very act of comparison.  Rogers (1980) describes the future at 
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its most ideal when he dreams of a “person-centered scenario of the future” which “will be more 
human and more humane.”   This world, he says, “will explore and develop the richness and 
capacities of the human mind and spirit.  It will produce individuals who are more integrated and 
whole.  It will be a world that prizes the individual person – the greatest of our resources” (356). 
I identify, as discussed in chapter seven, with Lichtenstein, who sees the humanities as 
one of man’s greatest explorations of the mind of God; for the great works of literature are a 
celebration and elaboration of God’s most sophisticated creation, humankind.  I would love it if 
my reading life or my literature class – or if anyone’s reading life or anyone’s literature class – 
could help bring us to such a Rogerian “new world,” one which celebrates humanity, but with a 
sense of humility, if that is possible, without undue humanist glorification.  The Jewish educator 
in me has developed what Kress (2012) calls “Jewish developmental process knowledge,” or 
JDPK.  This is the “knowledge that educators possess in order to create environments that are 
most likely to promote identity development.”  This approach takes into account the needs of the 
learner, the curricular goals, and the structuring of the environment to “enhance the 
developmental-learning aspects of the curriculum” (157).  My goal in the classroom – both in 
Judaic studies as well as in English – has been to foster the development of a moral identity. 
 
II. What Gets in Our Way?  
Students do not always understand a context for moral decision-making: they need to 
learn not just how one should make such decisions, but also need to understand the type of 
situations in which such decisions are necessary.  As we noted in chapter two, Buckley and 
Erricker (2004) see the issue as a psychological one: students are missing a “metanarrative.”  
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Those students have “no coherent ‘story’ that tells them how they should live… They have 
choice, and who tells them how to choose?” (182).   In a world with a wide variety of ideological 
options, and with access to all of them, even my yeshiva students (who are products of a 
religious, ideologically-driven system) are pressured to make “wise” decisions – yet they are 
consistently not taught how to do so.  Even though Haidt (2012) writes that religions “are moral 
exoskeletons,” and adds that religious communities enmesh their inhabitants in sets of values and 
organizations that influence their behavior (313), I have observed that general educational 
systems do not necessarily provide the enmeshing or the metanarrative that students and 
communities require; indeed, confusion occurs.  And even my Modern Orthodox yeshiva 
students, who would theoretically be more enmeshed in a “moral exoskeleton,” were often more 
“modern” than “orthodox” in their worldview, and thus did not seem compelled by the religious 
values that I attempted to teach and model for them and which were part of the school’s mission.  
Such a lack of mooring could be an obstacle to attaining Greene’s and Roger’s vision of an 
interdependent, humane sharing of ideas. 
The overemphasis on the rights, thoughts and feelings of the individual may well be part 
of the problem.  Moffett (1994) writes of the need for a “spiritual framework” to provide for 
“lifelong learning,” with an ultimate goal of “inner growth for meaning.”  With such a goal, he 
writes, “one’s talents and traits, predispositions and predilections, would develop not merely for 
their own sake but as part of an individual’s evolving toward spiritual fulfillment…” (332-3).  
Students – indeed, all members of society – need to realize that they are part of a larger whole, 
and as such need to work towards building some greater unified community.  
Alexander (2004) feels that schools are the vehicle for delivery of such a societal agenda; 
he also thinks that they have fallen down on the job.  In an unconscious echo of Matthew 
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Arnold’s Victorian lament, Alexander writes that “spiritual interest” has grown due to “the sense 
that schools and other contemporary educational institutions have lost their moral compass” 
(viii).  He bemoans the artificial schism placed between knowledge and religion and ethics, 
adding that the relegation of spiritual values to home or places of worship, and the exclusion of 
these values from “the public spheres of work or politics” (which includes the bulk of schools in 
the United States) is an unnecessary and ultimately detrimental outgrowth of the Enlightenment 
politics that have influenced our current system of education (xi).   
Indeed, my own students are all products of a dual-curricular religious educational 
system, one with a very clearly defined set of values, yet I have observed them consistently 
boxing their religious subjects into one area of practice and/or belief, while either refusing, 
failing, or being unable to utilize religious or values-oriented thinking in the area of the 
development of character and moral ways of thought and behavior.   
One would think this would not occur.  Chazan (1980) writes of the assumption that “the 
study of classical texts can… stimulate one’s motivation or desire to be moral.”  He adds that 
“Jewish tradition sees the study of texts as a moral act in itself.  Thus, the very act of studying 
the texts contributes to a child’s moral development by enabling (or forcing the child) actually to 
perform a moral deed” (305).  Additionally, Kress (2012), citing Rachel Kessler’s 2001 study, 
points out that adolescents specifically experience “an awakening of energy when larger 
questions of meaning and purpose, of ultimate beginnings and endings, begin to press with an 
urgency much too powerful to be dismissed as ‘hormones’” (13).  Tanchel (2013) adds that while 
during early adolescence “the authority for a teenager’s beliefs resides principally with the 
authority figure,” most experience what she terms a “disruption” which leads them to “realize the 
limits of literalism” and / or to see a clash between their own experiences and what they have 
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learned from an authority (258).  Despite such awakenings and disruptions, students in my 
classroom did not always seem motivated to be “moral.”  The Modern Orthodox schools in 
which I have taught have had their share of cheating scandals and bullying issues, in what seems 
at no lesser frequency than any other private day schools. 
Still, I wish my students to see beyond themselves and, like I feel I have, attempt to better 
the world.  I too am a product of such a system.  To do so, however, they need grounding in 
quality ideas and the judgment to interpret new situations and challenges with wisdom.  As 
Alexander (2001) writes, a person educated in such a system 
is not afraid of the world, or scared of intellectual challenge, or frightened by new 
ideas.  She is open to the possibility of a better tomorrow, confident, hopeful, and 
optimistic.  By the same token, she is deeply committed to a vision of the good, 
either the one in which she had been educated, or another that she has chosen with 
the tools that she acquired through the educational process.  Put simply, such a 
person is empowered (188). 
How best, then, to empower students who often struggle to find the metanarrative?  What 
follows are some models and suggestions.   
 
III. Addressing These Issues 
Moffett (1994) offers a solution: make education “more personal,” which includes 
making it both “more social” and “more relational.”  He advocates simultaneous 
individualization and pluralization: “that is, coach personal decision making but orchestrate the 
plurality of personal choice so that everybody is teaching everybody else and all learn 
enormously more than they would if herded through a common course set at a common 
denominator.” (51).  While Moffett advocates the elimination of standardized curricula as the 
mode to his vision of “spiritual awakening,” I argue for a different agenda: relevance.  Moffett 
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writes that people “actually learn” from “inner agendas acted on through communal means” (51).  
I agree that students must find their curriculum relevant in order for them to successfully connect 
to it but wonder if everything must become completely individualized in order to do so.  We will 
return to this idea below. 
In their study of effective classroom discussion, Marshall, Smagorinsky and Smith (1995) 
note that readers “quite literally make sense” of a text in a Rosenblattian mode by drawing upon 
“their own histories, their own emotions” (4).  Marshall et al. note that successful classroom 
discussion happens when students are “moving into a higher level application of the piece of 
literature to their own lives or to a deeper understanding of the piece” (19).  Indeed, students 
connect best on the transactional level when they find the text “relevant” to their lives (22).   
This connection most effectively takes place, argue Marshall et al., when students 
actively take part in class discussion: teachers who lecture, they claim, do not allow for this key 
process to occur (73).  Defining the teacher’s role in guiding the discussion, however, is more 
situationally specific.   While one teacher they quote takes pride in “organizing the potential 
‘chaos’ of discussion into coherence” (21), another teacher is deemed “quite effective in helping 
the students develop their interpretations and participate actively in the discussion” by using 
Rogerian techniques of “listening and extending” and basing “his questions on students’ 
contributions” (93).  I have employed both approaches in my own classrooms, as both are 
necessary in different class groups at various times: not every class could handle an independent 
conversation, even when guiding questions and other similar rubrics were assigned to them.  
While much of their data is culled from classroom observation, Marshall et al. also 
observed book club discussions, from which they in turn draw additional conclusions.  They note 
that in order to make relevant connections and attain an effective transactional reading 
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experience, participants in the discussion need to internalize “the voices of other members of the 
group” (119).  This recalls for me Booth’s (1988) model of coduction (71), discussed in chapter 
four.  It is unclear, however, whether a teacher in a classroom setting, who tends to create 
“authoritative discourse” can foster the same comfort level and the same type of Marshall, 
Smagorinsky and Smith’s “internally persuasive discourse” (119).   
Furthermore, the authors note that for some of the teachers in their study, successful 
classroom discussion includes not only elements of “question and answer” between teacher and 
students as well as “higher level applications” of knowledge by the students to both the material 
as well as to their own prior knowledge.  While the teachers studied felt that students needed to 
review the “basic technical components” of the class text, they also wanted students to move to 
what one teacher described as “an interaction of interested minds on a common topic” (19).   
But how to attain such “interested minds” in the first place?  As I mentioned, Moffett 
(1994), argues for the “individualization” of education.  He explains that doing so “requires 
developing all levels of one’s being towards self-realization and self-transcendence.”  Moffett’s 
model of the “universal schoolhouse” is at once pluralistic and democratic: “it offers God’s 
plenty and leaves selection to the learner.”  Moffett, however, has no curricular requirements in 
his “schoolhouse.”  This in turn “makes everything possible” (158).  I disagree with Moffett: I 
require the study of literature, seeing it as the key to attaining the self-transcendence which 






IV. Why Literature? 
As Garrod and Bramble (1977) note, “so many of the best poets and writers have 
addressed themselves, directly or indirectly, to issues of moral significance.”  Their examples 
include Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird and John Knowles’s A Separate Peace (105).  
Considerations and discussions of values in classes using such texts are likely to be richer than 
those of the same issues in philosophy classes.  As Singer and Singer (2005) explain (practically 
paraphrasing Sir Philip Sidney), “discussions of ethical issues in fiction tend to be concrete, 
rather than abstract, and to give a rich context for the distinctive moral views or choices that are 
portrayed” (xi).  When students can discuss specific choices that characters have made, and when 
they know those characters and the plot implications of their choices, the conversations and the 
thinking that they engender are that much more rooted and real.  
There is a danger of using literature as a source for moral thinking: curricula and the 
teachers or administrators who select that curricula may feel limited to certain works – or to 
certain examples of moral choices.  Alexander (2001) therefore cautions against the “rigid 
thinking” that “emphasizes the role of tradition in the quest for goodness.”  When the canon of 
texts as well as the meanings assigned to them become fixed, the key element of the critical eye 
is threatened.  Alexander finds the idea that the well-read student must be exposed to “essentially 
only one hundred Great Books” not merely quaint and outdated, but downright wrong and 
dangerous (125 - 6).  Literature is a powerful teacher of values – and as such, its power must be 
respected and cannot be abused.   
Hazony (2012), in establishing a rationale for appreciating the educative aspects of the 
Biblical narrative, cites Nussbaum, who writes that  
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certain truths about human life can only be fittingly and accurately stated in the 
language and forms characteristic of the narrative artist.  With respect to certain 
elements of human life, the terms of the novelist’s art are… perceiving where the 
blunt terms of ordinary speech, or of abstract theoretical discourse, are blind… 
(68)  
Literature’s language and depth allow for a discussion of values that is far more 
meaningful – and therefore (once again!) relevant – to students than would be a straight 
discussion of “values.”   
Not all educators who argue for a curriculum in moral education agree on the efficacy of 
literature per se.  Chazan (1985) notes that Durkheim “surprisingly focuses on science and 
history as the two important curricular areas for moral education.”  Art can be misleading, says 
Durkheim, in that it “makes us live in an imaginary environment; it detaches us from reality and 
from the concrete beings that comprise reality.”  For Durkheim, science and history, with their 
focus on “larger social patterns and motifs,” are far better modes through which to teach a moral 
curriculum (17-18).17  I find Durkheim, however, to be far less compelling than the arguments 
and approaches of Arnold, Sidney, Lichtenstein or Nussbaum. 
In addition to my own predilections, though, I would add scientific evidence to further 
refute Durkheim.  Annie Murphy Paul (2012) writes of psychologist Raymond Mar’s 2011 MRI 
studies, which show a “substantial overlap in the brain networks used to understand stories and 
the networks used to navigate interactions with other individuals – in particular, interactions in 
which we’re trying to figure out the thoughts and feelings of others.”  Citing other studies, done 
by Mar and others, Paul reports that “individuals who frequently read fiction seem to be better 
                                                          
17 Oddly enough, another Jewish educator, for whom I had tremendous respect, once commented to me of his 
surprise that my mentor Rabbi Lichtenstein, who had an affinity for the Aristotelian rational thought of 
Maimonides, did not seek (and find) God in the sciences rather than in literature.  I think that educator did not 
really understand literature’s power in the way that Lichtenstein and I learned to. 
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able to understand other people, empathize with them and see the world from their perspective.”  
This science serves to confirm the thinking of Nussbaum, Booth, Coles, and others. 
Greene (1995) adds an additional perspective to the idea of the power of literature when 
she writes of the importance of each student – indeed, of every person – creating their own 
“narrative,” one which recalls their own “childhood landscapes” and allows them to understand 
the vital role of imagination.  This is accomplished “through the recovery of literary experience 
that have been significant at various times in our lives.”  Greene explains that “The reading of 
literature may nurture all kinds of understanding of lived structures of meaning, although not 
chronologically necessarily, not in any particular logical order.” (75 - 76).  This is exactly what 
this entire project has been for me: the very work of writing and then autoethnographically 
analyzing my writing, using the four critical lenses detailed in the preceding chapters, has 
demonstrated the validity of literature’s potential as moral primer. 
I have been, unknowingly and unwittingly, a reader as Rosenblatt (1994) describes, one 
who, when reading a new work (or even when re-reading a familiar one), is “stimulated to clarify 
his own values, his prior sense of the world and its possibilities” (145).  She explains how this 
works: 
The possibilities are infinite: the insights derived from contrasts with my own 
temperament and my own environment; the empathy with violence, the sadistic 
impulse, that may now be faced and perhaps controlled; the compassion for others 
formerly felt to be alien; the opportunity for what C. S. Pierce called “ideal 
experimentation,” that is, the trying-out of alternative modes of behavior in 
imagined situations (146). 
I want my own students to achieve such self-reflection, or at least to learn the method for 
achieving it so they can do so at some later point in their lives.  Levisohn (2001) points out that 
for Jewish educators the challenge is “to articulate their (or their communities’) understanding of 
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the genre of the traditionary text, and of their own historical situations, so that the truth claims of 
the text can amount to more than just vague admonitions” (30).  As an English teacher with a 
moral bent, I want to similarly articulate the way a Modern Orthodox individual would 
understand the genre of the text at hand in order to make sharper sense of its “truth claims.”  
Moffett (1994) points out that such self-reflection is key, urging us to “consider the fundamental 
role the arts play in making things, whether objects or knowledge.”  He reminds us that 
“Creativity is not a sentimental or romantic concept; it is the most practical fact of human 
learning.”  Language arts, he concludes, “t the inner life with the physical and social worlds.  
They partake of both mind and matter.  In this sense, as incarnation, they are all soulful and best 
learned soulfully” (243).  Moffett’s concept of the “spiritual” echoes and reinforces that of 
Hansen’s “moral” classroom and Alexander’s “spiritual awareness,” and is one that I seek for my 
own classroom. 
 
V. What Such Reading Looks Like 
My research and my experience has led me to several examples of the utilization of 
literature toward a moral agenda.  The works that follow fall into the Lichtensteinian category 
more than into the categories of Nussbaum, Coles or Booth in that they are overt uses of various 
forms of literature with moral goals in mind.  Carmy and Zuckier (2015) cite Lichtenstein’s early 
dissertation on Henry More, where Lichtenstein writes that “knowledge within a moral context is 
very different from knowledge without it, and that within such a context, the quest for wisdom 
and its possession may be essential aspects of right human character” (305, italics in original).  
The following three writers seek to place literature within a moral context and use it as a 
springboard for ethical thought and discussion. 
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The first is the subtle, integrated approach of William Kolbrener (2011), whose work 
(unlike those we will see below) does not overtly address pedagogic methodology.  Although he 
does not explicitly explain how he attempts to use literary texts to moral ends, Kolbrener 
constantly provides a model of reflective comparison between traditional Jewish texts and 
classics of Western philosophy and literature.  His goal is to achieve a better understanding of 
the world at large by integrating the worldviews of Torah-infused thought and that of English 
literature, philosophy and general culture.  Kolbrener, a professor at Bar Ilan University and a 
Columbia Ph. D in Milton, has fused the two worlds in his own work and thought.  Blau (2003), 
who suggests three categories for such literacy, writes of students attaining “textual literacy, or 
procedural knowledge… Intertextual literacy, or informational knowledge… [and] Performative 
literacy, or enabling knowledge” (203, italics in original).   Kolbrener writes of his “conviction 
that attuning to the voice from Mount Sinai means first an open-mindedness to the self” (xiv).  
Such “open-mindedness” is nothing less than a type of Blau’s “performative literacy,” which is 
not merely an understanding of the text, but an activation of other kinds of knowledge needed for 
what Blau calls “a critical or disciplined literacy,” i.e., an ability not only to make connections 
beyond the text, but to grow as a result of making those connections. 
For Kolbrener, different literary paths represent different ways to understand the world; 
the voice of each, however, must be heard.  Thus one essay on the observance of the Sabbath 
includes references to Oprah Winfrey, Tony Soprano, Sigmund Freud, and Deuteronomy (136-
7).  In another essay, Kolbrener contrasts Plato’s division between heart and mind, based on “the 
Socratic distinction between ‘rational principles’ and ‘pleasure,’” with that of the Talmudic 
sages, who think, writes Kolbrener, with their “hearts.”  “From this perspective,” he writes, “the 
sages’ counsel [of] ‘make for yourself a teacher’ is not just practical advice to find someone to 
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answer questions about how to make your oven kosher… but an injunction to cultivate a 
relationship.” (52).  This hearkens back to Booth’s (1988) notion of books as friends.  
Kolbrener’s breadth and his openness to all texts as potential sources of ideas greatly inspires 
me, and I agree with his ultimate end: using the classical secular texts as a means, he continually 
returns to the traditional Jewish texts as his source of moral values.  Other educators take a 
slightly different tack on integrating the various texts. 
Two other proponents of using English literature to promote a moral agenda are far more 
overt in connecting the two and both explicitly articulate their respective methodologies.  Herbert 
Cohen (2010) puts forth a theory that “Judaism does not believe in ‘art for art’s sake.”  For 
Cohen, literature “has value, art has value, but only to the extent that they enhance our 
knowledge and understanding of our spiritual selves.  The context is everything.” (14).  His 
philosophy drives both his selection of texts as well as their mode of presentation.  Cohen 
advocates choosing texts which either “drive student discussion or… provoke students to think 
about life in a complex way” (53).  His approach illustrates his theory and method: Cohen 
analyzes the Biblical character of Jethro, father-in-law of Moses, by contrasting him with Frank 
Alpine, protagonist of Bernard Malamud’s The Assistant (1957).  Cohen attempts to understand 
Jethro’s conversion to Judaism by comparing the experiences of Malamud’s Italian-American 
convert (41-43).  Literature, for Cohen, is a tool with which greater understanding of the 
narratives and values of the Bible can be better achieved and thereby internalized.  
Whereas Lichtenstein (1997) used Milton’s “On His Blindness” to gain insight into the 
experience of the blind, Cohen uses the poem more globally, to illustrate what he calls the 
“Torah value” of perseverance “in the face of adversity.”  Noting that God can punish, but that 
“tribulations are vehicles of emotional and spiritual growth,” Cohen applauds Milton’s notion 
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that “They also serve who only stand and wait” (91).  Cohen does not derive the moral values he 
teaches from his texts; rather, he approaches his text with values already firmly in hand, looking 
to the texts either as prooftexts for established ideas or, more accurately, as modes of delivery for 
previously determined moral messages.  In this he is closer to Lickona (who, we saw in section I, 
advocated that teachers serve as direct instructors of moral messages) than he is to Alexander or 
Noddings, and is therefore a bit heavy-handed for my taste.   
A parallel approach to Cohen’s is that of Rosenberg (2011), who has developed a values 
curriculum based on the narratives of J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series.  Rosenberg writes of 
his love of the Bible, saying that “Its rhythms and poetry are the beat to which I live,” and his 
love of Harry Potter, saying that “It resonates within me as only truth does.”  His own book, 
Rosenberg writes, “will be a welcome pretext to think about universal themes that give life 
meaning, and which find expression in holy and secular scripture” (vii-viii). 
Rosenberg thus sees Harry’s decisions to break rules as an opportunity to apply Talmudic 
standards of when a positive commandment supersedes a contradictory negative commandment, 
noting that any decision is a choice of value (5).  The characters and plot of Rowling’s novels 
trigger discussions of Jewish law and values.  Rosenberg contrasts the characters of Rowling’s 
headmaster Albus Dumbledore and the Biblical Aaron, both of whom face death with “dignity” 
and “control.”  Rosenberg writes that  
the true vanquishers of death are those who sense death’s inevitability but 
continue to live heroic lives, accomplishing their life’s mission for as long as they 
are able… and never allowing death to rob them of the tzelem elokim, the image 
of God reflected in every human being (70). 
Whereas Cohen approaches literature with a pre-determined agenda, Rosenberg’s 
approach is more open-minded: while Rosenberg is clearly well-versed in the heavily moral texts 
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of classical Judaism, his tone implies that he is a reader who enjoys reading the Harry Potter 
books for their exciting narrative and enjoyable characterizations, and who only later sees the 
moral implications of the text.  Rosenberg is closer to Kolbrener in his approach, allowing the 
texts to make the connections for him, leading him wither they will.  This recalls for me the 
Boothian coductions I myself have made, of the Colesian kinships that books have provided me.  
Still, Kolbrener, Cohen and Rosenberg each make no bones about the agenda of their 
thought and pedagogy: they all wish to further a specific moral agenda.  The variance among the 
three is how much weight the secular sources are given relative to the (always far weightier) 
ideas and values of the traditional Jewish texts, and what comes first, the inspirational idea or the 
text that inspires it.   
Cohen and Rosenberg both make clear their desire to impact upon their students morally 
as well as intellectually.  The emphasis on teaching students rather than teaching texts or 
curricula is not new.  Indeed, Louise Rosenblatt’s reading as transaction is often invoked in 
discussion of such teaching. As noted above, Marshall, Smagorinsky and Smith (1995) note that 
student transactional response better occurs when there is active student participation in class 
discussion; teachers who lecture, they claim, do not allow for this key process to occur (73).  The 
question that remains, obviously, is how to best facilitate this process.  I found a number of 
means to that end. 
 
VI. How Do We Get Students to Talk? 
Holtz (2003) advises student teachers of Judaic texts to think of a number of issues as 
they prepare a lesson.  Each is completely relevant to teachers of literature as well.  The list of 
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questions a teacher ought to ask herself includes: “What do you, the teacher, find difficult or 
confusing in the text?”  “What in this text will your potential students find difficult?”  “What 
preconceptions (prior beliefs) will your potential students bring with them?” and ultimately, 
“What key ideas, practices or values would you want to teach these students about this text?” 
(166).  These are key questions for preparation, but the teacher must also take care not to overly 
“spoon-feed” her students. 
Blau (2003) rightly notes that the intellectual lives of students are filled with “unearned 
interpretations,” i.e., those that they receive by reading or hearing others’ interpretations of the 
text before them.  The goal, he notes, is for students to find independent, “earned 
interpretations,” those which 
push students to enter for themselves into the hermeneutic arena and engage in 
acts of interpretation that will produce meanings that they themselves can trace 
back to the evidentiary reasoning, textual facts, and ideological engagement that 
plausible meanings are built on” (187). 
 Blau advocates a student transactional experience built not exclusively on verbal 
discussion, but rather upon writing as well.  Citing Scholes, he notes that the process of 
interpretation is only complete when the student “has produced an interpretive text of his or her 
own” (152).  In teaching my high school students, the bulk of the writing that I demanded of 
them, I realize in retrospect, was less of the “earned interpretation,” and more of the “unearned 
interpretation.”  Only occasionally were my students asked to provide their own insights or 
opinions and to derive them from a text.  Later, when I began teaching middle schoolers, I swung 
slightly more to the “earned interpretation” side of the scale, but only somewhat.  Wilhelm, 
Baker and Dube (2001) urge teachers to be constructivist: to “take more time to do fewer things 
and to do these things thoroughly, providing lots of practice and support…[to] emphasize 
132 
 
learning, and learning as performance” (237).  I was guilty, as are so many teachers, of worrying 
about finishing the curricular unit; I was teaching books, rather than teaching students. 
Blau notes that asking students to write out the questions they have on a particular text – 
indeed, the very act of writing out the questions – causes the questions themselves to evaporate.  
“I found that my questions cleared up as I wrote them,” he quotes one workshop student as 
saying (38).  This act of writing, of articulating difficulty or difficulties with the text, is itself the 
earning of the interpretation.  This is the “unique task of selection, synthesis and interpretation” 
of which Rosenblatt (1994) writes (52).  I need to do such teaching more often with my students.  
Greene (1995) urges teachers to “emphasize the importance of persons becoming reflective 
enough to think about their own thinking and become conscious of their own consciousness” 
(65).  By earning their interpretations – which can come through any of the lenses, those of 
Booth, Nussbaum, Coles, or Lichtenstein – students can attain such consciousness. 
 
VII. The Relevance of Reading 
“If we can enable more young persons to arouse themselves in this way,” writes Greene 
(1994), “to make sense of what they see and hear… they may begin to experience art as a way of 
understanding.”  Such experience enables sensitivity and insight, at least as far as this reader and 
teacher is concerned.  And Greene agrees with me, as she continues, “The experience and 
knowledge gained by this way of knowing opens new modalities for us in the lived world” (149).  
The transition to the “lived world” has been a key concept throughout my experience as a reader, 
and it informs my entire approach.  While I do value the sensitivity that students may have 
developed towards accused murderer Tom Robinson as they studied To Kill a Mockingbird, I am 
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more concerned that they develop such sensitivity towards their classmates and others around 
them in the “lived world.”  Kress (2012) writes that Jewish educators “aim for holistic Jewish 
development within a variety of spheres including cognition, behavior, affect, and attitudes,” 
with the goal of students incorporating these into a “Jewish self-schema,” one that is in turn 
located within a “more general sense of self or even as an organizing schema for this general 
sense of self” (39).  My agenda as an English teacher was and is clearly influenced by my agenda 
as a Jewish educator.  
In section III, I cited Moffett’s (1994) recommendation for a curriculum that is personally 
chosen by an individual student as an argument for a relevant curriculum.  Rogers (1969) agrees 
that relevance is vital.  The student, he writes, must “be confronted by issues which have 
meaning and relevance for him.”  This is important in a culture (which has only worsened in this 
regard since 1969!) where “we try to insulate the student from any and all the real problems of 
life.”  The goal is fostering concerned, informed and involved members of society, and therefore 
“if we desire to have student learn to be free and responsible individuals, then we must be willing 
for them to confront life, to face problems” (130). 
Rogers’s ideology is put into practice by Wilhelm, Baker and Dube’s (2001) technique of 
“frontloading,” which involves organizing student reading experiences to be both “personally 
and socially relevant” and asking such questions as “How might this text lend itself to 
exploration of a contact zone or lead to social action (‘something that mattered’)?” (102).  
Wilhelm, Baker and Dube then suggest thinking about pertinent background information that 
students will need to know prior to reading a text; what “procedural knowledge” they will need 
to have; and what knowledge and skills “will have the most transfer value and be most useful as 
a touchstone to return to throughout our unit and beyond” (103).  Hansen (2001) similarly urges 
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teachers to expose students to “questions from tradition,” which will make them appreciate from 
whence they (and their texts) hail (142).  These questions take time to answer, and a teacher with 
an eye on the curricular clock will find this mindset a challenge to adopt.   
Hansen (2001) also suggests the methodology of “focused discussion” (which returns the 
venue to verbal conversation, in addition to Blau’s (2003) advocacy for written commentaries as 
supplements to discussion).  Such classroom discussion “contributes to an environment 
conducive to communication” and “spurs participants to formulate, to cultivate, and to heed 
ideas, interpretations, knowledge, emotions, insight, questions, and more” (83).  Hansen urges 
teachers to make use of such focused discussion, as it can “deepen qualities such as 
responsibility, open-heartedness, and seriousness” and 
can help equip persons with what it takes to tackle problems in respectful, 
thoughtful, and non-for-or-against ways.  That is, it can spotlight the dangers in 
presuming to take the moral high ground on an issue, rather than conceiving the 
task as clearing moral ground (112). 
If students can feel comfortable and motivated to express their values respectfully and 
openly, maintaining an “open-heartedness,” they have learned an important life skill that has the 
potential to improve themselves and society.  This will also take them over the hurdle of 
integrating the value under discussion into their own sense of self.  Kress (2012) cautions that 
classroom discussion “generally stops short of delving into what the core concept of theme of the 
lesson has to do with the student’s identity, how it integrates into his or her self-schema” (85).  






VIII. Freedom of Choice 
Rogers (1969) strongly advocates for student self-evaluation.  “It is when the individual 
has to take responsibility for deciding what criteria are important to him,” he writes, “what goals 
he has been trying to achieve, and the extent to which he has achieved those goals, that he truly 
learns to take responsibility for himself and his directions.” (142-3).  Without such 
independence, students will be that much less invested in their own learning, and they will be 
that much less successful in accomplishing it.  Without it, students risk attaining, in Blau’s 
(2003) terminology, “unearned interpretations,” and experiencing what Wilhelm, Baker and 
Dube describe as a classroom where “the teacher tells and the student listens, then the student 
tells (or regurgitates information on a written test) and the teacher evaluates.”  Such knowledge, 
complain Wilhelm, Baker and Dube, is “declarative, decontextualized, and inert” (10).   This 
does not mean each student gets to make his or her own curricular choices; but it does mean that 
they must have an active voice in determining how their understanding of the curriculum will be 
assessed. 
Rogers (1969) further bolsters my vision when he writes that the educational system as a 
whole must develop “a climate conducive to personal growth” and “a climate in which 
innovation is not frightening.”  He adds that creative individuals, those open to and accepting of 
change, can only be developed by the creation of “a climate in the system in which the focus is 
not upon teaching, but on the facilitation of self-directed learning” (304, italics in original).  
Rogers (1995) therefore also recommends doing away with “a compartmentalized world,” 
explaining that the successful person of the future strives “for a wholeness of life, with thought, 
feeling, physical energy, psychic energy, healing energy all being integrated in experience” (350 
– 351).    
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Rogers’s ideas are manifest curricularly in Moffett’s (1994) thinking, when Moffett 
argues that educators have begun to realize that “self-containment of subjects is self-defeating.”  
He writes that even  
math and science need the concrete particulars of personal experience and 
purpose, the realism of problems drawn from other subject matter, and the 
working over of mathematical and scientific concepts and procedures within the 
contemporary social contexts that establish their fuller meaning (209). 
Indeed, leaving math and science aside, the connection to “personal experience” is pure 
Rosenblatt; the connection to “purpose” is our concept of relevance. 
 
IX. Connecting to Others 
In addition to pressing for relevance and individual choice, I argue for students to 
understand and fully appreciate the need to connect to others.  For me, a non-negotiable facet of 
what students need to attain as they learn to make wise moral decisions is sensitivity towards the 
thoughts, feelings and ideas of others.  Noddings (1991) writes compellingly of the power of 
what she terms “interpersonal reasoning,” which is the “capacity of moral agents to talk 
appreciatively with each other regardless of fundamental differences” (157).  She lauds this 
quality, explaining that “Interpersonal reasoners build each other’s confidence and self-esteem, 
and they direct their efforts toward strengthening the relation” (162).  Once a student gains 
confidence in his or her own opinion, can ground it in the text (a la Blau), and can have a 
conversation with others, is it not vital that he or she be able to listen to and integrate the ideas 
and opinions of others?   And again, literature is precisely the vehicle to foster such interactions.  
“Literature deals in complexity,” writes Gregory Currie (2013) in the New York Times.  Citing 
Nussbaum, he adds that literature “turns us away from the simple moral rules that so often prove 
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unhelpful when we are confronted with messy real-life decision making, and gets us ready for 
the stormy voyage through the social world that sensitive, discriminating moral agents are 
supposed to undertake.”  With some forethought, a teacher can provide his or her class with 
complex fodder for discussion, and they can arrive together at the interactions that Noddings 
seeks to foster in students. 
Holzer (2016), based on a reading of a Talmudic passage,18 argues for interactive, 
student-to-student “argumentative learning” in the style of the traditional Jewish beit midrash, or 
study hall.  Students, usually in pairs, dissect a text and vociferously argue for the accuracy of 
their individual readings.  The danger in employing such a method is that a student who is skilled 
at argument may become arrogant.  The antidote, and one with which Noddings would agree, is 
what Howard Gardner calls “intrapersonal intelligence – the capacity to detect and access one’s 
own range of emotions, and to label, assess, and use them as behavior guides” (55, italics in 
original).  Noddings further writes that schools could become “places in which teachers and 
students live together, talk to each other, reason together, take delight in each other’s company” 
(169).  As such, schools are unique venues for the type of cross-pollination of ideas that she 
advocates.  And whereas Moffett (1994) advocates for a jettisoning of the curriculum, and 
Wilhelm, Baker and Dube (2001) urge teachers to slow down and do fewer things better, 
Noddings optimistically declares that “when schools focus on what really matters in life, the 
cognitive ends we are now striving toward in such painful and artificial ways will be met as 
natural culminations of the means we have wisely chosen” (169).  In such schools, students 
could and would become (to use Alexander’s phrase) spiritually aware, (to use Hansen’s) open-
                                                          
18 Shabbat 63a. 
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hearted and humane, and would possess Rogers’s quality of “changingness,” to say nothing of 
the Blavian “performative literacy” they would gain. 
 
X. One Further Suggestion 
My own journey in this project, that of mining my own story as a reader and teacher of 
readers, all as a series of data and as sources of wisdom and insight, has been a remarkable and 
enlightening one.  It has allowed me to articulate the balance I have found between my own 
ideological worlds and enabled me to articulate how I have utilized various sources of wisdom 
and insight.  The theory and process of autoethnography have allowed me to triangulate what 
Chang (2008) calls the “external data” alongside my memory’s “internal data” (55).  If such a 
process has been beneficial to me, I must imagine it would help others as well: what if students 
were asked to produce a similar document, albeit on a smaller scale?  What would the process 
and product do for their own sense of becoming readers and of expanding their moral 
sensibilities?  Indeed, as we mentioned earlier, Tappan and Brown (1991) urge precisely such a 
narrative approach to moral education, asking students to write of a moral story that occurred in 
their lives.  This method is effective, they explain, “because when an individual tells a moral 
story about an experience in his life, he must necessarily reflect on that experience…”  Tappan 
and Brown explain that “such reflection also entails learning from the event narrated, in the 
sense that the individual has the opportunity to consider what happened, what he thought, felt, 
and did, and how things turned out” (184, italics in original).   
As we mentioned, Blau (2003) advocates for writing as a learning process to aid students 
to attain “earned interpretations” of texts.  This would ask students to learn something else, 
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something deeper, through their writing. “Authorship not only expresses itself through 
narrative,” write Tappan and Brown, “it also develops through narrative” (182).  What if the text 
about which they write is, like my own preceding work, their own experiences as readers?  One 
can imagine a tremendous impact on such students, on their self-awareness, on their quality of 
Rogerian “changingness.” 
And why limit such an exercise to students?  What if teachers wrote their own 
autoethnographies (again, with adjustments for the scale of the project)?  I would humbly 
suggest beginning such a movement with teachers of literature before taking this idea to a more 
global stage.  My own experience in researching and writing this project has been revelatory – to 
me, if to no one else.  Florio-Ruane (1991) suggests the creation of a bank of “’stories of 
teaching and learning’ in which practitioners play key author roles,” which, as she explains, are 
advantageous for several reasons: 
teachers can add richness and validity to accounts of their work by uncovering 
and sharing their own “implicit theories” about teaching and learning… Second, 
stories are representations of knowledge that do not dodge moral consequences… 
Third, teachers’ stories are a largely untapped source of information about 
teaching and an opportunity for teachers to communicate about their work to 
others (242). 
This has been precisely my experience in narrating the preceding tale of my own moral 
development and my own teaching.  I can personally and passionately attest what benefits such 
an experience has had on one educator; I can only imagine what would happen to the profession 
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